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Introduction
This thesis consists of ﬁve more or less independent papers which look at how insti-
tutions and individual preferences jointly inﬂuence human behavior and thereby de-
termine economic outcomes such as prices and efﬁciency. Whereas institutions are ob-
servable rules, individual preferences are determined by personal characteristics and
are often not directly observable. Institutional settings and preferences have many di-
mensions. This thesis focuses on four dimensions of preferences which are important
for economic transactions: fairness considerations, trust propensities, risk attitudes,
and time preferences. The impact of these preferences are studied in two economically
relevant institutional settings: bargaining and markets.
Theoretical investigation helps to understand the strategic structure of a situation.
By making assumptions about preferences and rationality of actors, the outcomes of
the interaction can be analyzed and predicted. However, preferences often cannot be
directly observed, nor can the rationality of actors. Economic experiments provide
a method with which human behavior can be explored in controlled environments.
Both theory and experiments are complements whose combination provides the ana-
lystwithanimportanttooltounderstandandstudyinteractioninmarkets, bargaining,
and other environments of economic interaction. All the chapters in the thesis are more
or less based on this combinatorial approach:1A theoretical benchmark which controls
1Experiments in this thesis were conducted at the laboratory of Humboldt Universit¨ at zu Berlin,
Berlin, Germany, and CentERdata, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. Financial support by
the German Science Foundation, through National Research Center SFB 373, “Quantiﬁcation and Simu-
lation of Economic Processes,” Humboldt Universit¨ at zu Berlin, CentER and CentERdata, EU–TMR Re-
search Network ENDEAR (FMRX–CT98–0238), and Max–Planck–Institute for Research into Economic
Systems, Jena, Germany, is gratefully acknowledged.
12 Chapter 1. Introduction
for certain preferences is subsequently tested with experimental data. Furthermore,
preferences can be revealed by individual behavior in an experiment and be explained
by the persons’ observable characteristics.
We ﬁrst provide an overview of the preferences under consideration as well as the




Many experiments suggest that bargainers may be concerned with more than just their
own material payoffs in evaluating the outcome of bargaining. The prevalence of equal
splits observed in bargaining experiments suggests that notions of fairness play a role
in economic transactions. Other studies however suggest that seemingly ‘fair’ offers
may be driven by the anticipated reaction of the opponent towards an unfair offer
rather than by the intrinsic motivation to behave in a fair way. Therefore, it may be
that fairness considerations of the person who has to accept or reject an offer, rather
than the person who proposes the offer, determine bargaining outcomes.
A similar impact of fairness considerations in market contexts has been related to
demand withholding of buyers, i.e., rejecting proﬁtable offers, resulting in price de-
creases. Chapters 4 and 6 of the thesis investigate a bilateral monopoly and monopoly
markets with incomplete and complete information about buyers’ valuation for the
product. An interesting result is, that buyers in both markets were willing to accept
prices which grant them only one fourth of their valuation. Compared to results of
bargaining experiments this is only half of the amount responders usually accept.
Chapter3showsthatfairnessprinciplesexplainbehaviorinasequentialbargaining
situation involving risky joint proﬁts.
1.1.2 Risk aversion
Risk neutrality would imply that people are indifferent between a safe option and a
risky option when both yield the same expected payoff. What one actually observes is
that even when the expected payoff of the safe option is slightly lower than the risky
option, individuals prefer the safe option. Behavioral deviations from risk neutralitySection 1.1. Behavior 3
in situations involving risky outcomes led to the incorporation of risk aversion into the
expected utility model. In chapter 3, we analyze a bargaining situation over risky joint
proﬁts and investigate risk aversion of subjects. Even though the theoretic solution
with risk averse agents approximates the experimental outcome on average better than
other theories, only 20% of the observed behavior can actually be explained by risk
aversion. This suggests that even if risk aversion seems to capture average behavior
quite well, a more detailed look reveals that its explanatory power is rather limited.
1.1.3 Impatience
Time preferences play a role when individuals have to trade off current for future con-
sumption. Time preferences paly a role also for self control and commitment problems.
One example of the latter is a durable goods monopoly. A monopolistic seller who
offers a durable good and cannot commit himself to prices in future periods might
suffer from the fact that buyers anticipate future price cuts and delay their purchase.
In chapter 4, we model a bilateral two–period durable goods monopoly market and
investigate how subjects react to induced time preferences. We allow for heterogene-
ity in time preferences, which imposes different degrees of bargaining power to seller
and buyer in the sequential interaction. Our results suggest that subjects anticipate
future proﬁts well and react to short term problems in accordance with the theoretic
prediction.
1.1.4 Trust
Trust and trustworthiness are basic components of human interaction and may depend
on the context in which persons interact. In a bilateral bargaining situation the context
is determined by the information bargaining parties possess: whether they interact
repeatedly, who makes the proposal etc., and might inﬂuence whether one trusts or
not, and whether one reciprocates in a trustworthy way. Trust and trustworthiness
may also depend on own experiences and the socioeconomic background of people
which might explain the variation of trust(worthiness) between people in the same
context. To measure this basic trust(worthiness) propensity is the challenge taken up
in chapter 2.4 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.2 Institutions
The impact of the preferences mentioned above are analyzed in the context of a trust
game, bilateral bargaining, auctions, and markets.
1.2.1 Trust Game and Bargaining
The trust game, also referred to as investment or gift exchange game, represents an
institution in which no formal contracts are possible. The model is set up as follows:
one person can send a certain amount to another person which will be multiplied by
a number greater than one. The other person has the possibility to return money to
the sender but can also take advantage of the situation and keep everything for him-
self. In many interactions individuals cannot rely on complete contracts or enforcing
institutions. In these cases the presence of trust (and trustworthiness) helps to over-
come opportunities to exploit the other party. In many instances, sufﬁcient levels of
trust and trustworthiness improve the odds of completing a transaction, making both
parties better off. The trust game is used in chapter 2 to measure trusting behavior and
trustworthiness.
In chapters 3 and 4, we consider sequential two–period bargaining situations. The
basic bargaining model involves two players who make sequential offers over how
to divide some amount of money. The information structure of these models is par-
ticularly important and is expressed by whether the amount over which to bargain
is known to both or only one party. It differs further in the certainty with which the
amount is realized, how costly a delay for each bargaining party is, and which bargain-
ing party has the opportunity to make an offer. In chapter 3, the amounts to bargain
over are separate by stages but additive and known to both parties which alternate
with their offers, where the amount at the ﬁrst stage is risky. In contrast in chapter 4,
the amount to bargain over is not separable and only known to the person who has
to accept or reject the offer, the costs of delay are private information and may differ
between parties, furthermore, offers are made by one party only.
1.2.2 Markets: One–Sided Auctions and Posted–Offer Markets
Efﬁciency is a main concern in markets that we study. The difference with bargaining
models is that in markets at least one side is characterized by competition. The dis-Section 1.3. Methodology 5
tinctive feature of one–sided auctions and posted–offer markets is their pricing mech-
anism. In auctions the competitive side makes the offer in posted offer markets the
monopoly side.
The institution studied in chapter 4 can also be used to investigate monopoly mar-
kets with privately known time preferences. The downward sloping demand curve
is implemented by a single buyer with a privately known valuation randomly drawn
from a commonly known uniform distribution.
In chapter 5, we focus on one–sided auctions (also known as procurement auctions)
in which competition is on the sellers’ side and the demand side is represented by a
single buyer. Economically procurement auctions play an important role in the ex-
change of products. For instance, governments and public services in Germany are
forced by law to call openly for tender bids to circumvent inefﬁcient usage of taxes.
The value of goods exchanged each year by public procurement auctions in Germany
is approximately 250 billion Euro. We are interested in efﬁciency and proﬁtability for
the buyer in two different procurement auctions allowing for quality differences across
products.
In chapter 6 we study two posted price monopoly markets with and without copy
protection for the information goods on the market.
1.3 Methodology
This thesis looks into the interplay between preferences and institutions, and their im-
pact on bargaining and pricing by confronting theoretical benchmarks with actual hu-
man behavior. Choice data can be collected in three different ways: real life data, sur-
vey data, or experimental data. Information of public procurement procedures which
are made publicly available to ensure monitoring and efﬁcient tax usage, is an example
of real life data. Information about bargaining is another example of publicly accessi-
ble real life data. One can, for instance, follow negotiations between employers and
unions in the media. The advantage of real life data is that one captures actual be-
havior in those institutions. The drawback of this kind of data is that many variables
of interest, such as costs for goods in the procurement auction or time preferences in
bargaining situations, cannot be observed directly. In combination with survey data
one could substitute most of the missing variables of interest by asking directly the
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real production costs. In bargaining environments agents would have to reveal their
preferences. In situations where private knowledge about own preferences or the cost
structure leads to advantages in the bargaining or market situation, conducting ques-
tionnaires to collect data about these information is difﬁcult. Many agents participat-
ing in bargaining or procurement auctions might be very reluctant to disclose their
information due to strategic considerations.
This thesis follows the third approach and uses experimental data. The main ad-
vantage of economic experiments is that human decisions with real monetary conse-
quences can be monitored in an environment under the experimenter’s control. This
allows isolation of speciﬁc aspects of complex real world situations, and at the same
time observation of consequential rather than hypothetical choices. Predictions and
assumptions usually made by theoretical models can thereby be tested, extended, and
reﬁned. Parametrization of experiments is usually chosen in a convenient way which
allows either to distinguish theories or to be close to real life settings of the amounts
to win or loose. In chapter 3 we present an experiment in which parameters were
calibrated by real life data from the movie business industry.
Typically, experiments are conducted in a computer laboratory located at the re-
searcher’s university campus with a quite homogeneous sample of student subjects.
The advantage of using students as subjects is that they are close to the laboratory and
that their opportunity costs are rather low which requires less compensation. Homo-
geneous samples can successfully be used when background information is not the
main interest of the study. This is the case in most chapters of this book. If one, how-
ever, is interested in certain questions where background characteristics may have an
important inﬂuence on behavior, one might expect that results and conclusions drawn
from student samples are not representative for the population at large. As we show
in chapter 2 data panels open up the possibility to combine the strength of survey
and experimental analysis. In this chapter members of a data panel participated in an
experiment in order to investigate the determinants of trust and trustworthiness in a
wide population sample. Data panels offer new opportunities to conduct an exper-
iment with heterogeneous subject pools and use the information about participants’
background characteristics when interpreting behavior. This combination is a promis-
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1.4 Summary of the different chapters
Chapter 2 combines an economic experiment with survey data to investigate deter-
minants of trust and trustworthiness in the Dutch society. We contrast the inferences
which can be made on the trust propensity using stated and revealed measures and we
test for participation bias in our experiment. We ﬁnd that middle aged and educated
individuals trust relatively more but are relatively less trustworthy. The effect of age
and religion on trust is shown to depend heavily on whether experimental or survey
trust measures are used. We ﬁnd no evidence of participation bias in any experimental
decisions.
Chapter 3 investigates theoretically and experimentally sequential bargaining in
risky joint ventures with additive stakes and alternating offers. Our example is the
production of a movie that may give rise to a sequel, so actors and producers negotiate
sequentially. To approximate the risk in real environments we calibrate parameters of
the experiment with empirical data from the movie industry. We compare the predic-
tions of alternative theoretical approaches based on different assumptions about the
preferences of the bargaining parties. The game theoretic prediction (assuming risk
averse actors) seems to explain the aggregate data best. Elicitation of individual risk
parameters discloses inconsistencies with the theoretic assumptions questioning the
predictive power of risk aversion. Equity theory seems to be a better explanation of
the observed behavior. Bargaining parties seem to share risk in the sense that if only
one party bears the risk the other party is willing to accept a lower share of the pie if
(s)he is compensated later in case of a success.
In chapter 4, we model a durable monopoly market with privately known time
preferences. The downward sloping demand curve is implemented by a single buyer
with a privately known valuation randomly drawn from a commonly known uniform
distribution. Therefore, the model under consideration is analogue to a two–period
sequential bilateral bargaining game with private information about the costs of delay
and asymmetric information about the amount to bargain over. We derive the closed–
form solution and compare it to the experimentally observed behavior. Our results
suggest that subjects anticipate future proﬁts well and react to short term problems in
accordance with the theoretic prediction.
Chapter 5 experimentally examines the efﬁciency and proﬁtability for the buyer
in two different procurement auctions allowing for quality differences across prod-
ucts. We compare the result of one treatment with more competition on the sellers’8 Chapter 1. Introduction
side (vector auction) to another treatment (half auction), reﬂecting actual procurement
practice, namely: To organize an auction for the cheaper variant and then to bargain
with the contractor about the additional cost of the higher quality variant. Our main
hypothesis, that buyers will be better off when using the vector auction instead of the
half auction, is conﬁrmed in spite of its worst–case scenario (minimal competition by
just having two potential sellers and ultimatum power of the buyer in the half auction).
Chapter 6 studies to what extent outcomes of information good markets are inﬂu-
enced by institutional settings. We ask, how products which are easy to replicate and
redistribute (music, software etc.) are sold in a monopolistic market with and without
copy protection. The implications of a theoretical model are compared to the outcome
of an economic experiment. We observe demand withholding, i.e., buyers reject prof-
itable offers. As a result of which prices are lower than predicted. Demand withhold-
ing depends on the institutional setting and results in welfare implications which are
different than theoretically predicted.Chapter 2
On Representative Trust
2.1 Introduction
It is increasingly argued that a nation’s social capital can inﬂuence its economic per-
formance. Although there is an ongoing debate over what constitutes social capital
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Durlauf 2002), there seems to be a consensus that both aver-
age societal trust and trustworthiness are two important components. The transactions
cost paradigm remains the traditional way of thinking about the mechanism by which
both these components of social capital affect economic performance. When societal
trust and trustworthiness levels are high, transactions costs are low which makes or-
ganizations and governments more efﬁcient which ultimately leads to better economic
performance.
The research on social capital started with the inﬂuential work of Putnam (1993)
who found a strong correlation between measures of civic engagement and govern-
ment quality across regions in Italy. The association of social capital with growth
started with the work of Knack and Keefer (1997), and Zak and Knack (2001) who
ﬁnd that a one–standard deviation increase in the World–Value Survey (WVS) trust
index increases economic growth by more than one–half of a standard deviation. La
Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) ﬁnd that across countries, a one–standard
deviation increase in the same measure of trust increases judicial efﬁciency by 0.7 of a
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standard deviation and reduces government corruption by 0.3 of a standard deviation.
These empirical facts rest on the WVS trust index constructed by drawing in each par-
ticipating country a random sample of participants who are asked to answer, amongst
others, the following question
WVS trust question Generallyspeakingwouldyousaythatmostpeoplecanbetrusted
or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
The WVS reports for each country the percentage of responders who indicated that
”Most people can be trusted”.
Because of the strong correlation between measures of social capital and economic
growth, and since age and income distributions of many Western societies are pre-
dicted to evolve over time in very alarming ways (Gruber and Wise, 2001; Gottschalk
and Smeeding, 1997), it becomes relevant for policy makers to investigate how average
trust and trustworthiness in their population are shifted as a result of changes in age,
education, income, and past life experiences of individuals. To perform these measure-
ments, two essential features must be combined: 1) to have a random sample drawn
from a country’s population, and 2) being able to measure trust and trustworthiness
with little error. The motivation for the ﬁrst condition follows from the law of large
numbers, whereas sample average trust and trustworthiness are consistent estimates
of their population counterparts. The second requirement follows from the fact that
the estimated parameters we make inferences on will, in general, be biased if trust and
trustworthiness are measured with error (Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz, 2001).
The empirical literature has up to now been unable to meet both requirements si-
multaneously. The empirical methods employed so far to analyze individual trust are
survey questionnaires and economic experiments. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) use
answers to the WVS trust question to investigate determinants of trust in the United
States. The main advantage of their approach is that it allows to make population in-
ferences by observing the behavior of a randomly drawn sample of individuals from
that population. The main drawback is that researchers run the risk of collecting an-
swers to a vague and hypothetical question which can create a discrepancy between
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may be attributed to differences in interpreting who compromises ”most people”, dif-
ferences in what is meant to trust someone etc. Moreover, variations in response may
also arise because individuals do not answer truthfully to the question.
Economic experiments have the virtue of countering the effects associated with sur-
vey data by observing the actual behavior of individuals placed in a context which is
under experimental control. These experiments offer an attractive alternative to sur-
veys, given one can design an experiment which captures the essential features of trust
and trustworthiness which are of interest. The seminal experiment of Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe (1995) (hereafter BDMc) remains today the main experimental design
used to test for the presence of trust and trustworthiness (more details on the game
are given later). The general results of the BDMc game are that people place trust in
others, but it is ambiguous whether or not this trust pays. These results have since
been shown to be robust to several framing effects (Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing,
2000) and role reversals (Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen, 2003). The main drawback
of these types of experiments is that subjects are generally drawn from homogenous
pools of university students. These subjects lack the required variation in background
characteristics to measure how these variables inﬂuence trust and trustworthiness.
The analysis of determinants of trustworthiness is even less documented than trust
and relies mostly on analyzing responders’ behavior in trust games such as the BDMc
game. Hence, this form of analysis suffers from the same drawbacks outlined above.
Our little knowledge of the determinants of trustworthiness at the population level is
source of concern as recent research has argued that trustworthiness could be ”the”
economically relevant component of social capital to understand the process of eco-
nomic development (Francois and Zabojnik, 2002).
This chapter makes three important contributions. First, we combine the strengths
of survey and experimental methods in a straightforward way by having a random
sample of the Dutch population play a computerized version of the BDMc trust game.
This allows us to touch on several related issues. First and foremost, we add to the
scarce body of knowledge on determinants of trust and trustworthiness by estimating
age, education, andotherlifeexperienceeffectsfromexperimentaltrustresponses. The
key results are that the age and education level of subjects inﬂuence trust and trustwor-
thiness in very different ways. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that there is an inverted U shape
relation between trust and education, and trust and age, while both relationships are
U shaped with respect to trustworthiness. The later ﬁnding contrasts with some of the12 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
existing relationships found in the social capital literature. The second advantage of
combining survey and experimental methods is that we are able to test the assump-
tion of parallelism between the lab and the ﬁeld. Up till now, this assumption has
generally been tested with newspaper experiments (e.g., see Bosch–Dom` enech, Mon-
talvo, Nagel, and Satorra (2002) for a survey of newspaper experiments) and internet
experiments (e.g., Lucking–Reiley, 1999). Because newspaper readers or internet users
are not generally representative of a nation’s population, these mediums prevent pop-
ulation inferences which are the primary concern of this chapter. Three noteworthy
experiments have recently been run with representative samples. Harrison, Lau, and
Williams (2002) use a random sample of the Danish population to investigate the het-
erogeneity in individual discount rates. Hey (2002) used the CentERpanel of Tilburg
University (more on this panel later on) to have a random sample of the Dutch pop-
ulation play an experiment on decision making under risk and uncertainty. Fehr, Fis-
chbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2002) report about a ”preliminary analy-
sis” (p. 529) of a “ﬁrst implementation” (p. 528) of an interview based trust game with
the German Socio–Economic Panel.
The second contribution of the chapter builds on the seminal work of Glaeser, Laib-
son, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) (hereafter GLSS) who, among other things, inval-
idate the use of survey trust measures on the basis that they do not predict well trust
responses in the lab. We show that the predictive power of survey trust is strongly
related to the sample used and the experimental design. The immediate consequence
of this is that experimenters can inﬂuence the predictive power of survey trust by ap-
propriately choosing subjects and experimental designs. This leads us to conclude that
the predictive power of survey trust questions is insufﬁcient to validate or invalidate
their use. We propose a new approach to compare both trust measures, which consists
of testing whether survey and experimental approaches are equally informative on the
determinants of trust. Our evidence shows that the effect of some background charac-
teristics, especially religion and education, can change dramatically when using stated
rather than experimental trust responses.
Finally, by giving our subjects the choice to participate and by observing the char-
acteristics of those who refuse to do so, we are in the unique position to test for partici-
pation bias in our experiment. If participants have for example above average taste for
gambling and risk, or higher cognitive abilities than non–participants, and these un-
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a participation bias will be present. Because experiments typically do not observe
non–participants, tests of participation bias in experiments are very limited. Eckel
and Grossman (2000) ﬁnd some evidence on the presence of participation bias in a
classroom experiment by comparing responses of student volunteers and “pseudo”–
volunteers. Their results are speciﬁc to the game they use (a dictator game) and hold
only for student populations. In this chapter we provide the ﬁrst full ﬂedge test of
participation bias in experimental economics. We do not ﬁnd any evidence suggesting
that the trust and trustworthiness behavior of participants in our experiment differ in
any way from that of randomly selected subjects.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
design of the experiment, the experimental procedure, and our sample. Section 2.3
discusses the empirical results on trust. Findings on trustworthiness are presented in
section 2.4. Section 2.5 reports results for participation bias while section 2.6 discusses
and concludes.
2.2 The Experimental Design and the Sample
The recruitment of our subjects was made by CentERdata, the survey research insti-
tute of Tilburg University in the Netherlands. The main activity of CentERdata is to
manage and carry out panel surveys through a telepanel: the CentERpanel (hereafter
CP), consisting of approximately 2000 representative Dutch households. Every Fri-
day, CP’s household members receive a questionnaire which they are asked to ﬁll in
at any time between Friday and Tuesday of the following week. This questionnaire is
ﬁlled at home either on a computer or on a television set which is connected to a set–
up box linking the household to the CentERdata server. In order to keep the sample
representative of the Dutch population, low income households without a computer
or a television set are given the necessary equipment in order to complete the weekly
questionnaire.1
There are many reasons why the CP is an attractive medium to conduct experi-
ments. First, it gives us access to a representative sample of a population, which is
the key feature of this study. Second, because participants answer questions on a com-
puter or a television set, we are able to replicate as closely as possible the environment
of a laboratory experiment, which simpliﬁes comparisons of our results with those of
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experiment is double blind as participants were told that they will be anonymously
matched and that their identities would not be revealed to the experimenters. Finally,
as CentERdata reimburses the weekly telephone costs for answering the questionnaire
by crediting CentERpoints (1 CentERpoint = 0.01 Euro) to their private bank accounts
fourtimesayear, ourparticipantsarealreadyfamiliartopaymentinﬁctitiouscurrency.
This allows us to use CentERpoints as the experimental currency unit and reimburse
our participants in a very convenient way.
Our design closely follows BDMc.2 A sender3 S and a responder R were both en-
dowed with 500 CentERpoints. S could send money to R from his endowment. We
discretized the choice set of S to 11 amounts yE 2 f0,50,...,450,500g. The amount S
sent was doubled by the experimenters and added to R’s endowment. We measured
responses using the strategy method by which R was asked to return an amount to S,
contingent on each of the 11 possible amounts he might receive from S. The response
which corresponded to the actual decision of S was chosen to be the effective action
and determined the payoff of both participants. After all participants made their de-
cisions, S and R players were randomly matched and payoffs were computed based
on the decisions of the pair. The ﬁnal payoffs were computed as follows: S received
the initial 500 CentERpoints reduced by the amount sent yE plus the amount received
from R, while R received his initial endowment of 500 CentERpoints, the amount sent
by S multiplied by 2 minus the amount returned to S.
The strategy method was chosen to overcome the difﬁculty of having CP members
play together in real time. This method has several additional advantages. First, it
facilitates data acquisition as the complete strategy plan for all 11 possible amounts
received is elicited. Second, as our game may seem complex to some subjects, the
strategy method requires that people thoroughly familiarize themselves with the ram-
iﬁcations of all choices, so that we do not retrieve data from uninformed subjects.4
Undertheassumptionthatbothplayersmaximizetheirmonetarypayoffs, theNash
equilibrium of the game is for S to send nothing to R, as R’s dominant strategy is to re-
turn nothing to S. Hence, observing increasing positive amounts sent is interpreted as
evidencethatpeopleincreasinglytrustothers. Likewise, observingincreasingamounts
returned is taken as evidence of the existence of increasing trustworthiness. It is im-
portant to stress that repeated game effects, retaliation strategies, and game experience
effects are deliberately excluded by our experimental design. Thus, one can think of
the current design as measuring the basic trust propensity of an individual at a givenSection 2.2. Experiment 15
point in time.5
S and R were additionally asked to state their beliefs about their partners’ action.
These questions were asked after both players made their decisions in order to cir-
cumvent the possibility that belief elicitation induces non–cooperative behavior when
asked before the play of the game (Croson, 2000). We elicit senders’ beliefs with two
questions. The ﬁrst question asks to state how much they think R will return to them.
The second question asks them to state what they think the average S player will send.
The latter question is intended to capture behavior directed towards some social norm.
Responders on the other hand simply had to state how much units they thought of re-
ceiving from senders. This concluded the experimental part of the session.
All players were then asked to answer two survey questions. The ﬁrst question
asked players to state their average experience with trust
Lifetime trust experience question In the past, when you trusted someone, was your
trust usually rewarded or usually exploited?
(Always rewarded) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 (Always exploited).
This question will be used to test for the presence of state dependent behavior
whereby differences in past experiences with trust may lead to different experimen-
tal decisions.
The second question was the WVS trust question presented in the introduction.
This question will allow us to compare the inferences on trust which can be made us-
ing stated and revealed decisions. Contrary to GLSS, our subjects answered the WVS
trust question after having made their experimental decisions. This has the beneﬁt of
not framing the experimental decision as one involving trust. The disadvantage is that
answers to the WVS trust question may be inﬂuenced by the experimental decisions
which were made before, which would complicate the comparisons of our experimen-
tal and survey trust measures. In the next section, we develop a simple economet-
ric model which allows to test for the presence of misreported answers to the WVS
trust question, and examines to which extent misreporting was inﬂuenced by the ex-
perimental decision. As will be shown, we do not ﬁnd evidence suggesting that our
sequence of tasks inﬂuenced answers to the WVS question.
Two weeks after the experiment, each participant received feedback information
on the outcome of the game and their ﬁnal payoff which was later credited to their
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and the 36th weeks of the calendar year 2002. Individuals contacted had to read an
opening screen informing them that they were selected to participate in an experiment
conducted jointly by a team of university researchers. A detailed description of the
gamefollowedwiththemodeofpayments. Eachpersonwasinformedthatconditional
on their participation, they would be randomly matched to one of the roles. The role
was revealed to panel members once they had agreed to participate. We contacted 541
panel members from which 42 declined to participate.6 Of the 499 panel members who
completed the experiment, 276 were S players and 223 were R players.
Table 2.1 gives the description of the variables and descriptive statistics of the 541
household members contacted for senders, receivers and non–participants. The means
of most variables are relatively identical across non–participants, senders, and respon-
ders. 63.7% of the persons contacted were heads of households and most players either
had a secondary or vocational training degree. Catholics and protestants are the two
most important religious communities in the sample and their relative weights in the
three participation categories are very similar. Two notable differences across the three
groups concern work propensity and age. Non–participants are on average 10 years
older than both senders and responders. This age effect is also reﬂected in a higher
labor market retirement frequency and lower labor work participation.
Despite all the advantages of using the CP, one limitation is that panel members
were not constrained to complete the experiment in a limited amount of time, giving
them the opportunity to seek advice in order to make more informed choices. As a
result, a high game time would be an indication of collective decision making. Cen-
tERdata keeps track of the time taken to complete the questionnaires from the time
subjects log in the CentERdata network. Table 2.1 also displays some statistics on
completion times for both types of players and non–participants. As expected, non–
participants have the lowest participation time in the experiment, with a median time
slightly greater than a minute. The median time taken by R players is greater than that
by S players, a result primarily due to the fact that R players made their decisions us-
ing the time–intensive strategy method. Since the majority of subjects took less than 10
minutes to complete the experiment, it seems unlikely that collective decision making
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2.3 Results on Trust
The distribution of amounts sent in the experiment is shown in ﬁgure 2.1. The two
distinctive features of this distribution are 1) the majority of subjects send positive
amounts 2) the distribution is heavily skewed to the left, with a mode at 5, the equal
split category. The shape of this distribution is familiar to that usually found in lab–
experiments with student samples (BDMc; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing, 2000) but
differs greatly from that of GLSS, which was heavily skewed to the right, with most
subjects sending the maximal possible amount. We will try to reconcile the differences
between GLSS and our data below.
We assume that senders have a continuous unobserved latent trust propensity T¤
i .
This propensity is heterogeneously distributed in the population according to
T¤
i = xt0
i b + #t
i (2.1)
where xt
i is a vector of observed characteristics of sender i, b is a vector of unknown
slope parameters, and #i is a random term capturing unobserved heterogeneity across
individuals. Our experimental trust measure yE
i is ordinal and discrete. The ordered
probit model is adequate to analyze this type of data (Maddala, 1983). However, the
ordered probit model requires a sufﬁcient amount of observations in each discrete cat-
egory to estimate nuisance threshold parameters. As can be seen from ﬁgure 2.1, cat-
egories 300 to 450 CentERpoints have very little observations. In our empirical ap-
plication, we merge these categories and estimate an ordered probit model with eight
categories.
The ﬁrst 2 speciﬁcations of table 2.2 present ordered probit regressions. The ﬁrst
speciﬁcation uses as regressors a standard set of background characteristics supple-
mented by reported life experience with trust (TRUSTEXP), subjects’ beliefs about the
amount they expect to be returned to them (STHINK), and the average amount they
expect other senders will send (SMEANS). The second speciﬁcation omits beliefs.7
In both speciﬁcations, we do not ﬁnd gender (GENDER) of subjects to inﬂuence
trust. This contrasts with the earlier ﬁndings in the social capital literature which
showed that women are less involved in organizations (Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacer-
dote, 2002) and that women trust less than men (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). We
also ﬁnd that family size (HSIZE), whether an individual is retired from the labor force
(RETIRED) or is not working (WORK) do not correlate with trust.
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tions. Both age parameters are signiﬁcant. Based on speciﬁcation 1 and holding other
factors constant, trust is seen to increase until the age of 30, beyond which it starts
to decline. This reconﬁrms the inverted–U shape pattern usually found in the social
capital literature (Putnam, 2000; Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002) although those
studies report that social capital reaches a high at 45 years of age. Education also has
an inverted–U proﬁle. We ﬁnd that individuals with secondary and technical training
are more likely to trust than subjects with either low education levels (the omitted cat-
egory) and subjects with university degrees. Comparisons of speciﬁcation 1 with spec-
iﬁcation 2 show that the education relationship is also robust to inclusions of beliefs.
Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) ﬁnd a positive relation between education and
organizational membership but do not report results which would indicate the pres-
ence of non–linearities. Subjects’ religious beliefs were classiﬁed in three categories,
protestants, catholics, and atheists. We ﬁnd no evidence that either catholics or protes-
tants trust differently than atheists (the omitted category), which squares with results
found by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).
Both belief variables, STHINK and SMEANS, have positive effects on trust and are
highly signiﬁcant. These results indicate that senders who expected to receive more
sent more, and senders who thought other senders would send more increased their
amount sent. The former result captures expectations of the subjects.8 The latter re-
sult can be interpreted as a social norm as individuals tend to partly emulate what
they expect others to do. In order to asses the contribution of beliefs to the empirical
model, we computed a likelihood–ratio test comparing speciﬁcations 1 and 2. The test
value of 232.12 (5% c2 critical value of 5.99) indicates that apart from being statistically
signiﬁcant, beliefs substantially improve the predictive ﬁt of the model.
Finally, we asked subjects to report their lifetime experience with trust (TRUST-
EXP).Thiswasdonetoinvestigatewhetheraformofstatedependanceexisted, whereas
an individual who is dissatisﬁed with his experiences with trust is less likely to trust
in the experiment.9 Our results show that the state of trust individuals perceive them-
selves to be in does not signiﬁcantly correlate with experimental trust.
2.3.1 Comparing Experimental and Survey Trust Measures
In this section, we sequentially address the following questions: 1) Do answers to the
WVS trust question predict well experimental trust? 2) Do survey and experimental
trust measures provide the same information on the determinants of trust? It is impor-Section 2.3. Results: Trust 19
tant to stress that both questions are complementary. The ﬁrst question is relevant if
we are interested in predicting experimental trust responses. However, it leaves open
the reasons of what drives the possible correlation between both variables. The second
question asks whether we can extract the same information from both set of measures.
Prediction
ThequestionofwhetherornotanswerstotheWVStrustquestionpredictexperimental
trust has been addressed by GLSS. Running a linear regression of experimental trust
of answers to the WVS trust question and a set of covariates, they ﬁnd that answers
to the WVS do not signiﬁcantly explain their experimental trust outcomes. The main
explanations given for this result are that the WVS question is vague, hypothetical, and
likely to be misreported. To investigate which of these explanations is more relevant,
weﬁrstfollowGLSSbyaddinganswerstotheWVStrustquestion(WVS)asaregressor
in our experimental trust equation. This corresponds to speciﬁcation 3 of table 2.2.
Contrary to GLSS, we ﬁnd that answers to the WVS trust question do signiﬁcantly
explain experimental trust. Furthermore, all other parameter estimates of the model
are robust to the inclusion of this variable.
How can we rationalize the ﬁnding that answers to the WVS trust question pre-
dicts well our experimental trust and not that of GLSS? In our view, the two elements
explaining the differences between both studies are the amount of background infor-
mation on subjects which is available, and differences in experimental designs. The
role of each of these factors can be better understood by analyzing the following sys-
tem of linear equations 10
yE
i = xt0





i bWVS + #WVS
i (2.3)
Equation (2.2) is the linear version of equation (2.1), where yWVS
i denotes answers to
the WVS question, #E
i captures the unobserved determinants of experimental trust and
x measures the predictive power of answers to the survey trust question. The second
equation relates answers to the WVS trust question to xt
i and an unobserved compo-
nent #WVS
i . It is important to point out that the result which we present below will hold
in general for any other measure or linear combination of survey trust and social cap-




i bE+ + x#WVS
i + #E
i (2.4)
where bE+ = bE + xbWVS. From equation (2.4) we see that the value of x is iden-
tiﬁed from the variation between yE
i and #WVS
i . Partialling out the covariates xt
i, it is
straightforward to show that for the linear model, the probability limit of the estimated
predictive effect b x is



































are the variances of #E
i and #WVS









denotes the correlation between both unobserved components for a
given set of covariates.
The impact of the amount of background information available and the experimen-
tal design on the estimated predictive power of survey trust measures emerge from
equation (2.5). First, the amount of information on the characteristics of subjects which
is available to experimenters will play an important role, as any omitted character-
istics remotely correlated with survey and experimental trust will be captured by #E
i
and #WVS








will be. It is important to note that a stronger correlation will amplify













. One such omitted factor is subjects’ history of traumatic
experiences which has been shown to be correlated with trust (Alesina and La Fererra,
2002), but which is not observed by GLSS nor the present study. We investigated the
amount of correlation between #E
i and #WVS
i in our data by jointly estimating equations
(2.2) and (2.3), conditioning on the set of background characteristics corresponding to








niﬁcant at the 1% level. To get an idea of the impact an omitted variable can have on the
estimated correlation between unobserved components, we removed lifetime experi-
ence with trust (TRUSTEXP) from the list of regressors. As conjectured, the estimated
correlation increased from 14.8% to 17.28%.12
Second, differences in experimental design will directly inﬂuence the predictive
power of survey trust measures via x, the common component between both trust






, the variance of the experimental design. The common
element shared by two trust measures x is expected to be higher when both measuresSection 2.3. Results: Trust 21
are tailored to capture the same type of trust. The WVS question explicitly elicits trust
towards strangers. In our experiment, senders and receivers were strangers as their
identities were never disclosed to the other party. On the other hand, subjects in GLSS
were not strangers, as their identity was deliberately revealed amongst subject pairs
in order to investigate the role of social connections.13 We suspect that the fact that
subjects knew each other served as a behavioral discipline device, with subjects acting
more kindly than they would if paired against strangers. This may well account for
the high concentration of offers around the maximal amount sent reported by GLSS.
Because our experimental design makes us more likely to capture WVS type trust than
the experimental design of GLSS, we expect x to be relatively higher in our experi-
ment. Finally, if whether subjects knew each other or not inﬂuences the distribution







GLSS show that the unconditional variance in amounts sent is low, with 71% of their
senders sending the maximal amount. In our experiment, the variance in the amount
sent is much more dispersed which, from (2.5), implies that we should indeed expect
higher values of b x.14
The framework above demonstrates that the predictive power of survey trust mea-
sures is intimately linked to the information experimenters posses on their subjects,
and the choice of the experimental design. Because most of the factors are to some
extent under the experimenters’ control, prediction is not a suitable basis to compare
experimental and survey trust. As the relevant policy exercise concerns measuring
the effect of changes in the background characteristics on trust and trustworthiness, it
seems more interesting to compare both measures on the basis of whether or not they
carry the same information on the determinants of trust. This is something on which
prediction has little to say.
Informational Content
Measuring trust and trustworthiness using experiments is difﬁcult when the target
groupisanation’spopulation. Amoreaccessiblealternativeconsistsofsurveys, which
are easily found for a handful of countries. The methodological question is whether
or not the effects of background characteristics on trust can be measured equally well
using either experimental or survey data. If the effects measured were the same, the
relative accessibility of survey measures would weaken the need for conducting exper-
iments with representative samples.22 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
By observing subjects’ decisions in the trust game and their answers to the WVS
trust question, we are in the unique position to compare how different the inferences
on the determinants of trust can be when researchers use a popular survey question
rather than experimental methods to measure trust. Speciﬁcation 4 in table 2.2 reports
results from a probit regression of the answers of our senders to the WVS trust question
on their background characteristics. The differences with the experimental estimates
are quite remarkable. We ﬁnd that catholics and protestants trust others less than in-
dividuals without religious beliefs. This is in sharp contrast to the results from the
experimental data where religious effects were totally absent. The second major differ-
ence concerns the education pattern. We do not ﬁnd any effect of education on survey
trust while we have found that a signiﬁcant inverted–U relationship related experi-
mental trust to education. Another notable difference is the effect of reported lifetime
experience on trust. The effect is positive and signiﬁcant when using the survey trust
measure while it has an insigniﬁcant impact on experimental trust.
Despite these differences, there are some notable similarities. The inverted–U shape
effect of age on trust remains when using survey trust. The number of children, sub-
jects income, gender, and work status also remain insigniﬁcant using the survey mea-
sure.
To test whether the differences across measures signiﬁcantly outweigh the similar-
ities, we compare all effects simultaneously. In appendix 2.A.1, we propose a simple
minimum distance test which compares the difference between all parameter estimates
of the probit model and the ordered probit model. We computed the test statistic based
on speciﬁcations 2 and 4 of table 2.2. The value of the test is 21.78, signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level. This indicates that the differences driven by the changes in the re-
ligious and education effects are strong enough to reject the null hypothesis that the
informational content of both trust measures is identical.
2.3.2 Explaining Differences between both Measures
The preceding section has shown that effects of background characteristics on trust are
not robust to the type of measure used. We already mentioned that these differences
can be attributed to the fact that the WVS question is vague and hypothetical or that
it is misreported at the individual level. Recent developments in econometrics give
us ways to test and control for misreporting of a discrete endogenous variable. If the
difference between both experimental and survey trust measures are entirely due toSection 2.3. Results: Trust 23
misreporting, there is scope for using the WVS question and appropriately correct for
misreporting. Furthermore, because our senders answered the survey question after
having played the trust game, there is the possibility that senders may have given
answers to the WVS question which looked coherent with their play in the game. This
would add to the amount of misreporting in our answers to the WVS question. This






as the probability that a subject answers 1 (“YES”) to the WVS
trust question when his truthful answer would be 0 (“NO”). This event occurs when,
for example, generous senders are more inclined to state that they trust others rather






ity that subject answers 0 (“NO”) to the WVS trust question when his truthful answer
would be 1 (“YES”). This probability captures events such as senders who are more
likely to state that they do not trust others when they would have answered the op-
posite, had they been truthful. We allow for the fact that the amount of misreporting
may depend on the experimental decision yE




















































are unknown parameters to be estimated. Some special cases
are of interest. If q10
1 = q01
1 = 0 and the constant terms q10
0 and q01
0 are large, misre-
porting is random in the population of senders and is not affected by the preceding
experiment. If in addition q10
0 and q01
0 are small, the misreporting probabilities are
small indicating that senders truthfully answer the WVS question. Incorporation of
these probabilities in a likelihood equation is a straightforward application of the re-
sults of Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott–Morton (1998) and can be found in appendix
2.A.2 of this chapter.
Speciﬁcation 5 of table 2.2 presents regression results for the probit model with mis-
reporting. Both q10
1 and q01
1 associated with senders’ experimental decisions yE
i are not
signiﬁcantly different from zero, indicating that the experimental decision did not lead
senders to systematically misreport their true answer to the WVS trust question. To test
for overall misreporting, we computed a log–likelihood ratio test comparing the probit
model with and without misreporting (speciﬁcations 4 and 5).15 The test value of 5.3824 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
with 10% critical value of 7.02 does not reject the null hypothesis of no misreporting.
Both sets of results suggest that senders in our experiment truthfully answered the
WVS trust question, which means that allowing for the possibility that subjects misre-
port their answers is not sufﬁcient to reconcile both measures. This suggests that the
WVS trust question captures a notion of trust which differs from the notion of trust
captured in our economic experiment.
2.4 Results on Trustworthiness
WefollowGLSSandmeasuretrustworthinessasthereturnratio, deﬁnedastheamount
returned divided by the amount available to return. In our experiment, the available
amount to return equals the amount received multiplied by two, plus the experimen-
tal endowment of 500 CentERpoints. Responders were asked to play the strategy
method by which they decide how much they will give back for each of the 11 possible
amounts they can receive from the sender. This implies that we observe a sequence
©
yR
a 2 [0,1]ja 2 f0,50,...,500g
ª
for each responder, where yR
a denotes the return ratio
when receiving a CentERpoints from the sender. The main advantage of the return ra-
tio is that it is automatically scaled, which controls for the fact that receivers can send
more simply because the total available amount increases with a. Figure 2.2 shows a
boxplot of the return ratio for all 11 possible amounts. The thick line inside each box
represents the median, the top and bottom of the boxes represent the 75th and 25th
percentiles while the top and lower whiskers represent respectively the maximal and
minimal values of the distribution.16 The two important features of this ﬁgure are that
the ratio 1) monotonically increases and is concave in the amounts received, 2) a sig-
niﬁcant fraction of the responders return nothing (especially in low categories) while
practically no responder returns the entire possible amount.
Did it pay to trust? Figure 2.3 presents density estimates of senders returns of
investments in trust.17 Each line represents the estimated distribution of returns for
a given number of CentERpoints sent. If responders return to senders exactly what
they sent, the return on investment is 0. If responders do not return anything to the
senders, the return is -1. Apart from the distribution of returns when 50 CentERpoints
are sent, all distributions have roughly the same shape. The common ﬁnding in labo-
ratory trust experiments is that trust barely pays, as responders return to senders what
they have sent (Camerer, 2003). Our results reconﬁrm these ﬁndings. We ﬁnd that theSection 2.4. Results: Trustworthiness 25
median return on investment is slightly above 0 for every amount sent. Furthermore,
the probability of getting nothing back from a receiver (a return ratio of -1) is not zero.
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ai > 0 (2.7)
= 0 if y¤R
ai · 0 (2.8)
Equation (2.6) describes the unconstrained trustworthiness propensity of responders.
This propensity is modelled as depending on a vector of background characteristics
xr
i, an unobservable component #r
i, and a vector of unknown population parameters h.
The quadratic form in a is added to capture the increasing monotonicity in amounts
returned observed in the data.18 Equations (2.7) and (2.8) describe the censoring rule
which allows responders with extremely low trustworthiness propensities to return
nothing with positive probability.
The estimation results are presented in table 2.3. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes
standard background characteristics of the responder, reported trust experience, their
beliefs about what they expect to receive from the sender (RTHINK),19 and responders’
answers to the WVS trust question. The second speciﬁcation removes the WVS trust
answers while the third speciﬁcation adds answers to the trust question and respon-
ders’ beliefs. We compare the ﬁrst three speciﬁcations using log–likelihood ratio tests.
The extended speciﬁcation which includes interaction terms is clearly preferred to the
ﬁrst two speciﬁcations.20 Accordingly, our analysis below will focus on the results of
the extended speciﬁcation.
As could be seen from the raw data in ﬁgure 2.2, amounts returned monotonically
increase and are concave in a, the amounts received. This is also reﬂected in the Tobit
estimates, where the ﬁrst order term g1 is positive and the second order term g2 is neg-
ative, both signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The life cycle evolution of reciprocity is captured
by the parameters of RETIRED, AGE, AGESQ, and the three interaction terms. The
change in the trustworthiness propensity which follows from a change in age is given











We ﬁrst solve for the turning points, which we deﬁne as the age around which the
sign of the derivative changes, and compare them with those of trust found in the26 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
previous section. Because of the interaction terms, computation of the turning points
requires that we ﬁx the values of WVS and RTHINK. We can get an overall picture
by evaluating equation (2.9) at the sample means of WVS and RTHINK. We ﬁnd that
trustworthiness reaches its lowest level when individuals reach the age of 30 years, and
increases beyond that. These results differ remarkably from the life cycle evolution
of trust discussed in the previous section. There, we found that trust increases until
the age of 30 and decreases beyond that. The last section of the chapter discusses a
possible explanation of this result. We next evaluated the age turning points for those
who report trusting others (WVS=1) and those who do not (WVS=0). The age proﬁle
of individuals who state they do not trust others reaches a low at 21 years of age, while
it reaches a low at 43 years of age for those who declare trusting others.
In the previous section, we found that the relationship between trust and educa-
tion was inverted U shape, with subjects without a secondary degree and those with
university degrees displaying relatively less trustful behavior. The relation between
education and trustworthiness is very different. Less educated subjects (the omitted
category) return signiﬁcantly more than educated subjects, all degrees confounded.
Moreover, the parameter estimates suggests a U shape relationship, with individuals
with university degrees being more trustworthy that subjects with technical education
degrees.
The effect of gender also distinguishes trust from trustworthiness. While gender
was found to have no impact on trust, we ﬁnd here that men return on average signif-
icantly less than women.
One of the interesting ﬁndings of GLSS was that answers to the WVS trust question
did not correlate with experimental trust but correlated rather well with the return ra-
tio. In our experiment, we also ﬁnd that subjects who trust more others are also more
trustworthy. However, some of the issues raised in section 2.3.1 concerning the predic-
tive power of stated trust questions may also apply here, although it is less clear from
the results in this section whether the underlying process determining trustworthiness
and trust are as similar.
We have shown in the previous section that subjects’ beliefs were important deter-
minants of trust. Here, beliefs of responders also play an important role in determining
trustworthiness. Responders who believed they would receive more had higher aver-
age return ratios. To gain some insights on the importance of beliefs on trustworthi-
ness, we estimated our extended speciﬁcation omitting beliefs. Speciﬁcation 4 in tableSection 2.5. Results: Participation 27
2.3 shows the result of this regression. The only notable change is that trustworthiness
of those who report trusting others continues to decline with age while it no longer
declines for those who report not trusting others. A log–likelihood ratio test (value of
85.88, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) conﬁrms that omitting beliefs substantially lowers the
predictive ﬁt of the model.
We end by noting that some individual characteristics have no effect on trustwor-
thiness. This is the case of subjects’ income, whether they work or not, their retirement
status, religion, and their lifetime trust experience. Interestingly, none of these charac-
teristics were found to explain experimental trust.
It is well known that the Tobit model is sensitive to the distributional assump-
tion placed on the unobserved component (Newey, 1987). An alternative estimator
which relaxes most distributional assumptions of the Tobit model is the Symmetri-
cally Trimmed Least Squares estimator (STLS) of Powell (1986). Contrary to Tobit, the
semiparametric STLS estimator does not require normality and is robust to (bounded)
heteroscedasticity of unknown form in #r
i. All our speciﬁcations were estimated using
the STLS estimator (results are presented in table 2.4). Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation
tests never reject the null hypothesis of normality and homoscedasticity of the error
terms on which the Tobit model rests.
2.5 Results on Participation
The major impediment experimenters must overcome to test for participation bias is
that they generally do not observe non–participants. In our experiment, we observe
both the decision to participate and the characteristics of non–participants. This al-
lows us to address the following issues 1) whether observed or unobserved factors
are more important determinants of participation and 2) if participation is based on
unobservable characteristics, are these related to experimental outcomes? The ﬁrst
question addresses the current belief in experimental economics which suggests that
unobserved factors such as preferences for risk and money are more likely to explain
participation in the experiment than the observed characteristics of subjects (Camerer
and Hogarth, 1999). The second question directly touches the issue of participation
bias, by which actions of participants are not representative of the population at large.
ThemostnaturalframeworktoapproachbothquestionsisthatdevelopedbyHeck-
man (1978). We model participation as being driven both by observed and unobserved28 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
factors, the latter having the potential to affect the outcomes of interest and cause par-
ticipation bias. Let di 2 f0,1g be an indicator of participation in the experiment and




id + q RATIOi + #d
i for j = r,t
where x
j
i is the conditioning vector entering the trust and reciprocity models, #d
i is an
unobservable determinant of participation assumed to be drawn from a N(0,1) distri-
bution, and (d,q) are unknown parameters. A general feature of these models is the
requirement of a valid exclusion restriction for nonparametric identiﬁcation of the par-
ticipation bias. In practical terms, we need a variable which affects participation but
does not directly affect either experimental and survey measures used in this chap-
ter. Our exclusion restriction is the variable RATIO, which is computed as proportion
of questionnaires completed by panel members in the three months which preceded
our experiment. This variable directly measures the participation propensity of sub-
jects when participation is uncorrelated with ﬁnancial outcomes.21 The dependance
between the experimental outcomes and the participation decisions is captured by the
amount of correlation between #d
i and the unobservable components determining trust
(see equation (2.1)) and trustworthiness (see equation (2.6)). We replicated the estima-
tions of sections 2.2 and 2.4 by separately estimating an ordered probit, a binary probit
model, and a Tobit model, along with the participation decision. We allow for potential
participation bias by letting #d
i be correlated with the unobserved component of each
experimental decision.
Most of the parameters entering the systematic part of the participation propen-
sity were insigniﬁcant, conﬁrming the conjecture that participation is mostly explained
by unobserved characteristics of subjects. Results for trust and trustworthiness are
virtually identical to those reported in the text. All but one parameter entering the
trust propensity was signiﬁcant (see text above).22 One notable exception was income
which has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on participation, which rules out partici-
pation based on low opportunity costs. The presence of participation bias can be de-
termined by testing the statistical signiﬁcance of the correlation coefﬁcients between
#d
i and the unobserved components of the trust and trustworthiness measures used in
this chapter. We ﬁnd that none of the three correlations are signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
a clear indication that the unobserved characteristics determining participation in the
experiment do not correlate with the experimental decisions.Section 2.6. Discussion 29
2.6 Discussion and Conclusions
The literature has identiﬁed trust and trustworthiness as important factors of economic
performance and growth. Understanding the determinants of these at the societal level
is important yet, not well documented. The majority of the existing empirical evidence
relies on one of two complementary methodologies. Survey methods on one hand col-
lect responses of heterogeneous samples, at the expense of having to rely on hypothet-
ical and self–reported measures. On the other hand laboratory experiments offer the
possibility to collect data on the actual behavior of subjects at the expense of collecting
this data for a very special subset of the population of interest.
This chapter presented results from a computerized experiment whose participants
were randomly drawn from the Dutch population. This approach allowed us to com-
bine the strengths of experiments and survey data collection methods.
One of the key ﬁndings of this chapter is that background characteristics of subjects,
mainly their age and education levels, do play an important role in determining trust
and trustworthiness, although they affect trust and trustworthiness in very different
ways. OurresultsreconﬁrmedtheexistinginvertedUshaperelationbetweentrustand
age, with trust increasing until the age of 30 and decreasing beyond that. On the other
hand, we ﬁnd that the relation between trustworthiness and age is U shaped, with
trustworthiness decreasing until the age of 30, and rising again beyond that point. This
raises the question of why do the young and elderly trust less but are more trustworthy
than middle aged individuals? One explanation is that individuals who trust the most
take for granted that the average individual in society will do the same. Hence, when
someone places trust in them, they are less likely to be surprised by this action and will
not place a premium as high on rewarding trust as would individuals who trust others
less.
The education patterns are also very different. We ﬁnd an inverted–U shape re-
lation between education and trust, and an U shape relationship between education
and trustworthiness. Such opposite inﬂuences of background characteristics are puz-
zling insofar as it is typically assumed that trust and trustworthiness go hand in hand,
which would suggest that both are determined in similar ways. Reconciling the age
and education patterns of trust and trustworthiness is an interesting topic for future
research.
An additional contribution of the chapter is that we provided a new way to com-
pare experimental and survey trust measures. The literature has up till now assessed30 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
the validity of survey trust questions by testing whether or not they predicted well
experimental trust. One of the main messages of the chapter is that this method of
validation has been given too much attention, primarily because the predictive power
of survey measures is intimately linked to the sample used, the amount of background
information available on the subjects, and the experimental design. Our analysis has
shown that by carefully selecting samples and designs, experimenters increase their
odds of ﬁnding either a low or high predictive power of the survey trust measure.
Thus, despite that contrary to the existing literature our survey trust measure predicts
well trust in our experiment, we do not take this as evidence validating the use of sur-
vey trust questions. It is important to note that the problems with prediction are only
relevant if predicting experimental trust with survey trust is what experimenters are
trying to achieve. In general, prediction is useful if applied to an object which has a
clear interest in being predicted well. Trust measured in an experiment is an abstract
quantity whose main purpose is to extract from it useful characteristics of the popula-
tion under study. Viewed in this way, it is not clear whether the emphasis on predicting
its value by other trust measures is in general warranted.
As our chapter focuses on investigating the determinants of trust and trustworthi-
ness, it follows quite naturally that a more convincing comparison of both measures
could be achieved by comparing whether experimental and survey measures have the
sameinformationalcontent. Onthesegrounds, thedifferencesbetweenbothtrustmea-
sures are stark. We found that education has an inverted–U shape relation with exper-
imental trust while it does not correlate at all with answers to the WVS trust question.
In contrast, religion correlates well with answers to the WVS trust question but not at
all with experimental trust.
Wehave also examinedpossible explanations for the differencesbetween both mea-
sures. The two prominent explanations are that subjects either misreport their answers
to the WVS question, or that the question simply captures a different notion of trust
than the one which is captured in the experiment. We do not ﬁnd any evidence sug-
gesting that these differences are due to subjects misreporting their answers to the sur-
vey trust question. As surveys remain more accessible than nation–wide laboratory
experiments, it seems worthwhile for researchers interested in making cross–country
comparisons to design new survey questions which will narrow the gap with experi-
mental measures.
Finally, this chapter made one of the ﬁrst tests of participation bias in an economicSection 2.6. Discussion 31
experiment. We have not found any evidence suggesting the presence of participa-
tion bias in our experiment. In our view, this is a reassuring ﬁnding for experimental
economics.32 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A Econometric appendix
2.A.1 Minimum Distance Test
Deﬁne sWVS and sE respectively as the standard deviation of #WVS and #E. Under
the assumptions of the parametric models, the probit estimator provides consistent
estimates of bE/sE while the ordered probit model provides consistent estimates of
bWVS/sWVS. The comparison of both ratios is complicated by the fact that the exper-
imental variance is partly under experimental control (see discussion in section 2.3.2).
It is possible to get ride of sE by normalizing say the kth component to 1, which is
equivalent to dividing the parameter vector by the kth component bE
k/sE. Under this























pendent of sE. One can perform a similar division for parameter estimates from the
probit model on the WVS trust question and obtain a second vector of parameters, this
time independent of sWVS. In what follows, we use xE and xWVS as shorthand nota-
tions for the vectors of the ordered and binary probit models excluding the constant
and the normalized kth term.24 Under the null hypothesis that the effects of back-
ground characteristics are the same, both sets of estimates would equal each other.










where W represents the covariance matrix of the difference between both parameter
vectors. Below we show that the test statistic above follows a chi square distribution
with K ¡ 2 degrees of freedom.
We brieﬂy sketch here a minimum distance test for observable characteristics. We
will use EN to denote sample expectations and E for corresponding population expec-
tations. The estimated parameters solve












where LWVS (x) denotes the binary probit likelihood function and LE (x) denotes the
likelihood function of the ordered probit where the threshold parameters have been
concentrated out. We will use the notation Lx (x) and L
xx0 (x) to respectively denoteSection 2.A. Appendix 33
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where every element of x lies in between corresponding elements of b xE and x0. Under


















































































b xE ¡ b xWVS
´
d ! N (0;W)
where W ´ V11 + V22 ¡ V12 ¡ V21. Hence, equation (2.10) follows a chi square distri-
bution with K ¡2 degrees of freedom. We compute the test statistic (2.10) by replacing
W with a sample average evaluated at either b xE or b xWVS, both equivalent under the
null hypothesis.
2.A.2 Probit Model with Misclassiﬁcation
Following Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998), the probability that a subject













































i are deﬁned in section 2.3. It follows that in the ab-










= 0), equation (2.12) collapses to
standard binary probit model (Maddala, 1983). The likelihood function of the binary
choice model with misreporting is constructed using the choice probabilities (2.12).34 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
2.B Instructions (Translation)
The ﬁrst 3 screens of the experiment are the same for both senders and responders.
Italic notes in the translation are comments by the authors.
² First screen:
This experiment is a research project of researchers from Humboldt University
Berlin and Catholic University of Brabant.25
WiththisexperimentyoucanmakerealmoneyintermsofCentERpoints. Youre-
ceive from the researchers additional CentERpoints (besides the usual telephone
allowance).
² Second screen:
During this experiment you will be matched with another member of the panel.
You will not know who this person is, both of you will stay anonymous. Both of
you receive 500 CentERpoints. Then the experiments starts.
One of you has the possibility to send a share of this away. The amount of points
sent will be doubled and given to the other person. The other person has then the
opportunity to send a share of the own total amount back. The amount which is
sent back will not be doubled.
How many points you ﬁnally earn depends therefore on your decision and the
decision of the person you are matched with. You will be randomly assigned to
your role.
² Third screen:
We now give you the chance to indicate whether you want to participate. If you
decide not to participate, the experiment will end immediately. You will receive
the usual telephone reimbursement. If you continue you will receive the 500
CentERpoints.
Do you want to continue?
° Yes
° No
Subjects who choose to participate were then randomly assigned to their roles. Senders and
receivers had to read decision screens tailored to their roles.
Senders
² Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this person
received 500 CentERpoints. You can send a share of your 500 CentERpoints. The
panel member with whom you are matched with receives the amount you sent
multiplied by 2. Then, this person has the opportunity to send a share of the
own total amount back (without knowing who you are). The amount which this
person sends back to you will not be doubled.
How many points do you want to give?
(The sender could send one out of 11 possible amounts.)Section 2.B. Appendix 35
° 0 the other person receives additionally nothing and has therefore 500 and
you remain with 500 points.
...
° 500 the other person receives additionally 1000 and has therefore 1500 in
total and you remain with 0 points.
² Fifth screen:
(was depending on the decision taken at the fourth screen, here as example “200”)
You decided to send 200 points.
The panel member you are matched with receives therefore 400 additional Cen-
tERpoints.
He or she has therefore in total 900 CentERpoints.
You remain with 300 CentERpoints.
How many points do you think the other panel member with whom you are
matched with will send to you?
(Participants had to type in a number. In this example in the range of [0,900].)
² Sixth screen:
This experiment is done with some panel members. Half of them interact in the
same position as you. They can send a share of their 500 CentERpoints which is
doubled and received by a person of the other position.
How many points do you think those panel members have sent?
(The sender could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500).
Responders
² Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this person
received 500 CentERpoints. This person is asked to send you a share from their
own 500 CentERpoints. You will receive the amount of those points the other
person has sent multiplied by 2.
For example, if the other person sends 100 CentERpoints, you will receive 200
CentERpoints. Together with the 500 points you begin with, you will have in
total 700 CentERpoints.
From this amount you can return a share. The amount you send will not be
doubled.
² Fifth screen:
As we do not know now how many CentERpoints the other panel member with
whom you are matched with has sent we present all possible amounts this per-
son could send to you. The amount you actually receive is written in the next
column. Please indicate in the last column what amount you would return for
each possible amount sent.
After the real decision of the other person is known the amount you indicated
for this particular decision will be realized. The amount you will return will be36 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
deducted from your total amount.
(The responder had to indicate for each of 11 possible amounts the sender could send what
he would return. The table was designed as follows:)
If the other sends: I receive: In total with the In this case I return:
500 CentERpoints:
0 0 500
¢¢¢ ¢¢¢ ¢¢¢ ¢¢¢
500 1000 1500
² Sixth screen:
How many points do you expect the panel member with whom you are matched
with has sent to you?
(The responder could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500.)
After these screens the experiment was over. Nobody could go backwards and both senders
and responders were asked the following post–experimental questions:
² Seventh screen (Trust experience question):
The last two questions are about trust in general. This question is about your
own trust experience.
If you trust is your trust generally rewarded or exploited?
Choose the number which is closest to your answer.
always rewarded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 always exploited.
(Participants had to type in a number between 1 and 7).
² Eight screen (WVS trust question):
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
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2.D Figures
CentERpoints
















Figure 2.1: Distribution of experimental trust.
CentERpoints










Figure 2.2: Return ratio of responders for each units received, strategy method.42 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust






































Figure 2.3: Estimated density of potential returns on investments in trust for each
amount sent. Gaussian kernel density estimation. Rate of return computed as (amount
returned - amount sent) / amount sent. The rate of return is inﬁnity when the amount
sent is zero and is not plotted here.Section 2.E. Notes 43
Notes
1For a description of the recruitment, sampling methods, and past usages of the CentERpanel see:
www.centerdata.nl . Children below 16 years of age as well as immigrants are excluded from the panel.
The latter for the reason being that their language proﬁciency in Dutch makes it difﬁcult for them to
answer the questions on a weekly basis.
2Computer screens of the original experiment (in Dutch) are available upon request. The translated
text of all screens are enclosed in appendix 2.B.
3For ease of reading we keep the terms “sender” and “responder” for the different roles. In the
experiment we omitted suggestive labels and referred to the person itself or to his opponent as “the
matched panel member.”
4There is weak evidence suggesting that a hot environment triggers stronger responses in two player
games. Brandts and Charness (2000) ﬁnd that the strategy method and the hot environment do not
yield signiﬁcant different responses in two simple sequential two player games.
5Results from repeated trust experiments can be found in Anderhub, Engelmann, and G¨ uth (1999)
and Willinger, Keser, Lohmann, and Usunier (2003).
614 non–participants initially accepted to play but eventually backed out of the experiment after
having observed the roles they were assigned to play. It is interesting to note that 11 out of those 14
panel members were assigned to the role of responders.
7We have experimented with a speciﬁcation including cross–terms but none was found to be statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.
8It has been argued that the causality may be in the opposite direction (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998,
p. 526-529). We do not investigate these issues in this chapter.
9This deﬁnition of state dependance differs from that used in labor economics. Labor economists
are generally interested in whether or not individuals in a state of unemployment are more likely to be
unemployed in the future. In our experiment, we do not investigate whether having trusted in the past
increases the likelihood of trusting in the experiment.
10In the probit model, E(yjX = x) = F(x0b) is approximately linear in x0b for individuals answering
1 to the WVS trust question with probability between 20% and 80% (e.g., Ruud, 2000). In general, the
average probability of answering 1 to the WVS questions lies between 45% and 55% which implies that
the linear model holds for most individuals in the sample.
11Tables of results are available upon request.
12Additionally removing age as a regressor further increased the correlation to 18.5%.
13In GLSS, pairs either knew each other before the experiment or got to know each other by jointly
ﬁlling in a social connection survey. This survey includes among other questions to report the number







is also likely do differ across studies according to differences in the dimension of the
choice space of players, the ﬁctitious currency used in the experiment, the monetary endowments, the
multiplier, whether the experiment is conducted in the lab, in the classroom, at home on paper or on a
computer, and whether the strategy method is used or not.
15We use the test proposed by Andrews (2001) to deal with the fact that the probabilities of misre-
porting rest on the boundary of the parameter space under the null hypothesis. Computation of the test
requires that the critical values of the log–likelihood ratio test be simulated. We report critical values
based on 1000 simulations. See Andrews for further details.
16The minimal and maximal values are corrected to the presence of extreme outliers.
17These returns are computed as the (amount received - amount sent) / amount sent.
18We have estimated a less restrictive speciﬁcation with dummy variables for each a category. Results
were numerically identical to those presented above.
19RTHINK is coded from 0 to 10, where each unit is worth 50 CentERpoints.
20The log–likelihood ratio test value is 19.9 when comparing speciﬁcations 1 against 3, and 59.14 when
comparing speciﬁcations 2 and 3. Both are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
21CP members are not paid to participate in the panel.
22Results are available upon request.
23This normalization requires that bk 6= 0.44 Chapter 2. On Representative Trust
24The constant term parameter is generally not separately identiﬁed from the threshold parameters
in both the binary and ordered probit models. Given their values are functions of ad hoc threshold
assumptions, they are not used in computation of the test.
25Now: Tilburg University. The Catholic University of Brabant changed its name after the experiment.Chapter 3
Risky Joint Ventures
3.1 Introduction
How do negotiations develop in the presence of large risks? We analyze such a bar-
gaining game between a producer of a movie and an actor. Movie production is char-
acterized by substantial risks: either the movie is a hit, in which case the producer’s
payoff is very large, or the movie is a ﬂop. Then proﬁts are small and often negative.
In many cases, producers try to rehire core actors of top–grossing movies to produce a
sequel. Producers seem to think that rehiring the main actors of the original is critical
to the success of a sequel (in case of “When Harry met Sally,” Meg Ryan and Billy Crys-
tal, in case of “Rocky,” Sylvester Stallone).1 Clearly, the bargaining power of the actor
is high when negotiating the contract for the sequel. Core actors of successful ﬁlms
know they are indispensable for the sequel, giving them effective monopoly power.
We present such situations by a two–stage bargaining game where “studios” have
ultimatum power when casting the ﬁrst ﬁlm. Only if the original ﬁlm has been suc-
cessful, actors negotiate a second contract. However, at the second stage actors make a
take it or leave it offer to the studio.
This setting has applications to situations outside the ﬁlm industry where produc-
tion leads to (1) a sequential resolution of uncertainty, (2) successive negotiations of
contracts, and where (3) each round of negotiations carries the risk of terminating the
relationship. The model structure therefore resembles risky partnerships and coopera-
tions typical also for R&D joint ventures and venture capital.2
0We thank Tim Grebe for his help conducting the experiment. We are grateful to Charles Bellemare
for providing his nonparametric OX–package and Jan Potters for helpful comments. The results in this
chapter were ﬁrst formulated in G¨ uth, Kr¨ oger, and Maug (2003), “You May Have To Do It Again, Rocky!
– An Experimental Analysis of Risky Joint Ventures –.”
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In the terminology of bargaining theory our model is a stochastic two–stage alter-
nating offer game.3 Stochastic uncertainty about the size of the pie has – to the best of
our knowledge – so far been explored for one round (ultimatum games) and one–pie
games only. Either only the proposer knows the size of the pie (see Mitzkewitz and
Nagel, 1993) or only the responder (see Rapoport, Erev, and Zwick, 1995). However,
the speciﬁc characteristics of repeated bargaining when uncertainty is large and early
termination of a productive relationship is possible have not been studied in experi-
ments before.
Standard game theory suggests that producers and actors both anticipate the po-
tential of a sequel to the original ﬁlm. Speciﬁcally, rational anticipation of a lucrative
second contract should make actors inclined to accept offers below their outside oppor-
tunities at the ﬁrst stage. So producers should make such offers and get them accepted.
We ﬁnd that our experimental subjects deviate from such a strategy in important
ways. Firstly, “actors” rarely accept offers below their ﬁrst–stage opportunity costs.
We hypothesize that this is the impact of the enormous risk subjects face: in our
parametrization, based on ﬁeld data, the probability of being able to bargain for a lu-
crative sequel–contract at the second stage is only 25%, so this potential reward is too
risky to make subjects pay for this opportunity by foregoing a certain outside oppor-
tunity. Thereby “producers” either have to become the only risk taker or have no joint
venture at all. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst experimental study of such
large risks in bargaining. Here and in the following we refer to our experimental roles
as “actors” and “producers.” However, the instructions to our experimental subjects
contain no reference to the movie industry or to any other real–life setting this game
may reﬂect.
Parameter calibration close to empirical data has hardly been used in experimental
economics. Mostly parameter constellations for experiments are chosen to distinguish
between competing theories. We are only aware of two studies by Grether and Plott
(1984), and Hong and Plott (1982) which try to capture parameters of the ﬁeld. We
determine our parameters so as to match the moments of an empirical distribution.4
This adds to the realism of the setting and also makes it easier to interpret our results.
It allows us to study additional questions, e.g., to what extent our results could ex-
plain the fact that sequels typically have 20% higher production costs than the original
ﬁlm. We feel that results may not be completely independent of the parameters chosen
in the experiment and our calibration makes us somewhat more conﬁdent about theSection 3.2. Model 47
relevance of our results.
In the following section 3.2 the model is introduced and solved. Section 3.3 is de-
voted to developing an alternative hypothesis based on equity theory. Section 3.4 ex-
plains the procedure we followed for calibrating the parameters of the model. Section
3.6 describes the details of the experimental design. Section 3.7 presents the major
regularities of the experimentally observed behavior. There we compare the stylized
facts of the case study with these regularities as well as with qualitative aspects of the
theoretical solution. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The Model
We model a bargaining game between a single actor, denoted by A and a producer,
denoted by P. The game starts with P making a wage offer W1 to A. If A rejects the
proposed wage, the game ends with A receiving his rather low outside option OA
1 and
P the proﬁt OP
1 which could be interpreted as the gain from producing the ﬁlm with
another (presumably less talented) actor. We explicitly permit W1 < OA
1 to allow the
producer to offer A a lower wage than A0s outside option.
If A accepts the wage offer W1, the movie is produced. Then chance determines
the success s of the movie, where s 2 ff,hg. The surplus or “pie” generated by the
movie, to be divided between A and P, is denoted by Cs
1. With probability w the movie
is a “hit” (denoted by h) and generates a total surplus Ch
1, otherwise the movie is a
“ﬂop,” denoted by f and generates only C
f
1 < Ch
1, where 0 < w < 1. The proﬁt of
the producer is always given by Ps
1 = Cs
1 ¡ W1. Note that we do not allow for output-
contingentcontracts. However, wedonotmodeleffort–incentives, sotheusualreasons
for output–related pay do not apply.5
After a “ﬂop” the game ends with A earning his wage W1 and P the low proﬁt P
f
1
of a “ﬂop.” After a “hit” the game proceeds to the second stage. Then A proposes
a contract for the sequel project. The gain from producing the sequel is known to be
C2. The agent A proposes a wage W2 that leaves P with proﬁts P2 = C2 ¡ W2. The
reversal of bargaining power to the agent captures that in case of a “hit” the formerly
unknown actor A is now a movie star and cannot easily be replaced. Accordingly, his
outside option OA
2 is much larger than before, so OA
2 > OA
1 . However, here we do not
investigate the raise of outside option as source for the increase of sequels’ costs and
keep the outside option constant for both stages in the experiment.48 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
If P rejects A’s contract offer, the game ends and A receives his outside option OA
2
in addition to his previous payoff W1 whereas P does not produce the sequel and earns
the outside option OP
2 in addition to his previous earnings Ph
1. If P accepts, then both
players collect their contractual earnings from both movies (see appendix 3.A for the
stage form).





2, and the three pie sizes C
f
1, Ch
1, and C2. In light of the
qualitative facts reported in the case study we assume
C
f
1 < 0 < C2 < Ch
1 .
Risk Neutral Agents We ﬁrst develop the game by assuming risk neutrality of pro-
cedures and actors. This solution serves as a benchmark and yields sharp, testable








where E(¢) denotes the expectation operator.
We solve this game by backward induction. At the second stage, A makes a take it
or leave it–offer and offers P proﬁts according to her outside option. Hence, the wage
at the second stage is
W¤




At the ﬁrst stage, P makes a take it or leave it offer to A that makes A indifferent













Equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) together with the assumption that offers (not)
worse than the ones derived are (accepted) rejected represent the game–theoretic solu-
tion (GT) of the game for risk neutral agents.Section 3.2. Model 49
Relaxing Risk Neutrality: Risk Averse Actors Now we partially relax the assump-
tion of risk neutrality by assuming that agents are risk–averse. Producers are typically
large studios owned by diversiﬁed investors. As the risk of movie success or failure
is idiosyncratic, producers can reasonably be assumed to behave as if they were risk–
neutral whereas the same is not true for actors. Moreover, this modelling strategy
allows us to build in reservation wages that may vary across actors, and producers
may not have full information about actors’ reservation wages in bargaining. Hence,
we introduce two assumptions:
² Actors are risk averse, while producers are risk–neutral.
² Producers are uncertain about actors’ risk aversion.
We explore the implications of these assumptions for the game–theoretic solution
in turn. Denote the agent’s utility function by U and observe that there is no uncer-
tainty at the second stage of the game, hence equations (3.3) and (3.5) still represent






· wU (W1 + W¤
2) + (1¡ w)U (W1) (3.7)
for any acceptable W1, where W¤
2 is still given from (3.3). Then, deﬁne the lowest W1
that is just acceptable to the agent by ˆ W1. Clearly, for any risk averse agent ˆ W1 exceeds
(3.5). Also, it follows directly from (3.7) that any wage offer W1 ¸ OA
1 will be accepted,
even by an inﬁnitely risk–averse agent. Hence, we have:
OA
1 ¡ wW¤
2 · ˆ W1 · OA
1 . (3.8)
In case the agent’s utility function is common knowledge, we would now have
W¤
1 = ˆ W1 as before. However, we assume now that ˆ W1 is unknown to producers, who






and support given by (3.8). Hence, producer’s expected payoff as




1) ¡W1 + E(OP
2)
i








F(W1) + (1¡ F(W1))OP
2 (3.9)





= w ¢ Ch
1 + (1¡ w) ¢ C
f
1. Solving ﬁrst order con-
ditions
¶E(PP(W1))
















1 . (3.10)50 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
We develop a parametric example in appendix 3.C below, which allows us to ob-
tain a closed–form solution for (10) and then convert this solution into quantiﬁable
predictions.
3.3 Behavioral Hypotheses
We are sceptical whether the game–theoretic results, just derived, are in line with ex-
perimental behavior. In view of the former results of ultimatum (bargaining) experi-
ments one may expect:7
Hypothesis 1: Claims will aim at equal splits which will be nearly always accepted.
Equity theory (Homans, 1961) predicts equal sharing but leaves open what is shared
equally.8 This can, for instance, be the expected pie of the given stage so that
W1 = E(Cs
1)/2 , (3.11)
P2 = C2/2 . (3.12)







on the second stage is possible. If lower ﬁrst stage offers lead to lower second stage





/2 equally is still possible. The
actor will accept the lower offer and not be compensated with probability (1¡ w). If





/2 ¡ wD at the ﬁrst stage in case of a hit the actor can offer
C2/2¡ D. To reach the equal split he should be compensated by D. We therefore allow
W1 = E(Cs
1)/2¡ wD , (3.13)







Of course, some producers may deviate from equal sharing, e.g., by exploiting their
ultimatum power. If so we expect that actors will reciprocate.
Hypothesis 2:
(i) Too meager offers (P2 and W1 close to the game theoretic prediction from (4) and
(5)) will be rejected.
(ii) If they are not rejected, then meager offers W1 are followed by meager offers P2
such that P2 depends positively on W1.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 essentially predict (positive and negative) reciprocity.Section 3.4. Calibration 51
3.4 Calibrating Parameters
Our experimental design exactly matches the sequential game. We have determined
most experimental parameters through calibration. This seems to be important for the
case at hand since movie production is extremely risky. The easiest way to capture
such risks involved is to rely on parameters that closely resemble those of the ﬁeld
study. Parameter constellations, far off those in the ﬁeld study, may be interesting for
their own sake but do not illuminate what happens in movie production. To avoid that
hypotheses are just conﬁrmed because they rely on prominent numbers (Albers, 1997)
calibration will aim at non–prominent predictions whenever this can be reasonably
justiﬁed.
The data for calibration are found in the case “Arundel Partners – The Sequel
Project” (Luehrmann, 1992). The case assembles data for 99 movies produced by 6
major studios released in the United States in 1989. The data in this case study are
taken from a database largely based on Variety Magazine, a trade magazine specializ-
ing on the movie industry. Based on Exhibit 7 of the case we calculate the net present
value (NPV) of a ﬁrst ﬁlm as:9
NPV =
PV of Net Inflows at year 1
1.12
¡ PV of Negative Cost at year 0. (3.15)
Here, the present value of net inﬂows are gross box ofﬁce proceeds in the US, plus
international proceeds and revenues from video rentals net of distribution costs and
expenses. These are discounted at an estimated cost of capital of 12%. Negative costs
include all costs required to make the negative of the ﬁlm of which prints can be made
and rented to theaters. Negative costs include among others the salaries of actors and
director, production management, special effects, lighting and music. Table 3.5 gives
the total number of ﬁlms per studio, the number of ﬁlms that generated a positive NPV
on the initial investment, and the total net present value over all 99 ﬁlms for six major
Hollywood studios.
Hence, the average value of a ﬁrst ﬁlm is $736.6m/99=$7.44m, and 42 ﬁlms are
proﬁtable with the median ﬁlm making a loss of $2.26m. The standard deviation is
$34.16m, showing that movie–production is risky. Also, the risks and payoffs are dis-
tributed somewhat unevenly across studios with MCA being by far the most prof-
itable and Sony being the least proﬁtable, making losses on 26 of their 34 ﬁlms in
1989. The most proﬁtable ﬁlm in the sample is Batman (Warner Brothers, NPV=
$224.33m), the greatest disaster was The Adventures of Baron Munchhausen (Sony,52 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
NPV= ¡$45.54m).
The case study estimates the value of potential sequels. On average, costs of se-
quels are 120% of the costs of a ﬁrst ﬁlm, according to Hypothesis 4 largely due to the
higher wages after a successful ﬁrst ﬁlm. Box ofﬁce proceeds are on average 70% of
the ﬁrst ﬁlm, and not every successful ﬁlm in the sense of a large positive NPV leads to
a potentially proﬁtable sequel. Hence, on average sequels are less proﬁtable than ﬁrst
(success) ﬁlms. There are exceptions: Batman 2 was more successful than the original
movie! The detailed calibration of experimental parameters with the help of such data
is documented in appendix3.B. Based on the calibration we choose the parameters
listed in table 3.6.10
On the basis of table 3.6 we can now be more speciﬁc about the hypothesis we
formulated above (see section 3.3 above). We distinguish between four theoretical ap-
proaches:
² the game–theoretic solution with risk–neutral players (3) - (6) (abbreviated by
GT)
² and risk–averse actors (GT–risk),
² the equity–theoretic solution (11) - (12), (ET) and
² the equity–theoretic solution (13) - (14), based on the total pie (ET–total).
Using the calibration above, we obtain the predictions in table 3.7.
3.5 Model Predictions
Clearly, given our calibrated parameters game–theory and equity theory provide quite
different forecasts (see table 3.7). The two predictions for W1 would be either ¡4.5 or
4.75, respectively. This means that they are11% apart fromeach other in the total action
space [¡10,68] and that game theory would predict the actor to accept negative wage
offers.11 The two remaining theories relax the assumptions by allowing for risk averse
actors (GT–risk) and compensation for W1¡offers below the equal split of the expected
ﬁrst stage payoff in case of a success (ET–total). They would predict the W1¡offer to
fall in the range of [¡4.5,2] and [0.625,8.875], respectively, resulting in an overlapping
range of [0.625,2]. As there is no uncertainty at stage 2 about the joint proﬁt of 33,
actors will offer only the outside option of 7 to the producer resulting in a wage (W2)Section 3.6. Experiment 53
of 26 for both predictions by game theory. Equity theory would predict the offer of the
actor to be 16.5, or depending on the deviation wD from the equal split offer at stage 1,
a compensation of D with w = 0.25 (ET–total).
A more practical matter is, of course, to explain the higher costs of the sequel project
compared to ﬁrst ﬁlms. The cost increase of 20% of the sequel project relative to the
ﬁrst ﬁlm, as documented by the case study (Luehrmann, 1992), can be explained by the
higher wage costs of actors on the second stage. Thus if Rocky does it again, it is much
more expensive to hire him. And this should imply an increase of total production
costs of about 20% as reported in the case study.







of a sequel predicted by the different theories where PC1,PC2 denotes the production
costs, excluding the actor’s wages, for the original ﬁrm and for the sequel, respectively.
It is based on the calibrated parameters for costs beside the actors’ wage, PC1 = PC2 =
48 (see appendix 3.B), and on the assumption that both, actor and producer, follow the
same heuristic. The GT predictions forecast the cost increase to be 48% for (expecting)
risk averse actors and up to 70% for risk neutral players. Thereby the cost increase is
driven by the fact that risk neutral actors would agree on a much lower wage at the
ﬁrst stage whereas they have the same wage as risk averse actors at the second stage.
A cost increase for the ET–total prediction depends on the ﬁrst stage offers and can
therefore only specify a range for the increase. If the W1¡ offer is at the lower range
of the interval speciﬁed by equation (3.13) and (3.14), then the implied cost increase
would be 67 %. Clearly, if the producer offers a higher Wage at the ﬁrst stage (so,
a smaller D in equation (3.13)), then the cost increase for the sequel would be lower.
With a cost increase of 22% for sequels the prediction of equity theory, allowing for
moderate sharing of (expected) proﬁts on both stages, comes closest to the reported
20% in the ﬁeld (Luehrman).
3.6 Experimental Design and Procedure
The computerized experiment was conducted at the laboratory of Humboldt Univer-
sity Berlin in November and December 2001. The computer program was developed
using the software z–tree (Fischbacher, 1999). 72 Participants –mainly studentsof busi-
ness administration, economics and information technology– were recruited via E–
mail and telephone. We ran six sessions, each consisting of two matching groups. To54 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
allow for learning, participants played 18 rounds of the two–stage bargaining game.
Participants ﬁrst read the instructions and were then privately informed about their
role.12 Roles were neutrally framed as “participant A” and “participant B” for the role
of the actor and producer, respectively. Participants remained either A or B through-
out the whole experiment. One matching group consisted of three negotiation groups
each with one A and one B player. After every round new pairs were formed ran-
domly.13 We continue to refer to participants as “actors” and “producers,” although
the experimental subjects were not aware of this interpretation.
Information feedback was as follows: After the ﬁrst bargaining stage participants
were told whether A had accepted B’s offer. If the offer was accepted, they were in-
formed about the randomly selected pie size and their ﬁrst stage earnings. After the
second stage participants were told whether B had accepted A’s offer and what they
have earned on the second stage. At the end of each interaction participants also were
informed about their own cumulative payoffs.
A session lasted on average 140 minutes. The exchange rate was DM 2 for one
experimental currency unit (ECU).14 Participants were paid their average payoff of
all 18 which was on average DM 21. More precisely, producers received on average
DM 25 with a minimum payment of DM 1 and a maximum of DM 71. Actors were
paid DM 17 on average with minimum payments of DM 8 and maximum of DM 26.
Additionally, participants were paid an initial endowment of DM 10 and DM 5 for
completely answering the post experimental questionnaire.
3.7 Results
3.7.1 First and Second Stage Offers
At the ﬁrst stage which involved negotiations about the stochastic pie size of either
¡10 (ﬂop) or 68 (hit), we observe in total 648 take it or leave it W1 ¡ ¡offers. Table 3.8
and ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4 report means and standard deviations as well as histograms of
the offers, acceptances and rejections on both stages. At stage 1 the producer offered on
average 0.8 to the actor. In 435 cases actors accepted the offer with a mean of 4.5. Then
chance decided for 143 producer–actor–pairs that a “hit” was realized and subjects
continued at the second stage.
The amount actors offer to the producer at the second stage (P2 of C2 = 33) is on av-Section 3.7. Results 55
erage close to the producer’s outside option OP
2 of 7 with median P2 ¡¡offer of 8 and
47% of all second stage offers being either 7 or 8. P2 ¡ ¡offers below the producer’s
outside option OP
2 are rare (2.1%). Second stage offers were mainly accepted (85%) the
average offer being P2 = 8.9 leaving W2 = 24.1 for the actor. From the remaining 213
producer–actor–pairs the actor did not accept the W1 ¡ ¡offer with mean ¡6.6 and
the round ﬁnished immediately after stage one by both parties receiving their outside
option.
3.7.2 Contrasting Predictions
Accepted offers at the ﬁrst stage seem to corroborate the equity prediction of W1 =
4.75 (table 3.7) whereas offers at the second stage are very close to the game theoretic
solution of P2 = 7 leaving W2 = 26 to the actor. In the following we investigate how
far the theoretical predictions are from observed behavior. The measure used is the
mean squared error (MSE) of all observations (xi
t) and the prediction (xt) for x = W,P












ing MSE for all predictors.15 ET, GT, and GT–risk refer to the predictions of equity
theory, game theory, and game theory assuming risk averse actors, respectively. ET–





, such that more
generous wage offers at the ﬁrst stage (low D) are compensated by higher producer
proﬁts at the second stage. 18% of all observations fall into the range of the GT–risk
prediction with a mean offer of 0.51. For each of the 76% of observations which fall
into the ET–total range we derive the corresponding theoretical second stage offer con-
ditional on the ﬁrst offer and compare it to the actual response. For P2 equity theory
is less ambiguous. It is remarkable, how strong game theory is conﬁrmed. The ob-
served behavior suggests that opportunistic rationality becomes stronger when the sit-
uation becomes simple (deterministic and non–dynamic). Even though ET–total seems
to explain the data much better then pure equal split, behavior predicted by the game
theoretic solution for risk averse actors with the lowest total MSE seems to be most
supported by the data.
A more detailed analysis of the offer frequencies and acceptance rates reveals neg-
ative offers are almost never accepted (2%), and non–negative offers below the outside56 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
option are rarely accepted (26%). The acceptance rate for offers above the outside op-
tion is with 97% much larger. In ﬁgure 3.5 a non–parametric estimate of the acceptance
probability is shown as a function of the ﬁrst stage offers. The concave relationship in
the range of [¡4.5,2] might portend that the assumption of risk neutrality is too restric-
tive. Also on the matching group level it is a robust result that actors do (not) accept
offers above (below) their outside option OA
1 . Actors seem to prefer to “dishwash”
rather than gamble (for fame). We can therefore summarize our results so far:
Regularity 1
(i) Assuming risk averse agents is the best supported prediction according to the MSE
criteria. This suggests that unequal splits at the ﬁrst stage are accepted if the
producer is willing to bear the risk of a ﬂop alone.
(ii) Producers frequently offer negative wages W1 which, however, are almost never
accepted; W1 ¡ ¡offers below A’s outside option 2 are rarely accepted.
(iii) Actors are willing to accept less than the equal split but not less than their outside
option.
(iv) Equity concerns seems to be rarely indicated by second stage offers. According to
equity theory actors (over)compensate at the second stage for ﬁrst stage inequal-
ity by (too) low second stage offers. Almost all second stage offers conﬁrm the
game theoretic W¤
2–prediction. Offers close to OP
2 are rather often accepted.
Risk aversion seems to explain the data on average very well. However, offers out-
side the interval [¡4.5,2] cannot be rationalized at all. This means that risk aversion
can account for 18% of the ﬁrst stage offers. Relaxing the assumption of risk neutral
producers would not expand the range of offers which we can explain. A risk neu-
tral producer would offer at maximum W1 = 2 what even the most risk averse agent
should accept. Depending on the risk aversion of the producer, the minimum offer an
actor might accept is W1 = ¡4.5 (see equation (3.5) and table 3.7) if he would be risk
neutral. Therefore, producers who offer below ¡4.5 do not want to become engaged in
a joint project, which might be explained by risk aversion. In fact, 50% of all producers
never offer a wage below this threshold. 25% of all producers place one third of their
offers below ¡4.5.
ET–total might be a more meaningful interpretation than risk aversion as it captures
76% of ﬁrst stage offers and 83% of all second stage offers. However, before we inves-Section 3.7. Results 57
tigate equal split as an alternative explanation on the individual level, we will brieﬂy
summarize results one obtains when estimating risk aversion on an individual level
for actors and the reactions of producers given the uncertainty about the risk aversion
of their bargaining partner.
3.7.3 Risk Aversion
Actors First we try to make inferences about actors’ risk aversion from the offers
rejected and accepted. Here we assume that actors behave rational over all 18 periods
and infer individual risk preferences from their choices. However, for many subjects
in our experiment the results are not informative.16 We are left with only 15 out of 36




by the highest rejected offer we obtain individual risk parameters in
the range [.69,7.13]. Assuming that the acceptance threshold lies in the middle of the
interval of the highest rejected and the lowest accepted offer, we can estimate ˆ W1 by
averaging the highest rejected and the lowest accepted offer. Then we obtain a larger
range of risk parameters [.21,26.17].
Uncertainty about risk–aversion We model the uncertainty about actors’ risk aver-








with W = ¡4.5 and W = 2 in (3.10) in section 3.2 above. We apply two ways to esti-
mate the parameter g. Our ﬁrst approach is directly from the uses the arithmetic mean
of all offers in the range [¡4.5,2]. Our second approach uses additionally the infor-
mation of answers to those offers and applies maximum likelihood estimation. Details
are explained in appendix 3.D. The parameter estimate for g is 0.34 for approach 1 and
2.70 for approach 2. This result seems to indicate that producers might underestimate
actors’ risk aversion.
Nevertheless, those results should be interpreted cautiously as for the estimation of
the risk aversion parameter only 44% of the subjects in the actor position could be ana-
lyzed. The decisions of all remaining subjects were not informative: they do not satisfy
the requirement that the highest rejected offer is not higher than the lowest accepted
offer. Also the estimation of the g–parameter of the threshold density function cannot
account for all data. It considers only offers in the interval [¡4.5,2] which comprises
18% of ﬁrst stage offers.58 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
3.7.4 Equity Preferences
We will now explore how well equity theory can explain the data. From equation(3.13)






W1 which should be equal to the deviation at the second stage weighted by the proba-
bility to reach the second stage: wD
w = D = C2/2 ¡ P2. If behavior is guided by equity
principles, then the ratio of stage–wise deviations from equity, wD and D, should be
wD
D = w. Figure 3.6 plots the density of this ratio for all second stage offers and addi-
tionally in a separate graph the 118 cases satisfying the ET–total at the ﬁrst stage. The
mode of the ratio density is close to the commonly known probability (w = 25%) of
reaching the second stage. The skewed density with more mass on lower values indi-
cates that actors try to overcompensate the “losses” at the ﬁrst stage in a self–serving
way. However, this impact is not signiﬁcant. Actors do not earn more than producers
even if they are offered a ﬁrst stage wage in the ET–total range. In only 3 out of 12
sessions average earnings of actors are higher than average earnings of producers.
Comparison of competing hypotheses purely on the basis of mean squared errors
appears somewhat problematic. Such statistical approach evaluates a theory only by
comparing how its prediction ﬁts the data on average. Statistical criteria like mean
squared errors neglect the fact that we have a signiﬁcant number of observations that
cannot be rationalized on the basis of game theoretic predictions at all.
Regularity 2 Allowing for risk aversion of actors only moderately improves the pre-
dictive success of the game theoretic solution. Equity considerations with the
possibility of compensation for the actor seem to explain more of the observed
behavior.
3.7.5 Reciprocity
It is interesting that despite the result from equity considerations actors seem not to
react with their offer at the second stage to the producer’s wage offer. Regressing P2
on W1 indicates a constant second stage offer around 9 and no reaction towards the
offer at ﬁrst stage.18 It could be that actors react in heterogeneous ways. We will now
investigate how individual actors reciprocate in view of hypothesis 2(ii) how the offer
P2 depends on the accepted offer W1. Second stage offers conditional on ﬁrst stage
offers indicates three different types of behavior:
² no reaction regardless of the ﬁrst stage offer,Section 3.7. Results 59
² reciprocity reacting to to high (low) ﬁrst stage offers by a increase (decrease) of
second stage offers, and
² idiosyncratic reaction.
We partition 34 actors (for which P2–choices range from 2 to 7) into three sub-
groups:19
² 6 participants of a constant type (with no variation of P2) who all offer either OP
2
or the equal share (Opportunistic/Fair Proposers),
² 9 reciprocal participants (who respond in kind, i.e., react positively with P2 to
W1)20 (Linear Reciprocators), and
² 19 participants, who neither relied on the same P2 nor reciprocated (in the above
sense) (Experimenters, who try out different offers P2 in idiosyncratic ways).
Four of the ﬁrst type actors behave rather opportunistically after a hit by essentially
offering producers their outside option. Only 2 of these actors can be regarded as
equity minded with constant mean P2–offers of 16 and 14. Reciprocators are actor
types in line with hypothesis 2(ii).
The behavior of the ‘experimenting’ actors can partly be explained by directional
learning. Directional learning (see, for instance, Selten and Buchta, 1998) predicts the
direction of changing one’s strategy by adapting it in the direction suggested by an
ex post–analysis of past choices. For an actor reaching the second stage directional
learning theory would predict that if his offer was rejected last time it will be increased
next time. Similarly, in case of an accepted offer last time one should not increase the
offer(orkeepconstant). 92%ofall‘experimentator’–offersconﬁrmdirectionallearning
(43% are constant offers mainly at 7.5 or 8, i.e., when the producer’s outside option has
been reached). Only 8% of the ‘experimentator’–offers contradict directional learning.
Regularity 3 There is no support for general reciprocation by actors but we can dis-
tinguish different types of behavior amongst actor subjects: opportunistic/fair
proposers, linear reciprocators, and adjusting in an experimental manner.
Considering different types of behavior by actors might already give some insights
in sequels’ costs increases. For opportunistic/fair actors the ﬁnal picture of an increase
in costs depends on the ﬁrst stage offer. If it is low, the cost increase via an indirect60 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
wage claim is high, if it is high, the cost increase seems to be lower. This picture is
ampliﬁed for reciprocators who compensate (or reciprocate) low ﬁrst stage offers by
high second stage claims and therefore higher costs for the producer. Only for the last
group of subjects, experimenters, the cost increase of a sequel remains ambiguous.
3.7.6 Explaining Sequels Cost Increase
We will now investigate how much our experimental sequel would increase in costs. In
section 3.5 we discuss the implications for the cost increase of a sequel by the different
theories (see also table 3.7). Similarly to the ﬁeld we consider for this analysis only
movies which were produced and lead to a sequel, i.e., 143 observations where the
ﬁrst stage offer has been accepted and chance continued to the second stage. Sequels
in our experiment lay with 37% above the ET prediction of 22% and very close to the
ET–total prediction but below game theoretic prediction of 70% for risk neutral, or 48%
for risk averse actors.21
If our calibrated scenario captures the crucial aspects of the ﬁeld then in the ex-
periment our actor subjects seemed to be slightly more greedy than real life actors.
Nevertheless, as we model wage as the only source of a cost increase experimental
subjects are much less greedy than game theory would predict. Of course, real life ac-
tors may not be able to anticipate the prospects of a movie as well as the participants in
our experiment. In reality the process of negotiating will be also more complex. How-
ever, a more complex model would have more parameters that could not be identiﬁed.
Of course, actors may also be offered incentive contracts (although there is no moral
hazard problem).
Regularity 4 If wages account for a substantial part of a sequel’s cost increase then the
stylized facts seem to be rather close to equity predictions than to pure strategic
considerations. According to our experimental data the cost increase of the se-
quel can be explained by more ambitious demands of the core actor as expected.
3.8 Discussion
Our experiment has been inspired by a ﬁeld study (Luehrmann, 1992) to which we re-
fer as the sequel project. A producer and an actor negotiate how to share the uncertain
proceeds from a ﬁrst movie and in case of a sequel the proﬁts of the second movie in anSection 3.8. Discussion 61
alternating offer–way. Other related experiments22 did not include such dramatic risks
which seem crucial for the movie industry. In our view, these qualitative and quanti-
tative differences to former experiments are too dramatic to expect similar results as in
previous studies (G¨ uth and Tietz, 1990, for instance, report much lower conﬂict rates
in their review).
Anotherinnovativeaspectisthatwerelyoncalibratedparameters. Ourexperiment
which uses parameters calibrated from the ﬁeld study, should imply more reliable in-
sights and should avoid the missing parallelism of usual experiments. Actually, the
data of the sequel project suggest such extreme parameters that we ﬁrst were reluctant
to use them. In hindsight we consider our results, however, as rather encouraging: Al-
though“movieproduction”isrisky, eveninthelaboratorythereis“movieproduction”
as some experimental subjects in the role of producers are willing to take on risks.
Moreover, accordingtoourdataproducerseitherhavetobecometheonlyrisktaker
or have no joint venture at all. Risk–aversion can partly account for actors’ behavior.
Often joint ventures fail since producers underestimate actors’ acceptance threshold.
Reciprocity ideas seem to explain other aspects of observed behavior, although some
actors behave rather opportunistically. More generally, we could distinguish three
types of actor behavior, namely, constant, reciprocal and experimenter the latter ad-
justing in a learning direction–mode. Altogether there seems to be some variety in
what motivates behavior in such complex and risky joint ventures.
Our model and the experimental test “explain” an important aspect of the case
study, namely the cost increase of sequels. In their risky joint venture producer and
actor could share expected proﬁts rather than only those resulting from a hit. Equity
theory would predict a cost increase of a sequel by 22% or 35% depending on its spec-
iﬁcation for the model at hand. In the experiment actors do not just enjoy their “fame”
after a hit, but also want to be compensated for their low payoff from the ﬁrst ﬁlm.62 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A The Stage Form of the Game Model
The extensive form of the game is therefore:
1. P offers a wage–contract to A that speciﬁes a ﬁxed wage W1 for A and splits the
uncertain gain from producing the original movie.
2. A can accept or reject. If A rejects, both parties receive their outside payoff and
the game ends. If A accepts, the original movie is produced and the game con-
tinues.
3. Nature determines the success state s of the movie. Both parties receive a payoff
dependent on the success of the movie according to their contract. If the movie is
a ﬂop, the game ends. If the movie is a hit, the game continues.
4. A offers P a contract that speciﬁes a ﬁxed wage for A and a ﬁxed proﬁt for P for
producing a sequel to the original movie.
5. P can accept or reject this contract. If P rejects, both parties receive an additional
payoff dependent on their outside opportunities and the game ends. If P accepts,
the sequel is produced with gains from production C2 that are split according to
the contract and the game ends.
3.B Parameter Calibration
Calibrating Model Parameters. We estimate the proﬁtability of sequels (in present
value terms) estimating NPVs on the basis of projected revenues and costs. Note that
the calculations are similar to those above, but for the ﬁrst ﬁlms we used actual data,
whereas we use projected proﬁtability for sequels based on the stylized facts reported
above. Hence, this procedure reﬂects the expected and not the actual proﬁtability of
sequels. For example, it would never predict that a sequel is more proﬁtable than its
ﬁrst ﬁlm (like Batman 2). Also, while no studio would ever make a sequel with a
negative NPV, sequels can turn out to make losses even after a successful ﬁrst ﬁlm.
(“Look who is Talking 2” was a disaster.) We can then estimate the value of a sequel
right, that is the economic value of the right of the movie studio to produce a sequelSection 3.A. Appendix 63
Studio Proﬁtable Sequels Value of sequel right Sequel/First ﬁlm
MCA Universal 9 $6.69 30%
Paramount 3 $2.68 32%
Sony 4 $2.89 35%
20th Century Fox 2 $1.78 30%
Warner Brothers 3 $7.33 42%
Disney 5 $10.29 36%
Total/Average 26 $4.96 34%
Table 3.1: Values of sequels
Parameter Symbol Value
Probability of hit w 0.25
Proﬁt of hit Ph
1 66
Proﬁt of ﬂop P
f
1 ¡12
Exp. proﬁt of sequel P2 20
Table 3.2: Parameters
after observing the success of the ﬁrst ﬁlm. While only a small number of ﬁrst ﬁlm
gives rise to proﬁtable sequels, the movie studio does not have to produce sequels to
ﬂops. Table 3.1 gives the relevant data.
Hence, based on this model we would project that of 99 ﬁlms, 26 would generate
proﬁtable sequels. Note that even Sony, which had a negative proﬁt for its ﬁrst ﬁlms,
would have expected positive proﬁts for its sequels, since it would only make sequels
of 4 of its 34 ﬁlms. These data are volatile and can be driven by a small number of
outliers. In the case of Sony, a large fraction of projected sequel proﬁts comes from
the successful “Look who is talking,” that generates about 80% of its projected sequel
proﬁts.23 For our purposes, we now deﬁne a “hit” as a ﬁlm that could give rise to
a proﬁtable sequel, hence our hit rate here would be 26/99 or 26.3%. Note that this
hit rate probably overestimates the likelihood of a sequel being made, since it includes
some movies where the script of the ﬁrst movie would hardly give rise to a sequel (e.g.,
“Driving Miss Daisy”).
We reduce the empirical distribution of movies to a binary distribution as follows.64 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
A ﬁlm in our model is either a “hit” and produces a payoff of Ph






1. A ﬁlm is a hit with probability w, hence the expected
proﬁtability of a ﬁlm is:
m = wPh
1 + (1¡ w)P
f
1 . (3.16)








w (1¡ w) . (3.17)
The value of a sequel after a successful ﬁrst ﬁlm is denoted by P2, hence the value of
the sequel right is wP2. We chose the parameters in table 3.2.
Parameter Symbol Value Data Error
Prob. of hit w 0.25 0.263 ¡4.8%
Expected proﬁt m $7.50m $7.44 0.8%
Std. dev. s $33.77m $34.16 ¡1.1%
Exp. prof. of sequel P2 $20.00m $18.88 ¡5.6%
Sequel/ﬁrst ﬁlm P2/Ph
1 30% 34.1% 12.4%
Sequel right wP2 $5.00m $4.96 ¡0.8%
Table 3.3: Error statistics
Table 3.3 compares the actual values in the data, the calibrated values, and the er-
rors between actual and calibrated values. The calibration captures the mean and stan-
dard deviation of the data very accurately. The proﬁtability of the sequel and the value
of a sequel right is also captured. The typical ratio of the expected proﬁtability of a
sequel to a successful ﬁrst ﬁlm is 30% for the model values, and 34.1% in the sample.
Calibrating Sequel Costs. With the calibrated parameters we adjust the values of the
experiment the following way: If the company produces the movie it earns the revenue
R and has to bear production costs, consisting of the actor’s wages W and remaining
production costs PC. The producer’s proﬁts P1 in the ﬁrst stage for the “hit” (Ph
1) and
for the “ﬂop” (P
f
1) as well as proﬁt for a sequel P2 can be written as:
Pk
i = Rk
i ¡ (Wi + PCi), for i = 1, k 2 ff,hg, and i = 2 (without k). (3.18)
For calibrating R2 we use the stylized facts as in the case study for the relation of the


















Revenue: sequel R2 81
Additional costs hit/ﬂop PC1 48
Additional costs sequel PC2 48
Wage costs hit/ﬂop W1 2
Pie in case of a hit Ch
1 68
Pie in case of a ﬂop C
f
1 ¡10
Pie in case of the sequel C2 33
Outside option actor both stages OA 2
Outside option producer both stages OP 7
Table 3.4: Experimental parameters
Furthermore, we assume that the additional production costs are the same in the
ﬁlm and its sequel, PC1 = PC2. With this system of equations and the calibrated
values of Ph
1 = 66 (in case of a “hit”), of P
f
1 = ¡12 (in case of a “ﬂop”), and P2 =
20 we chose the parameters according to the game with one modiﬁcation as follows.
Neither the ﬁeld study nor our experimental data, give any evidence for W1 below
the outside option. That is why we prefer the calibration of W1 as W1 = OA
1 = 2
to W1 = OA
1 ¡ wW¤
2 = ¡4.5, which also matches the case study in that the relation
of total wage costs to cumulative costs (so called “negative costs” plus distribution
expenses) is approximately one to ﬁve for a typical ﬁlm, i.e., 1
4PC1 > W1.






1 ¡ PC1, j 2 fl,hg before the movie is going to be produced. The two possible pie
sizes are therefore Ch
1 = 68 and C
f
1 = ¡10 for the hit and the ﬂop movie, respectively.
In case of a successful ﬁrst movie the actor and producer negotiate about the remaining
share of the sequel’s revenue which is C2 = R2 ¡ PC2 = 7
10R1 ¡ PC2 = 33, according






2 = 7. Table 3.4 displays the calibrated parameters.2466 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
3.C Parametric Example
Actors Assume actors have outside wealth W0 and constant relative risk aversion






This expression can be used directly in (3.7) and solved for ˆ W1 (at least numerically) in
terms of the parameters of the model.

















with g 2 [¡1, ¥], (3.23)
which have density
f (W1) =





so that the second order condition becomes
g(W1 ¡W) > 2(g + 1) . (3.25)
Note that for g(W1 ¡ W) > 2(g + 1) this family of distribution functions is sufﬁ-
ciently ﬂexible for our example. For g = ¡1 we obtain the uniform distribution, for
¡1 < g < 0 we obtain distribution functions with the probability mass shifted to the
left, and for g > 0 we obtain distributions with the probability mass shifted to the























We have to guarantee that the solution lies in the interval (3.8), so the Min-operator
makes sure that the expression does not exceed the upper bound W. Hence, for interior
solutions W¤
1 is a weighted average of the minimum W (the reservation wage for aSection 3.D. Appendix 67























2 > 2 (3.27)
for all solutions. Hence, a distribution that assigns higher probabilities to higher reser-



















1 = W (3.29)
Here, the ﬁrst result follows from the deﬁnition of (3.21) and (3.5). Hence, if we
choose g small enough, then the probability distribution degenerates and all probabil-
ity mass is put on the event where the actor is risk-neutral (W¤
1 = W for all g + 1 < 0).
Hence, for g = ¡1 we recover the original problem and the solution (3.5), (3.6). Con-
versely, for large g, all actors are deemed to be inﬁnitely risk averse and judge the pay-
offs from the maximin criterion, so ˆ W1 = OA
1 (W¤






Equation (3.26) extends our game theoretic solution to risk averse actors. The im-
portance of (3.26) lies in the fact that we can always ﬁnd a probability distribution
characterized by some parameter g that would rationalize the behavior of producers
as an outcome of this game, where producers are uncertain about the actor’s reserva-
tion utility. Conversely, offers outside the interval (3.8) cannot be rationalized at all.
3.D Modelling Uncertainty about Risk-Aversion
We model the uncertainty about actors’ risk aversion by choosing a parametric family








in (3.10) in section 3.2 above. We apply
two ways to estimate g. Our ﬁrst approach uses the arithmetic mean of all offers in the























We can calculate g with the offers observed. For this, we insert the experimental68 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures








































with g as the only unknown parameter. The mean (median) offer in the range [¡4.5,2]
is 0.52 (0.00) and yields g = 0.34 (0.06) from direct substitution into (3.30).
Our second approach to estimate g is maximum likelihood estimation. We assume




1 if W1 ¸ ˆ W,
0 if W1 < ˆ W.
hence, the probability of accepting W1 is
Pr(a = 1) = Pr
¡
W1 ¸ ˆ W
¢
= F(W1).



























is drawn for the observed W1, answers, and different values of g between ¡1 and 25.25
The log-likelihood function is maximized for g = 2.7.Figure 3.2 plots the nonparamet-
ric estimation and the distribution function for both estimates of g.Section 3.D. Appendix 69






























































Max Log−Likelihood−Value = −0.52695
at g = 2.7
Figure 3.1: Log-likelihood function l (gjW1) for different g¡values









































95% Confidence interval 
g1 = 0.34 
g2 = 2.70 
Figure 3.2: The ﬁgure compares two parametric approaches to a non-parametric ap-
proach to estimating the acceptance probability. g1 is a moment estimator based on
the average offer; g2 is the maximum likelihood estimate. The acceptance probabilities





are compared to a nonparametric estimate.70 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
3.E Instructions (Translation)
The experiment was conducted in German and the original experimental instructions were also
in German. This is a shortened26 translated version of the instructions. Participants read the
paper instructions before the computerized experiment started. In the beginning, subjects were
informed that the instructions are the same for every participant, they receive an initial endow-
ment of DM 10, that the payoff is according to the average earnings – wins and losses from all
periods would be added, the exchange rate from ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) to DM:
ECU 1 = DM 2, that communication was not allowed and questions would be answered pri-
vately and that all decisions will be treated anonymously. Then the main instructions started.
Before the programm started participants were informed that they will interact in this way 18
periods and that their bargaining partner is randomly selected after each period.
Two parties, two persons A and B negotiate in each period about how to share
up to two amounts of money (all in ECU). Whether you act as A or B is determined
randomly at the beginning of the experiment. You will keep your role for the whole
experiment. The schedule of the decision making is as follows:
First B offers an amount v1 , with ¡10 · v1 · 68, to A of a later randomly deter-
mined amount G1. Then A decides whether he accepts or rejects offer v1 of B.
) In case of rejection you receive:
as A : 2 and
as B : 7.
The interaction is ﬁnished.
) In case of acceptance you receive:
as A : v1
as B : G1 ¡ v1
If A accepted the offer v1 the amount G1 which is to be shared is determined ran-
domly. Thereby with a probability of 75% the amount has the value of ¡10 and with
probability 25% the value of 68. Please note, that G1 = ¡10 causes a loss for player B.
If G1 = ¡10 the interaction is ﬁnished.
Otherwise (after G1 = 68) the interaction proceeds and A offers B a share v2 , with
¡10 · v2 · 33, about an additional amount G2 of 33. Participant B decides whether
he accepts or rejects the offer v2 of A.
) In case of rejection you receive additionally to the previous proﬁt:
as A : 2 and
as B : 7.
The interaction is ﬁnished.
) In case of acceptance you receive additionally to the previous proﬁt:
as A : G2 ¡ v2 (= 33¡ v2)
as B : v2
The interaction is ﬁnished.
At the end you will be informed again about the decisions of your interaction part-
ner and your corresponding payoffs. Please note, that losses are possible.Section 3.F. Tables 71
3.F Tables
Studio Number of ﬁlms Positive NPV Films Total NPV
MCA Universal 14 11 $263.7
Paramount 10 5 $25.7
Sony 34 8 ¡$55.4
20th Century Fox 11 5 $23.2
Warner Brothers 19 7 $233.1
Disney 11 6 $246.2
Total 99 42 $736.6
Table 3.5: Proﬁtability of ﬁrst ﬁlms
Parameter Symbol Value
Probability of hit w 0.25
Pie in case of a hit Ch
1 68
Pie in case of a ﬂop C
f
1 ¡10
Pie in case of the sequel C2 33
Outside option actor OA
1 = OA
2 2
Outside option producer OP
1 = OP
2 7
Table 3.6: Experimental parameters72 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
Prediction Equation Acronym Model Predictions
sequel cost
W1 W2 increase sci
Game Theory (GT) (3.3) - (3.6) GT ¡4.50 26.0 0.70
GT risk averse actors (3.26) - (3.28) GT–risk [¡4.5,2.00] 26.0 [0.48,0.70]
Equity Theory (ET) (3.11) - (3.12) ET 4.75 16.5 0.22
ET–total (3.13) - (3.14) ET–total 4.75 ¡ wD 16.5+ D [¡0.16,0.67]
D 2 [¡16.5,16.5]
Table 3.7: Predictions of game and equity theory
Stage 1 offer (W1) Stage 2 offer (P2)
Nobs Mean Std.dev Nobs Mean Std.dev
All 648 0.8 6.8 143 8.9 2.9
Accepted 435 4.5 4.1 121 9.3 2.3
Not accepted 213 ¡6.6 4.8 22 6.6 4.4
Table 3.8: Offers: number of observations, mean and standard deviation
Prediction for W1 (N = 519) W1 MSE
GT ¡4.50 85
GT–risk (N = 92) [¡4.5,2.00] 19
ET 4.75 22
ET–total (N = 393) wD = 1.26 8
Prediction for P2 (N = 143) P2 MSE
GT = GT–risk 7.00 12
ET 16.50 66
ET–total (N = 118) 16.50 ¡ D 49
Table 3.9: Predictions according to the calibrated parameters and MSE of the actual
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Figure 1: Frequencies and acceptance/rejection of stage 1 o¤ers (N=648).
Figure 2: Frequencies and acceptance/rejection of stage 2 o¤ers (N=143).
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Figure 3.3: Frequencies and acceptance/rejection of stage 1 offers (N=648)
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Figure 2: Frequencies and acceptance/rejection of stage 2 o¤ers (N=143).
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Figure 3.5: Acceptance Probability of ﬁrst stage offers
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Figure 3.6: Ratio of ﬁrst and second stage deviations from equity theory, N=118Section 3.H. Notes 75
Notes
1A notable exception are the James Bond–movies that led to a remarkable number of sequels, albeit
with different actors.
2Venture capital ﬁrms ﬁnance their portfolio ﬁrms in stages. At each stage, the venture capitalist
either negotiates another round of ﬁnancing or refuses further ﬁnancing and terminates the relationship.
See Gompers (1995).
3See the original experiments of Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1985) without stochastic uncertainty
and at most one contract.
4Our calibrations and the data for our study are based on a case study (Luehrmann, 1992) that con-
tains data on 99 movies in the 1989–season and some additional data on the proﬁtability of sequels,
based on 60 sequels produced between 1970 and 1990. Luehrmann bases his data on Variety Magazine
and some other industry sources.
5See Holstr¨ om (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983) for the traditional argument for output-con-
tingent contracts. See G¨ uth and Maug (2002) for an example of a principal-agent model with effort–
incentives where pay is ﬁxed.
















7See G¨ uth (1995) and Roth (1995) for surveys.
8See G¨ uth (1988) for an attempt to add speciﬁcity to this concept.
9The discount rate of 12 % is suggested by the case writer.
10The full calibration results for the parameters are listed in table 3.4 in appendix 3.B.
11A negative ﬁrst stage wage might be a reasonable result as unknown actors might become engaged
in rather costly actions to get the chance of their life and become a movie star.
12See appendix 3.E for translated instructions.
13Rematching was restricted to matching groups. Participants were not informed about the restriction
of rematching within matching groups what should have further discouraged repeated–game effects.
14DM 1 ¼ EUR 0.51.
15Producers had no chance to decline from negotiation. The only opportunity to drop out of the
negotiation was to offer a ﬁrst stage wage at the lower boundary of the offer space (W1 = ¡10). Those
offers which comprise 20% of the ﬁrst stage offers would bias the evaluation of different predictions, we
exclude them from the MSE analysis.
16In total we excluded 21 subjects from the analysis for one of the following reasons: (1.) subjects re-
jected offers of W1 = 2 and higher, which is inconsistent with any interpretation based on risk–aversion,
(2.) the highest offer rejected was smaller than the lower bound W = ¡4.5, (3.) the lowest accepted offer
was higher than the highest offer rejected.
17We estimate risk aversion by stipulating thatW0 = 20 (approximately equal to average experimental
earnings) and solve equation(3.20) in appendix 3.C for ˆ W1.
18Regressing P2 on W1
¡
Pi
2 = a0 + a1 ¢ Wi
1 + #i, with a1 > 0
¢
gives ˆ a0 = 9.3 (0.4), ˆ a1 = ¡0.09 (0.07)
for the estimates with standard errors in parenthesis and R2 = 0.01. Whereas strict ET–total would have
predicted the parameter estimates to be a0 = 0.625 ,a1 = 0.25.
19There is a total of 36 actors. Two participants reacted only once at the second stage or received and




2 = a0 + a1 ¢ Wi
1 + #i, with a1 > 0
¢
for those participants results in
a0 = 6.9 (0.2), a1 = .41 (0.04) for the estimates with standard errors in parenthesis and R2 = 0.80.
21The mean of all offers supporting ET–total is W1 = 3.49, so wD = 1.26. The theoretically corre-
sponding mean offer at the second stage would be P2 = 21.5 if subjects’ behavior follows the ET–total
prediction. Given ﬁrst and corresponding second stage offer, a sequel would therefore result in a cost
increase of 35%. It is not surprising that the observed data is close to this prediction. Equity preferences
have been shown to bee supported by the data for the relation of ﬁrst and second stage offers. Together
with the fact that the cost increase for this prediction is based on the average of the observed ﬁrst stage
offers makes this point clear.
22See Roth (1995) for a survey of simpler experiments.76 Chapter 3. Risky Joint Ventures
23Two sequels to this ﬁlm were made, but their economic success was far lower than expected on the
basis of the ﬁrst ﬁlm.
24One could assume that the outside option OA
2 of a movie star is much larger than before becoming
famous, so OA
2 > OA
1 . Manipulating the second stage outside option of the actor would allow to draw
conclusions whether an increase in the sequel’s costs might be explained by a raise in the movie star’s
real outside option. However in light of the results of the experiment a treatment with increased second
stage outside options became obsolete.





F( ˆ W) and taking logs gives (3.32).




Eversince Plato (1941)1 people seem to be aware that they may suffer from rational an-
ticipation of own future behavior.2 A very prominent intra–personal decision conﬂict
is one faced by a durable–goods monopolist (Coase, 1972). In a market with a durable
good, a monopolistic seller could easily collect the monopoly proﬁt by excluding any
future price cut. Buyers will, however, anticipate that future prices are opportunisti-
cally chosen by the monopolist; in particular, that the good will be sold cheaper in later
periods. For this reason, the monopolist loses market power.3 Coase conjectured that
this can even lead to competitive and thus efﬁcient market results.
Much of the literature on durable–goods monopoly has focused on the question un-
der which conditions the Coase conjecture proves to hold and under which conditions
it does not hold. For example, Stokey (1981) and Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986)
show that there is an equilibrium in which the price is (arbitrarily) close to marginal
cost if the number of successive sales periods is inﬁnitely high. Others have shown
that product durability does not necessarily reduce the monopolist’s market power
(Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989; Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski, 1989). G¨ uth and
Ritzberger (1998) show that a durable–goods monopolist may even increase proﬁts
above monopoly level when the model allows for a difference between the discount
factor of the monopolist and that of the potential buyers. Under this assumption, G¨ uth
0We thank Tim Grebe for his help by running the experiment. We gratefully acknowledge the con-
structive comments by Pio Baake, Margrethe Aanesen, and Jan Potters. The results in this chapter were
ﬁrstformulatedinG¨ uth, Kr¨ oger, andNorman(forthcoming), “Durable–GoodsMonopolywithPrivately
Known Impatience,” Economic Inquiry.
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and Ritzberger show that even over a ﬁnite number of periods the monopolist may sig-
niﬁcantly increase market power, provided the buyer has a lower discount factor. This
is the so–called Pacman Conjecture (Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski). If the seller
has a lower discount factor, he loses proﬁts compared to a one–period monopolist.
Insights from durable–goods markets also help to understand other markets and
their dynamics. First of all, quite many products can exhibit characteristics of durable
goods as they yield a ﬂow of services to the owner over a signiﬁcant long time. Several
products are traded on second hand markets so that durability or planned obsoles-
cence are of great importance. Empirical studies have focused on optimal durability
and the presence of second hand markets (Swan, 1985). Another interesting aspect
is that the concept of durable–goods captures behavioral aspects of time preferences
(see Hausman, 1979, who investigates the relation between discount factors of con-
sumers and purchase of goods). Nevertheless, not many empirical studies seem to
exist which deal with durable–goods monopolies (Suslow, 1986, who investigates Al-
coa’saluminiumpricingseemstobeanexception). Onereasonbeingthatitseemstobe
rather difﬁcult to distinguish the relevant differences in assumptions in the ﬁeld data.
Hence, empirical evidence relies mainly on experimental studies (G¨ uth, Ockenfels, and
Ritzberger, 1995, Reynolds, 2000, Cason and Sharma, 2001) to actually investigate the
predictive power of the theory.
Models taking time preferences of agents into account usually assume that players
have identical discount factors. However, there is ample evidence that discount factors
may be highly idiosyncratic in social environments.4 In this chapter, we follow G¨ uth
and Ritzberger in their less restrictive approach and allow for heterogeneous discount
factors. In addition, we assume that discount factors are privately known. Commonly
known impatience of players seems unlikely—at least, it requires further justiﬁcation.
How eager sellers and buyers are to obtain monetary rewards over time is presumably
difﬁcult to observe for others. So the assumption of privately known discount factors
seems less restrictive. More speciﬁcally, we assume that discount factors can be either
high or low, for both the monopolist and the buyer. Which state is realized is private
information. For this scenario, we analyze a two–period game with one seller and
one buyer whose valuation is also private knowledge, and derive the solution play
in closed form. Therefore, this chapter additionally contributes to the theoretical and
experimental literature on bargaining with asymmetric information.5
Experimental studies have investigated durable–goods monopolies with two, andSection 4.1. Introduction 79
more periods. Results of those studies mentioned above support the theoretical pre-
diction of intra–personal price competition in durable–goods monopolies. There is
strong evidence that monopolists indeed lose monopoly power when selling a durable
good. Where most experimental studies focus on dynamics of markets with the same
discount factor for all subjects G¨ uth, Ockenfels, and Ritzberger investigate the case of
heterogeneous discount factors for buyers and the monopolist.
However, in experimental studies also a large number of observations have been
made which indicate that subjects’ behavior is inconsistent with the predictions. Rey-
nolds observed that initial prices were higher in multi–period experiments than in
single–period monopoly experiments. In all experiments, there is more demand with-
holding than theory predicts. For example, Cason and Sharma observed more trading
periods than predicted due to higher demand withholding. Finally, durable–goods ex-
periments seem to require a number of repetitions due to their complexity. In G¨ uth,
Ockenfels, and Ritzberger, there was no opportunity for learning. Prices failed to
conform to comparative statics predictions and were often higher than the theoretical
benchmark. With experienced subjects, observed prices were closer to the prediction,
but participants still had serious difﬁculties to understand the crucial aspects of such
dynamic markets. Further experimental investigation is needed to solve the ambiguity
of previous results but also to provide a wider basis on which conclusions about the
predictive power of the theory can be drawn.
In addition to our theoretical contribution, we therefore provide experimental ev-
idence. Experimental data may reveal to what extent subjects’ behavior conforms to
(rational expectations) theory, but it may also show that bounded rationality limits the
predictive power of standard theory in durable–goods games. Theory has a number
of interesting testable implications in our market. Will sellers with a low discount
factor charge lower prices than a patient seller, as predicted? Similarly, will buyers
with a high discount factor refuse to purchase in period one more often compared to
impatient buyers? Considering bounded rationality, two kinds of behavior may be
important. First, buyer subjects may withhold demand, that is, they may reject prof-
itable purchases because of fairness reasons. Such behavior may soften the monopo-
list’s pricing behavior and may generally limit the predictive power of standard theory
in durable–goods games. Second, certain behavior might help to provide the missing
commitment device about future prices. It seems possible that seller subjects might feel
committed by mere intentions about their future behavior—even when there is no for-80 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
mal commitment device. This again could limit the predictive power of the theory. The
conﬂict of a durable–goods monopolist between avoiding the effects of intra–personal
pricecompetitionandreactingopportunistically, andhowthisentersthepriceexpecta-
tions of the buyer is an important behavioral issue with further theoretical implications
and suitable to be investigated with an economic experiment.
In view of these previous experiments and their results, it seems important to limit
attention to the simple case of markets with two periods. We also have provided am-
ple opportunities for learning by letting participants play the same market repeatedly
in our computerized experiment. This allows us to incorporate a further complexity,
namely that relative impatience is private information.
In section 4.2, we describe the model and in section 4.3 derive the game–theoretic
solutionplayfortwo–periodmarkets. Section4.4explainsthedesignoftheexperiment
whose results are described and statistically analyzed in section 4.5. We summarize in
section 4.6.
4.2 The Basic Model
Themonopolisticsellerhasanindivisiblecommoditywhichheevaluatesby0, whereas
the only buyer evaluates the commodity by v 2 [0,1]. The value v is, however, the
buyer’s private information. The distribution of v is uniform over the unit interval
[0,1], and this is commonly known.
We consider two successive sales periods. The discount factor z 2 (0,1) represents
the seller’s weight for future (period t = 2) versus present (period t = 1) proﬁt. Simi-
larly, d reﬂects the buyer’s impatience where d 2 (0,1).6 We denote by p1 the price in
period t = 1 and by p2 the price in period t = 2.
The decision process is as follows:
Period t = 1:
² The seller chooses his sales price p1 2 [0,1] for this period.
² Knowing p1 and her value v, the buyer decides whether or not to buy. If she does,
this ends the interaction; otherwise period t = 2 follows.
Period t = 2:
² The seller chooses his sales price p2 2 [0,1] for this period.Section 4.2. Model 81
² Knowing p2 and her value v, the buyer decides whether or not to buy. This ends
the interaction.
The proﬁt of the seller is p1 if there is trade in period t = 1, it is zp2 if trade occurs
in period t = 2, and it is 0 if there is no trade. For the buyer, the payoff is v ¡ p1 for
trade in period t = 1 it is d(v ¡ p2) for trade in period t = 2, and 0 in the case of no
trade.
If both discount factors are commonly known, and if the seller is risk neutral, the
solution prices p¤
1 and p¤










2[4¡ 2d ¡ z]
. (4.1)
Note that, with just one trading period, the monopoly price8 would be p¤ = 1
2, imply-
ing a proﬁt of 1
4. The polar cases of relative impatience correspond to
² z & 0 and d % 1 with lim p¤
1 = 1
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8 in period t = 1 (revenues in period t = 2 are
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² z % 1 and d & 0 with lim p¤
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3: the (extremely patient) seller
engages in price discrimination over time by collecting p¤
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3, more than the static monopoly proﬁt.
We assume that discount factors are private knowledge. In addition to information
about their discount factors, players observe the following: In period t = 1, the buyer
is informed about his valuation and the seller’s price offer. If there is trade in period
t = 1, the seller learns that there is trade. If there is no trade in period t = 1, the
buyer additionally observes the price p2, and the seller learns whether or not she sold
the commodity in period t = 2. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the
discount factors of buyers and sellers can adopt only two values, low or high. That is,
we assume
0 < d < d < 1 and 0 < z < z < 1 (4.2)
where the probability for d is w 2 (0,1) and that for z is w 2 (0,1). To allow for a
clear–cut benchmark solution,9 we assume that all the parameters d, d, z, z, w, and w
are commonly known.82 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
4.3 The Solution Play
Our ﬁrst point is obvious but useful to note. Whenever p2 ¸ p1 the buyer would not
buy in period t = 2 as d < 1. We therefore obtain
Proposition 1: The solution play of the two–period game involves a price decrease,
that is, p1 > p2.
Given the buyer’s discount factor d 2 fd, dg, when will she buy the commodity?
Consider the decision to buy in period t = 1 or t = 2. If a type v 2 [0,1] has not
bought in period t = 1 at price p1, she will buy in period t = 2 at price p2 whenever
v ¸ p2. Assume now a type v ¸ p2 who anticipates the actual solution prices p1 and
p2. Since buying in period t = 1 yields v ¡ p1, whereas delaying it yields d(v ¡ p2),
type v prefers to buy early if





Proposition 2: If the solution play involves prices p1 and p2,







1¡d for d = d
v =
p1¡dp2





and in period t = 2 if
v > v ¸ p2 for d = d (4.5)
v > v ¸ p2 for d = d ,
whereas
(ii) v < p2 implies no sales at all.
Note that Proposition 1 implies that the two thresholds v and v in Proposition 2 satisfy
v < v.
Next, we discard the possibility that the seller serves only the d–buyer types in
period t = 2. Assume, by contrast, that this is true. Then the d–buyer would onlySection 4.3. Solution Play 83
switch between buying at price p1 in period t = 1 and not buying at all, implying that
only d–buyers with v ¸ p1 buy in period t = 1. But, since p1 > p2, d–buyer types v
with p1 > v ¸ p2 would like to buy in period t = 2, contradicting the assumption that
only d–buyer types are served in period t = 2. Thus we have proved
Proposition 3: Trade in period t = 2 involves both buyer types d 2 fd,dg with positive
probability, i.e., v > p2.
Wecannowproceedtoderivethefullsolutionplayofthegame. Westartbysolving





value v ¸ v(v). Thus, his posterior probability of trade in period t = 2 at price p2 is
D(p2) =
(1¡ w)(v ¡ p2) + w(v ¡ p2)
(1¡ w)v + wv
, (4.6)
where, in view of Proposition 3, both terms of the numerator on the right–hand side
above are positive. Maximization of p2D(p2) yields
p2 = p2 (v,v) =
(1¡ w)v + wv
2
. (4.7)










This system can readily be solved as
v = p1
¡
2¡ dw ¡ d(2¡ w)
¢
¡




2¡ d(1+ w) ¡ d(1¡ w)
¢
¡
2¡ d(1+ w) ¡ d(2¡ w) + dd
¢ . (4.10)
Since the optimal price p2 = ((1¡ w)v + wv)/2 depends on v and v, it can be ex-
pressed as a function of p1 only:
p2 (p1) = p1
¡
1¡ dw ¡ d(1¡ w)
¢
¡
2¡ d(1+ w) ¡ d(2¡ w) + dd
¢ . (4.11)
We will use g = (1¡ dw¡ d(1¡ w)) and # = (1¡ d¡ d+ dd) to simplify the notation.
Note v = p1(g + 1¡ d)/(g + #), v = p1(g + 1¡ d)/(g + #), p2 (p1) = p1g/(g + #).84 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
With the help of these derivations, the expected proﬁt from trade over the two sales
periods can be deﬁned as a function of p1, the price of period t = 1, namely
p1 [(1¡ w)(1¡ v(p1)) + w(1¡ v(p1))]+ (4.12)
zp2 (p1)[(1¡ w)(v(p1) ¡ p2 (p1)) + w(v(p1) ¡ p2 (p1))] ,








(g + #)(g + 1¡ d)
2g(2(g + #) ¡ zg)
, (4.14)
v(z) =
(g + #)(g + 1¡ d)




2(2(g + #) ¡ zg)
. (4.16)
Hence, we have derived the solution10 play described by
Proposition 4: For z 2 fz,zg, the solution play of the two–period game is as follows:
² In period t = 1, the price is p1 (z) which induces all buyers with v ¸ v(z) and
d = d and those with v ¸ v(z) and d = d to buy.
² In period t = 2, all buyers with v(z) > v ¸ p2 (z) and d = d and those v(z) >
v ¸ p2 (z) and d = d buy, whereas
² all remaining buyer types abstain from trading.
According to p1 (z), the seller with time preference z 2 fz,zg reveals his impa-
tiencebyhisﬁrst–periodprice p1.11 Therefore, thebuyercanrationallyanticipate p2 (z)
after observing p1. The seller in turn only learns after the ﬁrst sales period whether or
not the buyer has bought in this period. Thus, his demand expectations for the second
sales period are as expressed by D(p2).Section 4.4. Experiment 85
4.4 Experimental Design
Our experimental design exactly matches the above setup of the durable–goods mono-
poly with privately known impatience. We employ the parameters d = z = 0.3,
d = z = 0.7, w = w = 0.5. These parameters imply the values in table 4.2. If the
buyers’ valuations are drawn from the unit interval as assumed in the theory section,
the two columns on the left apply. In the experiment, we took buyers’ valuations from
the interval [50,150]. Therefore, the absolute price prediction is according to the two
right columns of table 4.2. For the sake of plausibility of the frame, we introduced
a “production on demand”–cost of 50. Sellers could choose prices from the interval
[0,200].
We ran six sessions, each consisting of two matching groups, giving us twelve in-
dependent observations. Each round was conducted exactly as follows:12 One group
consisted of three sellers and three buyers. Within the groups, sellers and buyers were
randomly rematched after each round.13 Subjects learned their role, seller or buyer,
only after they had read the instructions (see appendix 4.B), and they did not switch
roles during the experiment. In order to allow for learning, we decided to run the
experiment over 40 rounds.14
Sellers learned their discount factor, then they had to choose their price. Knowing
their discount factor and value, buyers had to decide whether or not to buy at the
period–one price p1. If they decided not to, period two would commence and so forth.
At the end of each round, subjects were informed about their private earnings in the
previous round as well as their cumulative earnings up to this round. They did not
receive any information about the other persons discount rate or payoffs.15
The computerized experiments were conducted at Humboldt University, Berlin, in
December 2001 and January 2002, using the software z–tree (Fischbacher, 1999). The
72 participants were mainly business and economics students who were recruited via
email and telephone. Payments were 16 Euros on average, including a show–up fee of
2.5 Euros. Sessions lasted roughly 90 minutes.
4.5 Results
Let us ﬁrst check whether buying and pricing behavior is consistent with a few quali-
tative theoretical implications. It seems worth emphasizing that consistency even with86 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
very basic principles cannot be taken for granted in a complex durable–goods setting.
For example, G¨ uth, Ockenfels, and Ritzberger (1995) report a surprising amount of in-
consistency16 in a durable–goods experiment. Similarly, Reynolds (2000) emphasizes
the necessity of experience with the trading environment. Therefore, we ﬁnd it useful
check consistency ﬁrst.
Consider the buyers. Basic understanding of the situation implies that buyers
would never purchase at a price above their valuation. It seems impossible that some
argument based on repeated games or bounded rationality could plausibly support
such loss–inducing purchases. Out of 1,440 possible sales, we observed 1,037 actual
purchases. In all but six purchases, buyers had valuations above the prices. That is,
there are virtually no such loss–making purchases, and we can conclude that basic
buyer behavior was consistent in this sense.17
Buyers knew that proﬁts from sales made in period t = 2 are discounted. Thus, d–
buyers should reject a proﬁtable purchase in period t = 1 more often than a d–buyer.
Given any path of (expected) seller prices fp1, p2g, the impatient buyer has to purchase
earlymoreoften, ashersecond–periodopportunitiesarelessattractive. Evenifwetake
repeated–game effects like demand withholding into account, it seems implausible for
the more impatient buyer to reject more often because it is more costly for her to reject.
Conﬁrming this, the data show that, in period t = 1, the d–buyers reject proﬁtable
offers (i.e., offers with p1 · v) with 41% signiﬁcantly more often than d–buyers with
16%. Because of possible dependence of observations within the groups of six subjects,
we count group averages including all periods as one observation. Unless mentioned,
all tests reported in this chapter are therefore based on matching group averages. See
appendix 4.A for summary statistics of all matching groups. Relative acceptance rates
are lower with d for all groups, the according non–parametric test is highly signiﬁcant
(one–sided Wilcoxon, p = 0.0002). We conclude that buyers do understand the basic
impact of discounting.
Now consider the sellers. Did they understand the implication of discounting? If
so, sellers with a high discount factor should charge a higher price in both periods than
sellers with a low discount factor. As shown above (see table 4.2), this is the prediction.
Even if subjects do not behave according to the solution play, it should be apparent to
them that a high discount factor makes it relatively more attractive to charge a high
price in period t = 1 as there is still another proﬁtable opportunity to come. As both
types of sellers should (and indeed did) reduce their price in t = 2, a higher periodSection 4.5. Results 87
t = 1 price for high discount factor types also implies higher period t = 2 prices. By
contrast, the impatient seller has to make his sales early and, therefore, charges also a
lower period t = 2 price. The data show that average prices of z sellers were higher
(t = 1 : 91 and t = 2 : 81) than those of z sellers prices (t = 1 : 84 and t = 2 : 78) in
all groups and in both periods. Accordingly, the test is highly signiﬁcant (one–sided
Wilcoxon, p = 0.006). It appears that sellers understood the impact of their discount
factor.
Proposition 1 states that sellers should charge lower prices in period t = 2 com-
pared to period t = 1. The intuition is that a discounting buyer has no incentive to buy
at a higher price in period t = 2. If sellers want to exploit the opportunity to sell in
period t = 2, they should lower the price. However, the prediction of a price decrease
over the two periods is not the only plausible behavior. Boundedly rational sellers
may refuse to charge a lower period t = 2 price in an attempt to solve the commitment
problem.
In 750 cases, there is no trade in period t = 1, and therefore a period t = 2 price
is observed. In the vast majority of these cases, sellers indeed charged a lower price
in period t = 2. In total, only 33 out of 750 period t = 2 prices were strictly higher
than p1, and this ﬁgure gets even smaller over time. Over the last 10 rounds, only 3
out of 155 period t = 2 prices were strictly higher than p1. In many instances (13 out of
33 and 3 out of 3 cases, respectively), we observe the maximum price of 200 in period
t = 2, and all but one of these 13 observations were caused by a single seller.18 In
these cases, the higher price does not appear to be a mistake but a signal. In addition,
there are another 33 observations (7 over the last 10 rounds) in which the price was
constant over the two periods. The vast majority of these cases can be attributed to
only a few sellers.19 We never observed a seller who regularly behaved as a one–period
monopolist in the sense of p1 = p2 = 100. To summarize, we ﬁnd only few violations
of Proposition 1. A few subjects occasionally charged p2 = p1 or p2 = 200 > p1. This
may be interpreted as attempts to solve the durable–goods monopolist’s commitment
problem. The remaining number of inconsistencies is small and scattered over time
and subjects.
Result 1: Subjects’ behavior is consistent with several qualitative predictions. Buyers
virtually never make unproﬁtable purchases. Almost all sellers systematically
lowered prices in period t = 2. Patient buyers reject proﬁtable purchases in88 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
period t = 1 more often. Patient sellers charge higher prices in both periods.
Let us now compare the data to the exact predictions of p1, p2, v and v. Consider
buyer behavior ﬁrst. Buyers withhold demand whenever an offer v > p is rejected.
The prediction is that any price offer smaller than v (in period t = 2) or smaller than
v or v (in period t = 1) should be accepted independently of the history of the game.
There can be rational and boundedly rational (or irrational) demand withholding. In
period t = 1, when v > p1 but v < v or v < v respectively, a rejection is rational. In
period t = 2, there is no rational demand withholding. While demand withholding
as part of boundedly rational strategy has been frequently observed (Rufﬂe, 2000, in-
vestigates strategic buyer behavior in oligopoly experiments, and Engle–Warnick and
Rufﬂe, 2002, in a monopoly experiment), in this experiment, demand withholding in
order to establish a reputation for aggressive buyer behavior is particularly difﬁcult.
First, there is the random rematching, and the design does not allow to identify buy-
ers. Moreover, sellers do not know whether their offer was rejected because of demand
withholding or because it was not proﬁtable. By contrast, in many posted–offer experi-
ments, buyers’ valuations are known, and demand withholding can much better serve
as a signal.
Buyer behavior in period t = 2 is simple to analyze as there are no future effects
to consider. Buyers’ period t = 2 behavior is also independent of d. Any p2 · v
should be accepted by all buyers. Table 4.3 reports the numbers of observed price
offers, their acceptance conditional on the relation of price offer and threshold v and
v for both negotiation periods. In the data, we ﬁnd that 68 out of 413 offers (16.5%)
with p2 · v were rejected (see column 6 (”p2 · v”)). These rejected offers typically
left only a small proﬁt margin for the buyers. This margin was (v ¡ p2)/v = 0.0693
on average for the rejections. Two thirds of all rejections involved a margin of less
than 8%. Regarding accepted offers, buyers often were willing to accept even low
margins and, in four cases, buyers accepted a period t = 2 price at which they just
broke even. Two thirds of all accepted prices gave them a less than 26% proﬁt margin.
Buyers never rejected margins of more than 25%. Figure 4.1 illustrates the acceptance
and rejection averages of (v ¡ p2)/v for the twelve groups (provided v ¡ p2 ¸ 0).
Overall groups, offers which left on average at least 13% of the buyers’ valuation were
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seems to exist a quite robust acceptance threshold margin interval of [11%,13%] below
andabovewhichoffersarerejectedandaccepted, respectively. Recallthatbuyersknew
the production cost of the seller (50). Therefore, besides the impact of the discount
factor, they were able to identify the seller’s proﬁt and compare it to their own. Take
buyers’ reaction to the median period t = 2 price, p2 = 75, as an example. Buyers with
v < 100 knew that the seller would get a larger proﬁt from the sale, but they rejected
only in 9 out of 38 cases (taking only buyers with v ¸ p2 = 75 into account). Thus, it
seems that aversion against disadvantageous inequality played only a little role here.20
Nevertheless, there is demand withholding in period t = 2.
Weturntobuyerbehaviorinperiod t = 1. Thepredictionisthat, afterobservingthe
equilibrium price p1(z), buyers with v > v > p1 or v > v > p1 should accept. (Hence-
forth, we will refer to “v” whenever we want make a statement about “v or v”.) For
out-of-equilibrium prices b p1, buyers with v > v(b p1) > b p1 and v > v(b p1) > b p1 should
accept (see equation (4.4)). This relation holds if buyers interpret out-of-equilibrium
prices as decision errors and believe sellers behave rationally in period t = 2 and
will set the equilibrium price p2(b p1) as in equation (4.11). Acceptance numbers for
the observed prices po
1 and according to v(po
1) computed thresholds taking out-of-
equilibrium prices into account are listed in the ﬁrst three columns of table 4.3. First,
consider buyers with v > v ¸ po
1 which are predicted to reject (these are cases of ra-
tional demand withholding). Out of 206 cases (see column 2
¡
”po
1 · v < v”
¢
), buyers
rejected in 174 cases (84.5%). That is, to a large extent, buyers’ behavior was in ac-
cordance with the theory. There are, however, some inconsistencies, namely the 32
accepted offers yielding a proﬁt margin of (v ¡ p1)/v = 0.159. These buyers did not
realize that a lower period t = 2 price should have given them a higher discounted
margin. Second, did buyers with v ¸ v accept? If (v¡ v)/v is positive 90% of all offers
were accepted. If (v ¡ v)/v > 0.1 even 96% of all offers were accepted. The average
rejected margin was (v ¡ p1)/v = 0.115. Note that this margin is larger than the one
in period t = 2, so there is more demand withholding in period 1. These are cases of
irrational (or boundedly rational) demand withholding.
Result 2: Buyers’ behavior is to a large extent consistent with the prediction. Buyers
usually accepted proﬁtable offers in period t = 2 while, in period t = 1, they
accepted only if the offer gave them a more than positive proﬁt margin. Both90 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
in period t = 1 and t = 2, there is some irrational (or boundedly rational) de-
mand withholding, that is, buyers sometimes reject margins higher than those
predicted.
Now consider seller behavior. We report deviations from the (conditional) predic-
tions rather than absolute values because the optimal prices p2 depend on the realiza-






















, and we deﬁne
Dp1 (z) = po
1 ¡ p1 (z), Dp2 = pe
2 ¡ p2(po
1). Note that Dp2 does only depend on p1








= ¡6.46 , and
Dp2 = +0.89.21 We ﬁnd that both Dp1 (z) are signiﬁcantly different from zero (two–












Given that buyers charged prices in period t = 1 partly far away from the predic-
tion, it is more difﬁcult to analyze period t = 2 pricing behavior. If we interpret the
p1 / 2 f90,97g as decision errors, and if we assume that both buyers and sellers behave
fully rationally in the continuation game, then the appropriate period t = 2 price is
p2(po
1) as in equation (4.11). As mentioned, we report the difference between actual
prices in t = 2 and this prediction: Dp2 = pe
2 ¡ p2(po
1). Now, Dp2 = 0.89 is surprisingly
small what we interpret as support of the rationality hypothesis when the situation
is simple (in t = 2, sellers do not have to anticipate own future choices any longer).
Regarding group averages, ﬁgure 4.2 shows that all except one group have a rather
small Dp2 while the Dp1 observations are more dispersed and clearly negative. We
do not distinguish between z–values as the picture is roughly the same. The fact that
Dp2 average is slightly positive does not mean that pricing behavior in period t = 2
changes qualitatively from that in period t = 1. Sellers start with a lower price, reduc-
ing it by the proportion predicted. Hence, whatever accounts for the lower prices in
period t = 1, this behavior carries over to period t = 2. This picture holds also for the
individual sellers, but there is more variability.
Result 3: Sellers charge prices lower than predicted, both in period t = 1 and period
t = 2. The reduction of period t = 2 prices is consistent with (conditional) ratio-
nality.Section 4.5. Results 91
To conclude the analysis of seller behavior, we discuss the only signiﬁcant deviation
from the prediction, the lower period t = 1 prices. This is a robust ﬁnding in that it
is very similar for both discount rates z and z. One explanation for po
1 prices below
the theoretical prediction might lie in the speciﬁc design of the experiment. Instead
of a continuous demand function, we have assumed a single buyer whose value is
private information. The density of the value plays the role of the continuous demand
function. Theoretically, this does not matter much for the outcome, but it may matter
behaviorally as in such bilateral encounters fairness concerns may become stronger,
and this could account for low ﬁrst–period prices (which would imply more balanced
distributions of surplus from trade). Alternatively, risk considerations (an attitude of
sellers to ensure trade) may explain the result. We did not control for fairness concerns
nor for risk aversion of sellers. Because the buyer’s valuation is private knowledge,
sellers only know the expected buyer proﬁt. Though it is possible for buyers to make
inter–personal proﬁt comparisons for trades in period t = 1, it is quite difﬁcult to do so
for sellers and, regarding proﬁts made in the second period, there is uncertainty about
the discount factor. Therefore, compared to pure bargaining experiments, it seems less
likely that fairness matters, suggesting that the lower period t = 1 prices rather reﬂect
the risk attitude of sellers.
We ﬁnally analyze the impact of the constellation of the discount factors. It is
a central feature of our model that the discount factor of the seller, as compared to
the buyer’s, determines whether the seller suffers from intra–personal competition or
gains by price discrimination. In this sense, a higher discount factor implies higher
“power,” affecting both acceptance rates and proﬁts. Above, we already reported the
impact of discount factors, separately for buyers and sellers. Here, we compare accep-
tance rates and proﬁts for all (z,d) seller–buyer combinations.
We start with the percentage of accepted offers. Let at(z,d) denote the rate of ac-
ceptance for some (z,d) seller–buyer combination in period t (see appendix 4.A for the
data of the matching groups). Theory predicts that sellers with a high discount factor
charge higher prices both in period t = 1 and period t = 2, and that buyers with a
high discount factor reject proﬁtable purchases in period t = 1 more often. This im-
mediately implies that, in period t = 1, a1(z,d) should have the smallest and a1(z,d)
the highest acceptance rate, while a1(z,d) and a1(z,d) should be intermediate. Deduc-92 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
ing acceptances rates from table 4.2, the prediction is a1(z,d) < a1(z,d). This turns out







< a1(z,d) with corresponding signiﬁcance level
of the one–sided Wilcoxon tests above the inequality signs. Intuitively, the acceptance
rates in period t = 2 must exhibit the opposite inequality signs: if there are fewer ac-
ceptances in period t = 1, more buyers are left to accept in period t = 2. In accordance
with this intuition, one can deduce a2(z,d) > a2(z,d) > a2(z,d) > a2(z,d) from table
4.2. We ﬁnd that a2(z,d)
(.006)
> a2(z,d) and a2(z,d)
(.032)
> a2(z,d) as predicted and signif-
icantly so (one–sided Wilcoxon test), but neither a2(z,d) > a2(z,d) (as predicted) nor
a2(z,d) > a2(z,d) (not predicted) were signiﬁcant.
Now consider proﬁts (see appendix 4.A for the group data again). Predictions are
simple. Given the discount factor of the other player, a high own discount factor im-
plies a higher proﬁt. Given the own discount factor, a high discount factor of the other
player implies a lower proﬁt. It turns out that this holds in the experimental data for
all possible (z,d) combinations (see table 4.5). That is, though high and low discount
factor types can actually realize the same proﬁt in period t = 1, high discount factor
types make larger proﬁts because of the trade shifted to period t = 2. Let uS (z,d)
and uB (z,d) indicate the average proﬁts made in a (z,d) seller–buyer encounter. The
average uS (z,d) was roughly 19, and the average uB (z,d) was about 21. The following
inequalities are signiﬁcant (with the corresponding signiﬁcance level of the one–sided





























































Result 4: We ﬁnd, in line with the theoretical predictions, that high discount factors of
either the seller or the buyer reduce the probability of a successful trade in period
t = 1. Nevertheless, higher average earnings can be realized if the opponent has
a low discount factor. Whereas the own discount factor has no inﬂuence proﬁts.Section 4.6. Discussion 93
4.6 Discussion
The literature substantiating the intuition of Coase’s (1972) durable–goods monopolist
has inspired much theory but only few experiments. In this chapter, we have extended
both lines of research. We solve, for the ﬁrst time, the simplest case where discount
factors are private information. Second, by conducting a laboratory experiment, we
provide a test of the theory.
The experimental results of former studies on durable–goods monopolies and bilat-
eral bargaining with informed proposers are less supportive for theory. Participants in
our experiment behaved according to the qualitative predictions of the model. There
are few unproﬁtable purchases, and there are generally lower prices in the ﬁrst pe-
riod as predicted. Furthermore, participants reacted adequately to changes in discount
factors (within–subject comparisons) and, as buyers, maintained higher acceptance
thresholds in the ﬁrst than in the second period. Ceteris paribus, a higher discount fac-
tor of at least one player shifts more trade to the second period. Whenever the situation
becomes rather simple, as for instance in the second period, “conditional” rationality
can account for most of the decision data. Additionally, our results suggest that the
own discount factor has rather insigniﬁcant impact on earnings. Whereas negotiating
with an impatient opponent, yields signiﬁcant higher income.
Our results might indicate that short term problems and learning shifts behavior
closer to theoretical prediction of the durable–goods monopoly model. In our study
the time horizon was 2 periods whereas in Rapoport, Erev, and Zwick (1995), and Ca-
son and Sharma (2001) subjects interacted “inﬁnitely” long with each other. Short term
problems might be better capable by boundedly rational subjects than long term bar-
gaining situations. Another reason for our supportive results for theory might be, that
subjects in our experiment had more learning opportunities. Participants interacted in
40 durable–goods markets which allowed them to gain more experience.22 However,
those conclusions should be interpreted cautiously as our experimental design differed
in more than one variable from studies mentioned above.
It has already been indicated that we view durable–goods monopolies as very in-
triguing. They challenge the conventional wisdom that several competitors are needed
to induce competitive outcomes; they are also philosophically challenging by claiming94 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
intra–personal decision conﬂict. After all, it is due to rational anticipation of own fu-
ture behavior that the durable–goods monopolist may earn so much less than a usual
monopolist. It seems remarkable that such insights seem to have been well understood
by the participants.Section 4.A. Appendix 95
Appendix to Chapter 4
4.A Descriptive Statistics
The summary statistics for all presented variables and tests are reported in table 4.1 on
matching group level. All variables meet the notation in the chapter p1 and p2 are ﬁrst
and second period prices, uS(z,d) and uB(z,d) denote seller’s and buyer’s earnings,
and Dp1 (z) and Dp2 (p1) stand for the differences of prices to the theoretical predic-
tion. We introduce the new notation a1(z,d) and a1(z,d) distinguishing acceptance
rates of buyers with low and high discount factors. For the acceptance rate of buyers
we consider only offers below buyer’s valuation, i.e., no rejection due to losses. All
data with all individual decisions from the experiment, i.e., all 1,440 negotiations, are
available at http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/˜skroeger/dgm/ .
matching
group p1 p2 a1(z,d) a1(z,d) uS(z,d) uB(z,d) Dp1 (z) Dp2 (p1)
1 83.87 75.46 0.85 0.62 20.22 26.29 ¡9.52 ¡1.91
2 84.54 77.13 0.89 0.66 19.12 22.57 ¡8.84 ¡0.29
3 90.73 83.15 0.88 0.70 20.94 17.77 ¡2.65 1.87
4 100.73 85.49 0.87 0.46 19.19 14.71 7.34 ¡3.08
5 87.53 81.27 0.81 0.48 17.89 20.97 ¡5.86 1.43
6 83.71 74.98 0.81 0.69 17.06 21.23 ¡9.68 ¡0.93
7 91.08 80.12 0.79 0.70 22.89 20.13 ¡2.31 ¡1.12
8 87.91 97.87 0.93 0.56 18.98 21.70 ¡5.48 18.72
9 88.56 77.35 0.81 0.50 18.70 19.85 ¡4.83 ¡0.86
10 83.58 76.67 0.84 0.52 19.81 24.20 ¡9.81 0.84
11 85.12 73.32 0.82 0.48 16.74 22.59 ¡8.27 ¡4.21
12 80.27 73.16 0.74 0.69 15.41 22.78 ¡13.12 0.26
all 87.30 79.79 0.84 0.59 18.91 21.23 ¡6.08 0.79
Table 4.1: Summary statistics: Mean values for each matching group96 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
4.B Instructions (Translation)
The experiment was conducted in German, and the original experimental instructions were
also in German. This is a shortened23 translated version of the instructions. Participants read
the paper instructions before the computerized experiment started. In the beginning of the
instructions, subjects were informed that the instructions are the same for every participant,
that they receive an initial endowment of DM 5, that wins and losses from all periods would
be added, that the exchange rate from ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) to DM: 30 ECU =
DM 1, that communication was not allowed and questions would be answered privately, and
that all decisions will be treated anonymously. Then the main instructions started.
Two parties, a seller S and a buyer B, negotiate in each period about the sale of a
product. The buyer’s product value v is 50 · v · 150 (all in ECU). The valuation is
the payoff a buyer receives if he purchases the product. In each period, there will be
a new v drawn from this interval, with all values being equally likely. The seller has
production costs of 50 if he sells the good.
Whether you act as S or B is determined randomly at the beginning of the experi-
ment. You will keep your role for the whole experiment. You will interact in total over
40 periods. Your bargaining partner will every time be randomly determined at the
beginning of each period.
Trade takes place according to the following rules:
1. S decides about the price p1 with 0 · p1 · 200 within a ﬁrst sales opportunity.
2. B decides whether to buy and pay p1 or not.
(a) If B purchases the product, S receives p1 ¡50. B receives v and pays p1 , i.e.,
his proﬁt is v ¡ p1.
The period is over.
(b) If B does not purchase, there will be a second sales opportunity. In this case,
S decides about a second price p2 with 0 · p2 · 200 . B decides whether to
buy and pay p2 or not to buy at all.
i. If B purchases the product, S receives a discounted proﬁt z (p2 ¡ 50). B
receives v and pays p2 , i.e., his discounted proﬁt is d(v ¡ p2).
(The discount rates z and d of the seller and the buyer, respectively, spec-
ify with which factor the proﬁt from the second sales opportunity is
multiplied.)
ii. If B does not purchase (i.e., does not buy at all), both parties receive zero
proﬁts.
The period is over.
[At this point, the decision process is also graphically illustrated.]
There are only two values possible for both discount rates z and d , namely 0.3
and 0.7. Possible (z , d ) constellations are therefore (0.3,0.3), (0.3,0.7), (0.7,0.3), and
(0.7,0.7). The likelihood for both discount rates’ values is the same, and the values
are randomly determined at the beginning of each period independently for seller andSection 4.B. Appendix 97
buyer. All four constellations have the same probability. Only S knows which of the
two values z has been selected. Correspondingly, only B knows his realized d value.
At the beginning of each period, you are, according to your role, informed about:
² As seller S: Your discount rate z.
² As buyer B: Your discount rate d.
and your valuation for the product v.
At the end of each period, you will be informed about your proﬁt in each period
and your total payoffs.
Thank you for participating!98 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
4.C Tables
v 2 [0,1] v 2 [50,150]
z z z z
p1 (z) 0.47 0.40 97 90
p2 (z) 0.33 0.28 83 78
v(z) 0.53 0.45 103 95
v(z) 0.79 0.67 129 117
Table 4.2: Experimental parameters
Period t = 1 Period t = 2
Offers v < po
1 po
1 · v < v v · v All v < pe
2 pe
2 · v All
All 511 206 723 1440 337 413 750
Rejected 507 174 69 750 335 68 403
Accepted 4 32 654 690 2 345 347
Table 4.3: Acceptance numbers for different value classiﬁcation concerning observed
pe
1 and pe
2Section 4.C. Tables 99
t = 1 Buyer
Discount rate d = 0.3 d = 0.7
Seller z = .3 60.4% (11.0) 41.7% (9.6)
z = .7 49.8% (8.7) 31.9% (10.6)
t = 2 Buyer
Discount rate d = 0.3 d = 0.7
Seller z = .3 43.6% (17.4) 54.7% (12.2)
z = .7 36.1% (11.4) 54.6% (17.6)
Table 4.4: Share of accepted ﬁrst- and second-period offers separately for all four
(z,d)-constellations. Standard deviation based on independent observations (match-
ing groups) are reported in brackets
All Buyer
Discount rate d = .3 d = .7
Seller z = .3 uS : 20(3) uB : 22(5) uS : 15(3) uB : 24(5)
z = .7 uS : 22(3) uB : 19(4) uS : 17(4) uB : 20(4)
In case of sale Buyer
Discount rate d = .3 d = .7
Seller z = .3 uS : 26(3) uB : 29(5) uS : 20(4) uB : 33(5)
z = .7 uS : 32(4) uB : 28(5) uS : 25(3) uB : 29(5)
Table 4.5: Proﬁts for all observations separately for each role and all parameter constel-
lations. Standard deviations based on independent observations (matching groups)
are reported in brackets100 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
4.D Figures
relative profit buyer (=(v-p2)/v)
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Figure 4.1: Average group acceptance thresholds in t = 2 (provided v ¸ p2)
delta (p1)





















Figure 4.2: Dp1 and Dp2 averages for individual sellers and matching groupsSection 4.E. Notes 101
Notes
1See Frank (1996) for a modern analysis.
2For Homer’s Ulysses, who binds himself to the ship’s mast, there is a way out of the dilemma. But
usually such escape does not exist.
3A similar intra–personal decision conﬂict arises in vertically related markets. An upstream mono-
poly selling to multiple downstream ﬁrms may signiﬁcantly lose its market power (for experimental
evidence, see Martin, Normann, and Snyder, 2001).
4Thereisthesubstantial“myopia”or“short–terminism”literature. Takeoverthreats, careerconcerns
and risk considerations can induce managers not to maximize the discounted value of the ﬁrm but
to choose projects with a high return early. Such factors are likely to differ across managers. Thus,
managers ultimately operate with different discount factors. See, e.g., Stein (1989), or Palley (1997) for
more references.
5The study by Rapoport, Erev, and Zwick (1995) is closely related to the present one where the re-
sponder (buyer) is informed about the pie size and the proposer (seller) only knows its range. Bilateral
bargaining with a reversed asymmetric information structure has been experimentally investigated by
Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993, and Rapoport and Sundali, 1996.
6Only the assumption d < 1 is actually necessary for deriving a well–deﬁned solution play. The
boundary case d = 1 can only be analyzed via d % 1 (see G¨ uth and Ritzberger, 1998). Note that
d = 1 renders buying in period t = 1 or t = 2 as homogeneous trades in view of the buyer. The
fact that d = 1 cannot be solved directly provides an example that price competition for homogeneous
products should be solved as the limiting case of such competition for heterogeneous products when
heterogeneity vanishes.
7The general case of ﬁnitely many sales periods can be solved via backward induction, and the in-
ﬁnite horizon via approximation by letting the number of sales periods approach ¥ (see G¨ uth and
Ritzberger, 1998).
8Resulting from maximizing p(1¡ p) where p is the unique sales price and 1 ¡ p the probability by
which the seller expects his price p to be accepted due to 1¡ p =
R 1
p dv.
9Except for highly special games, e.g., when all players have unique not dominated strategies, game–
theoretic analysis requires commonly known rules of the game.
10 A pooling equilibrium, based on the ex ante expected impatience parameter e z = (1¡ w)z + wz,
would not satisfy sequential rationality since both seller types would like to deviate from the common
price p1(e z) as shown by our derivation.




since the additional revenue
in period t = 1 is overcompensated by the z–weighted revenue loss in period t = 2. For z = z the
opposite is true. Note, that the second stage price p2 is a best response to the residual demand. It does
not depend on the impatience parameter of the monopolist. For all monopolists with different discount
rates the relative reduction from p1 to p2 will be the same and is given by the distribution of impatience
amongst buyers (see equation 4.11).
12See appendix 4.B for the translated instructions.
13Participants were not informed that they were randomly matched in a group of six only which
should have further discouraged repeated–game effects.
14In the durable–goods experiment by Reynolds (2000), subjects interacted in 12 durable–goods mar-
kets.
15As“productionondemand”–costswerecommonlyknownbuyerscoulddeducetheirseller’spayoff
when the sale took place during the ﬁrst period.
16 Demand withholding, i.e., waiting to buy or not buying at all, exceeded by far the level predicted
by theory. In the last period uninstructed sellers set the theoretically predicted one shot monopoly price
against the remaining set of consumers only in half of all cases.
17 In two cases, buyers accepted a higher price than their valuation in period t = 2. The average loss,
¡2.5, was quite small suggesting the possibility that a preference for efﬁciency might explain these loss–
making decisions; in particular, as they occurred in later rounds (16, 38). By contrast, three of the four102 Chapter 4. Durable–Goods Monopoly
cases in which buyers accepted a price higher than their valuation in ﬁrst period occurred early (rounds
1, 1, and 7). Here, the average loss was ¡27. Rather than efﬁciency–seeking behavior, these cases can be
seen as mistakes.
18 This seller followed a pricing policy of p1 = 75 and p2 = 200 in many rounds. With an expected
value of v of 100, this splits the expected surplus of 50 evenly in period t = 1. If this price is not accepted,
this seller refused to transact at all by offering a price above the buyer’s value (p2 = 200 > 150 ¸ v). As
a referee pointed out, this seller might have tried to build up a reputation despite the random matching
scheme (which, apparently, he or she misunderstood).
19Four sellers followed this pricing policy four or more times, explaining 27 out of 33 observations.
20This suggests that inequity aversion (Bolton, 1991) loses inﬂuence in situations where at least some
individual payments are private information or difﬁcult to guess.
21 The reported numbers are group averages. Individual averages have the same means for Dp1. As
the number of trades which continue in period t = 2 differs within groups, for individual observations
the mean also slightly differs: Dp2 = +0.79.
22In G¨ uth, Ockenfels, and Ritzberger (1995) subjects interacted in either 1 or 2 and in Reynolds (2000)
in 12 sequential markets.
23The complete German instructions are available upon request.Chapter 5
Procurement Experiments with
Unknown Costs of Quality
5.1 Introduction
In most countries all major public investments are decided by organizing procurement
auctions. To have something speciﬁc in mind imagine a municipality which wants to
build a new concert hall. The major reason for organizing a procurement auction is
that only the potential sellers, here the potential construction ﬁrms, know how costly
it is to build such a concert hall.1
What one, however, often observes in public but also in private procurement is that,
after granting the deal, the buyer and the seller start bargaining about the additional
costs of quality improvements, changes in the design etc.2 If, however, the buyer does
not know how costly such changes are, he now is confronting a monopolistic seller
with unknown cost.
There is a simple solution to such problems which we want to illustrate for our
experimental scenario. It assumes that a round concert hall (variant 2) provides better
acoustics than a square one (variant 1). The buyer (the municipality) does not know
the costs of the variants, especially not how more costly variant 2 is. It is, therefore,
difﬁcult to decide between variant 1 and 2.
Our recommendation is to organize a vector auction: Every bidder i = 1,...,n can







j is bidder i’s bid for variant j = 1,2. Since
the auction rules determine for every bid vector b =
¡
b1,...,bn¢
the price vector (p1, p2)
0We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments by Jan Potters. The results in this chapter were
ﬁrstformulatedinG¨ uth, Ivanova–StenzelandKr¨ oger(2002), “ProcurementExperimentswithUnknown
Costs of Quality,” Discussion Paper –Economics Series–, No. 173, Humboldt Universit¨ at zu Berlin,
Berlin, Germany.
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with pj for j = 1,2beingthepriceforvariant j, afterthevectorauctionthebuyerknows
the prices of both variants and can thus reasonably decide whether to order variant 1
or 2 or none at all. The advantages of this proposal seem to be obvious, but it is – to
the best of our knowledge – rarely used (Kr¨ oger, 2000, who reviews the legal rules of
public procurement in the Federal Republic of Germany does not ﬁnd any rules con-
cerning (such uncertainties about) cost differences between variants). Actually we are
only aware of examples in private procurement, usually organized by (more buyer ori-
ented) architects.
We do not claim that quality aspects, i.e., the possibility of alternative variants, has
been totally neglected. Actually the legal rules or the accepted practise has been to ask
the buyer for a most detailed speciﬁcations of all quality aspects and to rule out offers
notmeetingthem(see, e.g., Gandenberger, 1961). Ourbasicargumentisthataskingthe
buyer for a most detailed speciﬁcation is unreasonable when the buyer does not know
the cost differences of alternative speciﬁcations of essential aspects. The homogeneity
requirement (all acceptable offers should meet the speciﬁcation of the buyer) can thus
be weakened to the variants rather than being applied to the product in general.
To compare our proposal to situations which resemble more closely the public pro-
curement practise we also study the case when the buyer ﬁrst organizes a variant 1–
auction and then bargains3 with the chosen contractor whether or not to order variant
2 instead of variant 1. Why would the buyer apply such a procedure instead of orga-
nizing a vector procurement auction? One argument would be that the technology of
the winning bidder is superior in general and therefore lower prices can be expected
for all quality variants. Such reasoning neglects the fact that the seller might exploit his
bargaining power even when he has the best technology with lowest costs. Another
answer might be that specifying more than one variant on all details by the buyer im-
plies higher costs as it is much more work.
In the following section 5.2 we describe the two experimentally explored procure-
ment procedures (vector and half auction). We then discuss the experimental design in
section 5.3 and report its results in section 5.4. Our conclusions in section 5.5 discuss
the actual practise in the light of the main ﬁndings.Section 5.2. Procurement Procedures 105
5.2 Vector and Half Procurement Auctions
We now describe the two procurement procedures, which we want to study experi-
mentally.







2 : ci < di
o
(5.1)
the set of bidder i’s possible cost characteristics
¡
ci,di¢
: ci is i’s cost for variant 1 and di
for variant 2, i.e., it is never cheaper to deliver variant 2 instead of variant 1. Further
we assume that only bidder i knows his own cost characteristic (private–value case).
The buyer and all his co–bidders j 6= i expect
¡
ci,di¢







which is commonly known. All bidders j expect that each individual characteristic
¡
ci,di¢
is independently and j(¢) randomly determined (iid–assumption).
Let v denote the buyer’s utility of variant 1 and by w with 0 · v < w his utility
for variant 2. The density Y(v,w) guiding the selection of the pair (v,w) is assumed
to be commonly known whereas the resulting vector (v,w) remains (the buyer’s) pri-
vate information. Both sequential decision processes assume that all former decisions
(of personal players) are commonly known. After the initial (ﬁctitious, see Harsanyi,
1967/68) chance move determining independently v,w as well as ci,di for i = 1,...,n
procurement is organized by either the vector auction or the half auction whose rules
are now described:
(i) The vector auction:
1. The buyer states upper bounds p1 and p2 with p1 · p2of maximal prices for
variant 1 and 2, respectively.






. The prices pj
for j = 1,2 are determined by the lowest bids bi
j.
3. The buyer selects the variant j with pj ¸ pj (j = 1 or 2),yielding the higher
proﬁt or none at all.
(ii) The half auction:
1. The buyer chooses p1, the upper price limit for the cheaper variant 1.106 Chapter 5. Procurement Auctions
2. All bidders i = 1,...,n submit their bids bi
1. The bidder i with the lowest bid
bi
1 becomes the contractor with p1 = bi
1 if p1 ¸ p1.
3. The buyer chooses p2 (¸ p1), i.e., his price offer for variant 2.
4. The contractor delivers variant 2 at price p2 if variant 2 yields a higher
proﬁt.4
A theoretical analysis of the two allocation mechanisms is extremely difﬁcult since
they combine the difﬁculties of signaling games, requiring updated beliefs, and of un-
usually complex auction games. In the appendix we therefore derive only the (equi-
librium) incentives. The ﬁrst–order conditions would imply to set the partial deriva-
tives of these payoff functions equal to zero what, in case of the vector auction, would
lead to a system of interrelated differential equations. Due to the missing subgame
structure even a numerical solution of such auction mechanisms is extremely difﬁcult.
Furthermore, game theoretic benchmark solutions are not needed for the qualitative
arguments supporting our main hypothesis that the vector auction is more desirable.
The models assume a Bayesian setup, based on commonly known and consistent
private beliefs as speciﬁed by the densities Y(¢) and j(¢) (see Harsanyi, 1968). Since in
the experiment the privately known variables v and w as well as ci and di for i = 1,...,n
are integers (as all decision variables), an analytic solution is even more difﬁcult to
derive.
Our main hypothesis (other hypotheses will be discussed when actually testing
them) is that the buyer will be better off using the vector instead of the half auction.
Since there are as many buyer types as there are vectors (v,w) with v < w, the main
hypothesis may not hold generally but rather only within a certain (important) region
of (v,w)–pairs. If (w ¡ v), for instance, is small, i.e., when the buyer does not care so
much which variant she buys, the competition via bids bi
1 to become the contractor in
case of the half auction may be ﬁercer. Here bidders would still hope to deliver variant
2 at a high price p2 what could result in a cheaper price of variant 1. For low values
(w ¡ v) the buyer thus might prefer the half auction.
We capture the actual practise by a best–case modelling. Since the main disadvan-
tage of the actual practise is its exclusion of competition when wanting to substitute
the contracted variant, the best case for the actual practise is when competition is mini-
mal: when there are only two bidders the lack of competition for providing variant 2 in
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bidders from competing for variant 2. Clearly, for larger numbers n¡1 the detrimental
effect of the half (as compared to the vector) auction will be more serious.
When bargaining whether to consider another than the contracted variant the best
case for the actual practise is to apply the most favorable bargaining rules for the buyer.
This is done by assigning ultimatum power to the buyer in the half auction. The buyer
makes a take it or leave it–price offer p2 when confronting her contractor with the
price for variant 2.5 In actual life often the initiative but always the willingness to
consider alternative variants rests on the buyer who will therefore often also determine
the rules of bargaining. Therefore, our design is a worst–case scenario for testing the
main hypothesis.
Other designs would have been more favorable for our main hypothesis. One
should, however, start with a worst–case scenario. If this already conﬁrms the main
hypothesis, more favorable conditions should only strengthen the effect. Given the
fact that we have a worst–case scenario we apply the rather weak requirement (p < .1)
when testing for statistically signiﬁcant effects.
5.3 Experimental Design
The instructions (see appendix 5.B) describe the decision process in each of the 30
rounds of playing the vector, respectively the half auction with three (in every round)
randomly chosen partners. In each session participants ﬁrst were partitioned into two
groups, the group of buyers and the twice as large group of bidders. A subject re-
mained a buyer or bidder throughout the experiment. In the vector auction the soft-
ware automatically selects the variant yielding the larger positive proﬁt. Similarly, for
the half auction the contractor automatically delivers the variant yielding the larger
proﬁt for him. In case of equal proﬁts always the higher quality, variant 2, is selected.
Information feedback was kept minimal. In addition to their private information
(therandomvariables v and w forthebuyer, thecostlevels ci and di forbidders i = 1,2)
participants learned whether and if so which variant has been delivered at which price,
their proﬁt in the present round and as well as their accumulated proﬁt. Further infor-
mationcouldhavecreatedadditionalpathdependenciesinwhichwewerenotparticu-
larly interested (for an experimental study which systematically varies feedback infor-
mation see Huck, Oechssler, and Normann, 1999). In actual procurement procedures
one often observes that bidders are informed about other bids as well. A follow–up108 Chapter 5. Procurement Auctions
study could provide richer feedback information.
The software of the computerized experiment was developed with the help of z–
Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). To avoid negative surplus values, we have imposed (generi-
cally) disjoint parameter regions by
50 · ci < di · 100 · v < w · 150 for i = 1,2. (5.3)
The privately known values, the reselling values (v,w) of the buyer and the costs
¡
ci,di¢
of the bidders were independently drawn with all possible constellations be-
ing equally likely. All values and decision variables had to be integers.
Upon arriving at the computer laboratory (of Humboldt University Berlin) partici-
pants were randomly seated at visually isolated terminals where they found the typed
instructions which they were asked to read carefully. This took on average 20 minutes.
We performed 10 sessions with 2 matching groups each consisting of 6 (yielding two
simultaneous plays) participants each; 10 matching groups for both institutions,6 i.e.,
on one session 12 participants took place. On average a session needed 100 minutes.
The uniform show up–fee was DM 10 per participant. As shown in Table 5.1 partici-
pants earned on average as buyers DM 29.17 and as bidders DM 14.96 (excluding their
show up–fee.).
5.4 Results
Will a buyer fare better with the vector rather than with the half auction in spite of the
worst–case scenario with just two bidders (where excluding competition for providing
variant 2 is least serious) and ultimatum power of the buyer (when bargaining with the
contractor whether variant 1 or 2 should be delivered)? Pooling all data (10 matching
groups £ 2 plays £ 30 rounds = 600 procurement auctions in the vector as well as in
the half auction institution) conﬁrms our basic intuition.
5.4.1 Prices
In the half auction, the buyer cannot rely on competition when negotiating for the
second variant. Ultimatum power may allow to exploit her contractor but not to switch
to the other supplier if this supplier has lower costs for variant 2. Furthermore, the
buyer does not know how much more costly variant 2 is for her contractor, which
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variant 2 over all sessions of the half auction (86.23) exceeds the mean price of variant
2 in the vector auction (83.36). This is illustrated by ﬁgure 5.1 and can be (weakly)
statistically corroborated (Mann–Whitney U test, henceforth: MWU, one–tailed, p =
.095).7
The mean price of variant 1 in Figure 5.1 is higher for the vector auction (69.52) than
for the half auction (67.30) in 7 out of 10 sessions (MWU, one–tailed, p = .083). In the
half auction bidders may bid more aggressively for variant 1 since they hope to supply
variant 2 at an even higher proﬁt. This is also conﬁrmed by the higher average bidders’
earnings in case of the vector auction when variant 1 is provided (MWU, one–tailed,
p = .072).
Observation 1: If variant 2 is ordered, the buyer pays signiﬁcantly less in case of the
vector auction whereas the half auction induces signiﬁcantly lower prices for
variant 1.
5.4.2 Proﬁts
Table 5.2 reports proﬁt numbers for buyer and bidders. There is no difference in proﬁts
for the buyer regardless the auction type used and what variant bought (MWU, one–
tailed, p = .34 and p = .29 for variant 1 and 2, respectively). Bidders’ proﬁts in case
of variant 1 in the half auction are even signiﬁcantly lower than in the vector auction
(p = .072).
The analysis so far is a rather global one. As already discussed in section 5.2 the
main hypothesis may hold or be strongly conﬁrmed only for certain regions (e.g., with
large (w ¡ v) values) of (v,w)–pairs or, as already suggested by the global effects, for
variant 2 only. We distinguish 4 regions of (v,w)–pairs (see Table 5.3), namely of small
and large values v, respectively value differences (w ¡ v) where we separate “small”
and “large” by median splits of the altogether 600 randomly selected pairs (v,w). The
median v–value is 116 and for the (w ¡ v)–level 16. The average low (high) v–value is
107 (128) whereas the average low (high) (w¡v)–level is 8 (28). According to Table 5.3
our intuition is conﬁrmed: For large (w ¡ v)–values the buyer is considerably better
off with the vector than the half auction whereas for small value differences this is
reversed. Comparing the two (vector and half auction) distributions of buyer’s proﬁts
separately for small and large (w ¡ v)–values (MWU, one-tailed, p = .112 for small,
p = .009 for large (w ¡ v)–values) corroborates the effects statistically. This justiﬁes110 Chapter 5. Procurement Auctions
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Observation 2: As claimed by our main hypothesis the buyer is better off when using
the vector rather than the half auction, especially for certain (important) regions
(with large (w ¡ v)–values) of (v,w)–pairs.
Behaviorally there exists no conﬂict of interest regarding the auction types since
also the bidders fare (partly signiﬁcantly) better with the vector rather than the half
auction. This result indicates efﬁciency gains in the vector compared to the half auc-
tion.
5.4.3 Efﬁciency
To illustrate the realized surplus per trade, i.e., the sum of the bidders’ and the buyer’s
proﬁt, for both auction types, ﬁgure 5.2 compares the realized surplus with the max-
imum surplus of all 600 plays. Clearly the realized surplus of the vector auction is
closer to the optimum than that of the half auction. Actually, differences between max-
imal and actual surplus are signiﬁcantly smaller for the vector than for the half auction
(MWU, one–tailed, p = .000).
Efﬁciency requires that the maximal surplus
E = maxfv ¡ minfc1,c2g,w ¡ minfd1,d2gg
is realized. Thus inefﬁciencies can result from
(i) delivering the less efﬁcient variant,
(ii) selecting the more costly bidder, and
(iii) not delivering at all.
In case of the vector (half) auction 409 (332) of the 600 plays were efﬁcient. One
classiﬁcation of all inefﬁcient plays is given in table 5.4. Of the altogether 191 (268) in-
efﬁcient plays in the vector (half) auction 102 (136) occurred during the ﬁrst 15 periods
(the three reasons (i), (ii), and (iii) for early and late plays are also listed in table 5.4).
Thus the likelihood of inefﬁcient deals does not decrease with experience.





v ¡ cj(k) if variant 1 is provided
w ¡ dj(k) if variant 2 is provided
0 in case of no deliverySection 5.4. Results 111
the surplus of the actual play k where j(k) is the contractor of the k–th play. Table 5.5
liststheaverageefﬁciencyrate E(k)/E ofallinefﬁcientplaysandofallinefﬁcientdeals
(excluding reason (iii)), separately for early and late plays and for both auction types.
All experience effects are minor and partly contradictory. Therefore, we conclude:
Observation 3: Efﬁciencyisusuallyquitelarge(above2/3ofthemaximalsurplus)but
does not increase with experience. Especially, the efﬁciency of both institutions
(vector-, half auction) does not differ much. The causes of inefﬁciencies, however,
partlydifferbetweeninstitution(forthehalfauctiondeliveringthewrongvariant
is, for instance, much more important.)
We can illustrate the different efﬁciency of both auction types by the rate of efﬁ-
ciency per trade, namely the ratio of the realized and the maximum surplus. There are
fewer inefﬁcient sales in the vector auction (150) than in the half auction (224). Fur-
thermore, these deals are more proﬁtable in case of the vector auction. The graph of
the efﬁciency rate for all sales is shown in Figure 5.3 for both mechanisms.
Variant 2 is ordered less frequently in the half auction (32.4% of all sales) than in
the vector auction (52.2% of all sales). The total number of realized sales of the second
variant in the half auction (180) is signiﬁcantly smaller than in the vector auction (292)
(MWU, one–tailed, p = .000). Similarly there are signiﬁcantly more sales of variant
1 in the half auction (376) than in the vector auction (267) (MWU, one–tailed, p =
.000). There is no signiﬁcant difference between auction types with respect to the “no
transaction”–frequencies (see table 5.6 which counts sales of variant 1, respectively 2
and the “no transaction”–frequencies in both auction types for all 10 sessions).
5.4.4 Bidders and Buyers
In the following we will investigate the behavior of sellers and buyers, their bids and











< di is weakly dominated as far as









> di. The scatterplots of all bids (see ﬁgures 5.4 and 5.5 ) reveal that the
overbidding incentives were nearly always understood. Every bidder was aware of
the upper price limits p1 and p2 and that exceeding bids would be disregarded. Hence,
a bidder making an invalid bid in range [pk + #;150], with # > 0 and k = 1,2, is
effectively refusing to participate in the auction. In the following invalid bids (bi
1 or bi
2)112 Chapter 5. Procurement Auctions
are excluded from the analysis. In the half auction the number of generally valid bids
(bid bi
1 is valid) are 983 (out of 1200 bids). Out of the 956 generally valid bids (at least
bid bi
1 or bi
2 is valid) in the vector auction 846 and 721 were placed for variant 1 and 2,
respectively.
Table 5.7 lists the total number of bids below cost and thereby realized proﬁts. In
the half auction this happens 54 times8 and can be justiﬁed by the chance to deliver
variant 2 instead of variant 1. Placing bids below cost in the vector auction is clearly
non–optimal. Only 0.1% (1 of 846) and 0.6% (4 of 721) of the bids, for variant 1 and 2,
respectively, in the vector auction are below cost. From table 5.7 one can see that the
18 realized transactions in the half auction yielded on average a minor positive pay-
off (1.11 ECU). This corroborates the hypothesis of different incentives and different
strategies in the two auction types when bidding for variant 1.
By imposing upper price limits lower than the maximal cost of 100 the buyer can
restrict the bidder’s attempts of exploitation by strategic overbidding (see Riley and
Samuelson, 1981). How upper price limits depend on the value parameters v, respec-
tively w of the buyer is illustrated by the scatterplots in ﬁgures 5.6 and 5.7. Buyers seem
to behave similarly in the vector and the half auction. We could not observe any other
differences in the buyer’s behavior regarding the upper price limit p1. However, dif-
ferent buyers use different strategies in placing their upper price limits. Some buyers
(25% , both auction types) do not actively restrict the bidders’ amount of overbidding
(they chose price limits near 100 ECU). Other buyers take the risk that no transaction
takes place by stating lower upper price limits.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
We compare procurement via two procedures, the vector and the half auction. In the
vector auction each bidder places two bids, one for variant 1 and one for variant 2. In
the half auction bidders ﬁrst compete for delivering the cheaper variant 1. Then the
contractor is confronted by the buyer with a price offer for the higher quality variant
2. In actual procurement the contractor himself often makes a take it or leave it–offer
for quality improvements. We designed the half auction as a worst–case scenario for
testing our main hypothesis that the vector auction should be preferred (at least by the
buyer).
We ﬁnd that for large quality differences the vector auction performs better than theSection 5.5. Concluding Remarks 113
half auction. Whereas there seems to be no impact from the auction format on the buy-
ers’ proﬁts if only small quality improvements can be achieved by establishing variant
2 instead of variant 1. Compared to the vector auction the half auction mechanism is
less efﬁcient due to its too few sales of the higher quality variant 2. Thus more com-
petition, as in the vector auction, leads to higher efﬁciency, more product variety and
cheaper prices for the higher quality variant. Which also explains why the need for the
vector auction is less strong if the differences between both variants are rather small.
We, therefore, propose that a vector auction should be applied when quality differ-
ences of variants are large and there is uncertainty about different costs of two or more
variants in procurement. For small quality improvements the half auction is justiﬁable
when preparing a vector auction is more costly. This might be a reasonable concern as
two instead of one variant have to be precisely speciﬁed.
In actual procurement buyers often become aware of another version of the product
only during or even after the auction. In such a case it would not be possible to perform
a vector auction. Therefore, it seems to be crucial to prepare the procurement more
carefully and consider several variants before calling for bids.114 Chapter 5. Procurement Auctions
Appendix to Chapter 5
5.A Incentives of Vector and Half Auctions
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the probability that i delivers variant 2. With the help of this notation bidder i’s payoff






and all other bidders j 6= i behave according to
























Whereas the proﬁts bi
1 ¡ ci and bi







, respectively, will typically decrease. As in usual
auctions bidders must thus balance proﬁts and winning probabilities.
For the half auction let i be the bidder who has won the auction for variant 1, i.e.,
whose bid bi
1 = p1 for variant 1 has been the lowest. The price offer p2 for variant 2
will be accepted by bidder i if
p1 ¡ ci · p2 ¡ di, (5.8)














(v ¡ p1)(1¡ P(p2jp1)) + (w ¡ p2) P(p2jp1). (5.10)
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Thus bidding lowest for variant 1 offers the additional chance to provide variant 2
whenever this is proﬁtable.
The symmetric and monotonic equilibrium bid functions will, of course, depend on
p1 (and p2 in case of the vector auction). The derivation of such symmetric equilibria
is extremely difﬁcult and might at present only be possible by applying numerical
methods. But even this would be extremely difﬁcult.116 Chapter 5. Procurement Auctions
5.B Instructions (Translation)
Instructions (Vector tender)9
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any question please raise your
hand. We will try to answer your question privately. All participants have received
identical instructions.
During the experiment you will participate in several tenders. The experiment con-
sistsof30periods. Ineveryperiodthreepersons(twobiddersandonebuyer)negotiate
about trading a commodity of which two different variants are possible.
In the beginning of the experiment you are randomly assigned to a role (buyer or
bidder). You keep this role for the entire experiment.
The composition of a group (two bidders, one buyer) will usually change between
periods since buyers and two bidders are randomly matched in each period. Every
single period (tender) proceeds as follows:
The buyer is informed about his individual reselling values v and w for variant 1
and 2 of the commodity, respectively. The values of v and w are randomly determined
in the range of 100 and 150. The inequality v < w always holds. Knowing these indi-
vidual reselling values the buyer places upper price limits for variants 1 and 2, i.e. what
he is at most willing to pay. The buyer is later on not allowed to accept offers above
these limit prices.
The bidders have production costs c (for variant 1) and d (for variant 2) when they
deliver the commodity. The values c and d are randomly determined in the range 50
and 100. The inequality c < d always holds. The bidders learn the buyer’s upper price
limits for variant 1 and 2. Knowing their own production costs and the upper price
limits the bidders (i = 1,2) place their bids (price offers) for both variants (j = 1,2) in
the range from 0 to 150.
bids (bi







Outcome of the tender:
The lowest bid for a variant, below or equal to the buyer’s price limit, determines
its price.
1. If for both variants there exists no such a bid, no sale takes place. In this case every-
body’s (the buyer’s and the bidders’) payoff is zero.
2. If there exist such bids, the variant yielding the higher proﬁt for the buyer is chosen.
The corresponding bidder (whose bid for this variant is lowest) is the winner of
the tender. If both variants guarantee the same proﬁt for the buyer variant 2, the
higher quality, is selected. If the lowest bid is chosen by both bidders, the con-
tractor will be chosen randomly. The price is determined by the lowest bid.
The contractor delivers the chosen variant and has to pay the corresponding in-
dividual production costs c and d for variant 1 and 2, respectively, and collectsSection 5.B. Appendix 117
the price (his bid for the chosen variant). The buyer has to pay the price and re-
ceives the corresponding individual reselling value v and w for variant 1 and 2,
respectively. The other bidder does not deliver and thus makes 0–proﬁt in this
period.
You learn:
¢ whether you are the contractor;
¢ which variant was delivered;
¢ the price;
¢ your proﬁt in this period;
¢ your total proﬁt until this period.
Forthe chosenvariant and dependingon your roleyou areinformedagain about:
¢ as a buyer: reselling value and the upper price limit;
¢ as a bidder: production cost, bid (price offer).
You will not get to know the privately known reselling values, resp. production
costs of other participants.
The privately known reselling values of the buyer and costs of the bidders are all
independent. Every constellation (v,w) with 100 · v < w · 150 and (c,d) with
50 · c < d · 100 is equally likely. Thus the costs c and d of the two bidders will
usually be different. Each participant learns only his own parameters (v and w as a
buyer, c and d as a bidder) and not the ones of the other participants.
Please, notice that losses are possible!
For the buyer this can happen when the limit prices exceed his reselling values.
For the bidders losses can occur when the bids are below the costs. Thus every partici-
pant can avoid any risk of losses by deciding accordingly: The buyer by avoiding limit
prices above the reselling values; the bidders by not bidding below costs.
You will type your decisions into the computer. You will learn nothing about the iden-
tity of the other participants during the experiment since decisions are anonymous.
All reselling values, costs and proﬁts are in ECU (Experimental Currency Unit). Your
valid exchange rate from ECU to DM is given on the screen. You receive an initial en-
dowment of 10.00 DM to cover possible losses. This will be added to your proﬁts (or
losses) in the 30 rounds. There will be a test period at the beginning. The results of this
test period will not matter for your total proﬁt.
[Only different parts of the] Instructions (Half tender)
Every period will proceed as follows:
First there is a tender for variant 1:
The buyer is informed about his individual reselling values v and w for variant 1
and 2 of the commodity, respectively. The values of v and w are randomly determined
in the range of 100 and 150. The inequality v < w always holds. Knowing these
individual reselling values the buyer places an upper price limit for variant 1, i.e. what
he is at most willing to pay for variant 1. The buyer is later on not allowed to take any
price offer above this value.
The bidders have production costs c (for variant 1) and d (for variant 2) when they118 Chapter 5. Procurement Auctions
deliver the commodity. The values c and d are randomly determined in the range 50
and 100. The inequality c < d always holds. The bidders learn the upper price limit for
variant 1. Knowing their own production costs and the buyer’s upper price limit the
bidders place their bids (price offers) in the range from 0 to 150 for the ﬁrst variant.
Outcome of the tender:
The lowest bid below or equal to the buyer’s upper price limit determines the price.
1. If there exists not such a bid, no sale takes place. In this case everybody’s (the
buyer’s and the bidders’) proﬁt is zero. The period is over.
2. If there exists such a bid, the corresponding bidder is the winner of the tender. If the
lowest bid is chosen by both bidders the contractor will be chosen randomly. The
price is determined by the lowest bid. The other bidder does not deliver, does
not produce and thus makes 0–proﬁt in this period.
You will be informed:
¢ whether you have been chosen to deliver variant 1;
¢ the price;
Depending on your role you are again informed about:
¢ as a buyer: reselling value and the upper price limit;
¢ as a bidder: production cost, bid (price offer)
You will not get to know the privately known reselling values or production costs
for variant 1 of other participants.
For the bidder, who has not won the tender, the period is over.
The period continues as follows: The buyer offers the contractor a price for variant
2. The offer will be accepted if it yields at least the same proﬁt as variant 1 for the
contractor. Otherwise variant 1 is sold at its agreed upon price.
The winner of the tender delivers the agreed upon variant and has to pay his
corresponding production costs c for variant 1 or d for variant 2 and collects the
price (bid for variant 1 , resp. the buyer’s price offer for variant 2). The buyer has
to pay the price and receives the corresponding individual reselling value v for
variant 1 or w for variant 2.
You will be informed:
¢ which variant was ﬁnally delivered;
¢ the price of the delivered variant;
¢ your proﬁt in this period;
¢ you total proﬁt until this period.
Depending on your role you are informed again for the chosen variant about:
¢ as a buyer: reselling value and the upper price limit;
¢ as a bidder: production cost, bid (price offer).
You will not get to know the privately known reselling values or production costs
of the other participants.Section 5.C. Tables 119
5.C Tables
Auction type Buyer Bidder Both
Min 21.84 3.80
Vector Max 33.12 27.80
Mean 29.70 14.56 19.61
Min 20.74 2.60
Half Max 31.82 31.60
Mean 28.65 15.35 19.78
Both Mean 29.17 14.96 19.69
Table 5.1: Experimental payoff statistics in DM (show–up fee excluded)
Buyer Bidder
Auction type Auction type
Variant Vector Half Vector Half
1 52.33 51.55 11.04 8.96
2 53.86 51.47 9.82 8.92
Both 53.13 51.52 10.41 8.95
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Vector auction Half auction
Distance (w ¡ v) Distance (w ¡ v)
small large small large
v Variant Proﬁt N Proﬁt N Proﬁt N Proﬁt N
no sale 0 (8) 0 (22) 0 (15) 0 (14)
small 1 39.07 (55) 42.12 (42) 41.73 (64) 40.32 (109)
2 39.26 (35) 53.39 (138) 41.05 (19) 48.81 (79)
no sale 0 (6) 0 (5) 0 (10) 0 (5)
large 1 59.81 (154) 52.81 (16) 62.83 (162) 52.12 (41)
2 55.28 (47) 60.94 (72) 54.46 (35) 57.92 (47)
no sale 0 (14) 0 (27) 0 (25) 0 (19)
all 1 54.35 (209) 45.07 (58) 56.85 (226) 43.55 (150)
2 48.44 (82) 55.98 (210) 49.74 (54) 52.21 (126)
all both variants 52.69 (291) 53.62 (268) 55.48 (280) 47.5 (276)
average proﬁt 53.13 (559) 51.52 (556)
Table 5.3: Buyer’s average proﬁt for small and large values v and value differences
(w ¡ v) (N - number of observations)
Auction Periods
type Reason 1 – 15 16 – 30 all
(i) 22 21 43
vector (ii) 35 24 59
(i+ii) 27 21 48
(iii) 18 23 41
(i) 54 49 103
half (ii) 24 21 45
(i+ii) 40 36 76
(iii) 18 26 44
Table 5.4: Classiﬁcation of all inefﬁcient playsSection 5.C. Tables 121
Inefﬁciency all without (iii)
Periods 1 – 15 16 – 30 all 1 – 15 16 – 30 all
Vector auction 0.697 0.672 0.685 0.856 0.890 0.872
Half auction 0.700 0.656 0.678 0.807 0.816 0.811
Table 5.5: Average efﬁciency rate of inefﬁcient plays
Variant 1 Variant 2 No Transaction
Vector Half Vector Half Vector Half
Session auction auction auction auction auction auction
1 25 40 31 18 4 2
2 33 42 25 16 2 2
3 29 34 26 19 5 7
4 26 45 29 12 5 3
5 22 38 28 16 10 6
6 29 40 26 19 5 1
7 27 38 29 19 4 3
8 26 28 33 24 1 8
9 25 34 34 17 1 9
10 25 37 31 20 4 3
all 267 376 292 180 41 44
Table 5.6: Number of transactions
Number of bids Proﬁt
Variant Total Realized Min Max Mean
Half auction 1 54 18 ¡28 27 1.11
Vector auction 1 1 0 ¡ ¡ ¡
2 4 2 ¡20 ¡4 ¡12
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Figure 5.1: Mean prices (std. deviation in brackets, numbers on the abscises refer to
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Figure 5.2: Cumulative distributions of realized and maximum surplus
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Figure 5.4: Scatter plots illustrating systematic tendencies of overbidding: half auction
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Figure 5.5: Scatter plots illustrating systematic tendencies of overbidding: vector auc-
tionSection 5.D. Figures 125
 
Figure 5.6: Scatter plots of upper price limitsp1in the half auction
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Figure 5.7: Scatter plots of upper price limits p1 and p2 in the vector auction126 Chapter 5. Procurement Auctions
Notes
1In their theoretical study McAfee and McMillan (1986) also allow that even the potential construc-
tion ﬁrms do not know all their costs but only its basic component (the experimental investigation by
Cox, Chech, Conn, and Isaac (1996) is based on their study).
2Theoretical and experimental studies of procurement procedures like Cox, Isaac, Chech, and Conn
(1996), Holt (1980), McAfee and McMillan (1986) exclude such uncertainty about which variant one
wants to buy. Their basic problem is that the cost of the uniquely deﬁned product is more (for the
bidders) or less (for the buyer) certain, an aspect which our study neglects. Other studies investigate
multidimensional auctions. A bidder submits bids with characteristics of the product and the price.
The buyer evaluates bids using a weighting function (scoring rule) for the different features of the bid
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987, Che, 1993). In our study bidders compete about prices for different quality
levels which are predetermined by the buyer. Bidders only differ in their cost structure.
3Since we want to prove the superiority of the vector auction we assume the most favorable negoti-
ation rules for the buyer in the half auction, i.e., the worst case for our hypothesis.
4Thus we do not only assign ultimatum power to the buyer but also do not burden him with the fear
that the offer p2 will be rejected because of social concerns of the contractor. We want to prove our main
hypothesis in a worst–case scenario.
5Althoughthereisquiteatraditionofultimatumexperimentswithincompleteinformation(seeRoth,
1995, for a survey), none of the studies corresponds to the situation on the second stage of the half auc-
tion. Here neither the buyer (the proposer in the terminology of ultimatum bargaining) nor his contrac-
tor (the responder) knows the size of the “pie” which may be even negative, namely when the positive
value difference (w ¡ v) is small but the cost difference dj ¡ cj of his contractor j large. It is therefore
questionable whether the usual regularities of ultimatum experiments apply here. The embedding of
ultimatum bargaining may, furthermore, matter (ultimatum games as subgames of larger games usually
yield different experimental results, see G¨ uth and Tietz, 1990).
6One may suspect that this could induce repeated game–effects. We, however, think that in a situa-
tion where at least one party is left empty–handed, such effects are less likely. This rematching within
small groups of 6 participants is justiﬁable.
7Since we have chosen only for one institution randomly the individual characteristics and then
applied the same sequence of individual characteristics for the other institution (in order to eliminate
stochastic effects) not only one session of one institution corresponds to one of the other institution but
also their ordering. This explains why in ﬁgure 5.1 a session of the vector auction can be compared with
the same session of the half auction.
8Actually there are 57 cases but 3 of them are disregarded since the subjects who submitted them
mentioned in the post–experimental questionnaire that these bids were done by mistake.
9This is a shortened translation of the instructions. The original (German) instructions are available
at the authors upon request.Chapter 6
Pricing of Information Goods
6.1 Introduction
To enjoy “Alice in Wonderland” by Lewis Carroll one can either buy a book in a book-
store, make paper copies, or scan the book into a data ﬁle. In the latter case, the data
ﬁle is stored in a computer and can be transmitted as electronic version, either on CD
or via the internet from which it ﬁnally can be read on a computer screen or printed
again. Alice in Wonderland is an example of an information good. This class of goods
includes amongst others, literature, music, and software. Information goods may be
deﬁned as any good that can be redistributed in its original format or in a digitalized
way at zero marginal cost (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
It is well established that information goods are an important factor for a society’s
progress. Policy interventions aimed at stimulating their creation are justiﬁed by the
concern for their underprovision. Is such reasoning, which is generally a concern for
public goods, convincing? It will be if information goods also exhibit non–rivalry and
non–excludability features which characterize public goods. The nature of informa-
tion goods guarantees their non–rivalry as consumption does not reduce their avail-
ability. Establishing that they are non–excludable is less straightforward as unlimited
access is narrowed by distribution restrictions and reproduction costs which have lead
Novos and Waldmann (1984) to describe information goods as being “partially” non–
excludable. However, cheap copying opportunities and publicly available networks
like the internet reduce reproduction costs which enhances the non–excludability fea-
0The author is grateful to Dominikus Gerst for programming and help conducting the experiment.
Also, the author is indebted to Charles Bellemare and Jan Potters for constructive comments and sug-
gestions. The results in this chapter were ﬁrst formulated in Kr¨ oger (2003), “How to Sell Information
Goods.”
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ture of information goods.1 Hence, it is likely that underprovision is also present in
such markets.
The cost structure characterized by high investment costs required to produce an
information good prototype and negligible copying costs for reproduction is one of the
explanation for the underprovision of information goods. As a result, innovators bear
the risk of low returns on investments because others might reproduce their creation
and undercut the price. By granting the right to control reproduction and redistribu-
tion, intellectual property protection shields them against the risk of being copied for
a limited amount of time. These rights grant the innovator a monopoly position. If
welfare is the measure with which artiﬁcial exclusion is justiﬁed, welfare losses due to
monopoly pricing, such as underutilization, have to be taken into account. Monopoly
pricing excludes consumers who cannot afford current prices but would be willing to
pay prices at the competitive level. Copy protection artiﬁcially reintroduces exclud-
ability in information product markets and channels the counterbalancing forces of
welfare increase due to reduction of underproduction of information goods and wel-
fare decrease due to monopoly pricing. The literature investigating economic issues
of intellectual property rights discusses the trade off between incentivizing produc-
ers and restricting the (re)use of information goods by patents, copyright laws, trade
marks, and trade secrets (see Besen and Raskind, 1991, and Gordon, 2003).2
Economists who have considered this type of markets typically assume that con-
sumers are price–takers and compare on this basis proﬁts of institutions with and with-
out intellectual property protection. The welfare optimal incentive compatible legal
system in the presence of investment costs is derived from this comparison (see Lou-
vry, 1979). What one, however, observes in reality is that consumers reject proﬁtable
offers, they withhold their demand. The assumption that consumers behave as passive
price takers has been questioned already by Galbraith (1952). Lately, consequences
of demand withholding have been investigated theoretically (see for instance Snyder,
1998, and Inderst and Wey, 2002), but also analyzed experimentally in oligopoly mar-
kets (Rufﬂe, 2000) and monopoly markets (Engle–Warnick and Rufﬂe, 2002). Demand
withholding is costly as gains of potential trades are lost. Consumers forgo the differ-
ence of valuation and price and sellers cannot realize the difference of price and costs.
Fairness considerations of consumers can account as one reason for demand with-
holding and might originate in the conﬂict of how to share the gain between seller and
buyers. Fairness as a constraint on proﬁt seeking has been investigated by Kahneman,Section 6.1. Introduction 129
Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). The authors conclude that the role of reputation effects
is widely recognized as an explanation of ‘fair’ pricing, but also the willingness to
punish unfairness and intrinsic motivation to be fair can contribute to fair behavior in
the marketplace. Fairness considerations might receive even higher attention for the
purchase of products under consideration as pricing of information goods is solely ori-
ented on consumers’ valuation. The cost structure of information goods does not allow
cost oriented pricing but rather implies that prices are set according to the valuation of
consumers.
In light of the presence of demand withholding, comparing markets with and with-
out protection of information goods under the assumption of price–taking consumers
might be questionable. Demand withholding in a market with protection and ﬁxed
prices might lead to an increase in welfare losses. On the other hand demand with-
holding could also decrease welfare losses as sellers might lower their prices and there-
fore make the product affordable to consumers who would otherwise be excluded by
monopoly prices. The impacts of such consumer behavior in a market without pro-
tection are also not apparent. Demand withholding is less costly for an individual
consumer than in a market with protection and might therefore increase. The reasons
for lower individual costs are twofold: First, prices are predicted to be higher in a
market without protection. This leads to lower gains from trade and thereby lower
costs in case of rejecting the price for the consumer than in a market with protection.
Second, in case of lower prices, there might also be a possibility that other consumers
will purchase the good as result of which one could copy the product instead of buy-
ing directly from the producer. The second aspect introduces a strategic component as
consumers might even gain from demand withholding. If, on the other hand, fairness
considerations are important buyers might also accept to transfer part of their surplus
in case of lower prices to the seller rather than only thinking of their own consumer
rent, despite the strategic component of demand withholding. Therefore, it is less clear
whether an environment without intellectual property protection would ensure less
coverage of investment costs. In this sense price setting and welfare implications in
information good markets seem to be not well understood. To draw conclusions about
welfare implications of different environments one should analyze the outcome of in
the different institutions given human behavior.
In this chapter, we study the impact of excludability on the outcome of informa-
tion good markets: the behavior of a monopolist and consumers, achieved welfare and130 Chapter 6. Information Goods
surplus shares. We investigate two different legal settings, resulting in markets with a
monopoly or a public good structure. A market where only buyers can use the product
is compared to a market where everybody is able to beneﬁt from the good when it is
bought at least once. The proposed model is tested experimentally. We do not explic-
itly investigate the production side of the market and take investment costs as sunk.
Nevertheless, observed proﬁts allow indirectly conclusions on returns on investment.
The results can be summarized as follows. Theory would predict that prices are
higher in the market without exclusion, which is corroborated by the behavior of some
sellers. Furthermore, we observe sellers who do not change their price setting behavior
across the two institutions, and some who even adjust in a opposite way, i.e., set lower
prices in the market without exclusion. Interestingly, behavior of the latter seems to be
a best reply given the observed demand behavior. Buyers react to the fact that demand
withholding in a market with non–exclusion is less costly by increasing it. As a result,
prices that would maximize a seller’s proﬁt, are lower in the market without exclusion
than in the market with exclusion. Finally, we ﬁnd that welfare is about the same in
the two markets.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents the model. Section 6.3
describes the design and procedure of the experiment. Results are presented in section
6.4 and in section 6.5 closes with a discussion.
6.2 The Model
In real world situations, producers take investment costs, expectations about the de-
mand curve, and expected proﬁts under the existing legal system into account when
deciding whether or not to invest into the production of an information good. In this
chapter, we consider producers who have already undertaken their investment and
focus on the interactions in markets with different institutional settings. For simplicity,
we assume the demand curve as given and the production costs as sunk at the moment
of selling.3
We will distinguish between two institutional settings, the Pro and the Free market
environment. In the Pro market, usage of the information good is protected and ex-
clusively restricted to buyers; reproduction is legally impossible. In the Free market,
usage of the information good is not limited to buyers. Consumers can copy the infor-
mation good at a low cost. Approaching the problem from a dynamic perspective, allSection 6.2. Model 131
initial buyers become sellers in the following period, a process which, when repeated,
would ultimately drive down the price of the good towards its competitive price level
(the costs of reproduction), which we normalize to zero.4 In the static model at hand,
this feature of dynamic markets is incorporated by assuming that once the product is
purchased by at least one consumer, all remaining consumers who have not bought
receive the good for a price of zero.
To formalize the model we consider a monopoly facing a linear downward sloping
demand curve with complete information (i.e., all agents know the rules of the market
and are informed about the distribution of all consumers’ valuation for the product).
The market consists of a seller S producing a single good, and three consumers L, M, H
whose valuations of the information good satisfy the following inequalities 0 < vL <
vM < vH. The seller posts a take-it-or-leave-it price offer to consumers who must
decide simultaneously whether or not to buy the good. Below, we derive equilibrium
strategies for consumers and sellers for the parameter values5 vL = 10,vM = 20,vH =
30.
Let di denote a binary indicator taking a value of 1 if consumer i pays the price
announced and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let j denote a binary indicator taking the
value of 1 when the good is sold to at least one consumer and 0 otherwise (i.e., j = 1
if åi di > 0 and j = 0 if åi di = 0 for i = L, M, H). The payoff of the seller can be
expressed as P = p ¢ åi di while that of the consumer i, with i = L, M, H, is given by
Pro : uPro
i = di[vi ¡ p].
Free : uFree
i = j ¢ [vi ¡ di ¢ p].





1 if p · vi
0 if p > vi
for i = L, M, H
Seller: set a price of p¤ = 20
Proof. Because consumer i purchases the product only if the price lies below his valu-
ation, the seller’s decision problem becomes
max
p¸0
p ¢ x(p), where x = å
i=L,M,H
di and di = 1 if and only if vi ¸ p, fori = L, M, H.
Under our choice of parameters, the seller maximizes his proﬁts by setting p¤ = 20. At
this price, both H and M purchase the product and receive respective payoffs of 10 and132 Chapter 6. Information Goods
0 while L does not purchase the good and settles for a payoff of 0. The seller’s proﬁt
is PPro = 40. Because no consumer has an incentive to deviate from his strategy, the
Nash equilibrium solution of the game in the Pro market is
¡
p¤ = 20,d¤
H (¢) = 1,d¤
M (¢) = 1,d¤
L (¢) = 0
¢
.





1 if p · vH
0 otherwise
, d¤
j (p) ´ 0 for j = L, M
Seller: set a prize of p¤ = 30.
Proof. If the seller sets the price at the level which would be optimal in the Pro market
(p = 20), both H or M have an incentive of not buying given the other still purchases
the product. This is so despite that vi ¸ p. Regardless whether H or M buys, the seller
earns only 20. Lowering the price does not improve the proﬁt of the seller as one of the
consumers pays and the others beneﬁt for free. As he can only sell the product to one
consumer, the seller maximizes his proﬁt by raising the price to the highest valuation
vH, which provides him with an payoff of PFree = 30. At this price, H is the only
buyer, and M and L enjoy the beneﬁts of the good without paying for it. The payoffs
of consumers are respectively 0,20, and 10. Because no consumer has an incentive to




H (¢) = 1,d¤
M (¢) = 0,d¤
L (¢) = 0
¢
.
Even for prices off the equilibrium (for all p < 30) consumer H should always
purchase the product under the assumption that the consumer buys who can afford
the price most easily.
Our model captures the general features of information good markets. The as-
sumption of a downward sloping demand reﬂects heterogeneous valuation for the
product, which might be sensible in light of various tastes within a population. Non–
excludability of information goods is implemented in the Free market as consumers
who did not pay for the product can beneﬁt from it. In case of the Pro market ar-
tiﬁcial exclusion, the main feature of a market with intellectual property protection,
is enforced: only buyers can use the product. In our model price discrimination is
not possible as only one posted price is offered to all buyers.6 For instance, sellers of
music CDs or books can hardly price discriminate as products are offered for a take-
it-or-leave-it price at the same time to all customers. In the model at hand we do notSection 6.2. Model 133
speciﬁcally investigate the production decision. Nevertheless, it can easily be incorpo-
rated into the model. Such extension would clarify which investment projects could be
undertaken, given the proﬁt expectation.7
In our model prices of p¤
Pro = 20 in the Pro market and p¤
Free = 30 in the Free market
lead to the following welfare implications and proﬁt shares. Welfare, deﬁned as the
sum of all market parties’ proﬁts, is socially optimal in the Free market as there is no
exclusion possible.8 In the Pro market welfare losses are caused by underutilization,
i.e., prices exclude consumers who would be willing to pay at the competitive level
and even above, but cannot afford current prices. If welfare is the policy variable,
the Free market would be the preferred institution as it is welfare optimizing. Finally,
proﬁt shares of the seller and the average consumer are with 50% and 17% in the Free
market more balanced than in the in the Pro market with 80% and 7% which might be
important the distribution of the social surplus is of interest.
These results rely on the assumption that the high value consumer always pur-
chases the product in the Free market. The decision of H to accept or reject the price
offer, is decisive for the beneﬁts of the seller and remaining consumers. H is therefore
in a similar position as responders in two–persons ultimatum games. Further, the re-
sulting division of surplus is unequal not only between the seller and H but also within
consumers to the disadvantage of H. H might decide not to buy at high prices because
of fairness considerations. The costs to reject the price offer are low for H as he does
not receive anything in case of a successful trade. As a result, markets would either
close without a purchase and lost gains from trade for the seller, M, and L, or the seller
could reduce his price offer such that also H beneﬁts in an adequate way and would
accept the offer.
In the Pro market prices are predicted to be lower and affordable by H and M.
The behavior of consumers in this market only affects the seller’s and the own payoff
but has no inﬂuence on other consumers’ proﬁts. Also here, consumers might refuse to
buy, leaving the seller with a lower proﬁt. For instance, M does not gain by purchasing
for the predicted price, so that he has no costs from demand withholding. M might
refuse to buy leaving the seller with a lower proﬁt. The seller could either raise the
price up to the acceptance threshold of H, only selling to the high value buyer, or
lower the price to the acceptance threshold of M still selling to both or maybe selling
also to L.
Even with the possibility of side payments amongst buyers H’s and M’s fairness134 Chapter 6. Information Goods
considerations and countervailing behavior might comply with the inequality towards
the seller which would still be high.9 The ﬁrst 2 columns of table 6.1 summarize the
predictions corresponding to the experimental parameters.
6.3 Experiment: Design and Procedure
In order to investigate the behavior in the markets described above we conducted a
computerized experiment with two treatments, the Free and the Pro market, at the
laboratory of the Humboldt University Berlin. For the implementation the software
z–Tree by Fischbacher (1999) was used. A session was conducted the following way.
Before the experiment seller and buyer roles were assigned to each computer. In or-
der to keep roles private information role assignments to computers were not openly
announced and changed after each session. Upon arriving participants were seated
on visually separated terminals randomly and received instructions (see appendix 6.B
for a translated version). In one session participants interacted repeatedly over several
periods remaining in their roles. The particular buyer valuations (H, M, and L) was
allocated within the buyers randomly each period. To exclude repeated game effects
participants are rematched after each period. In a market one seller interacted with
three buyers.
To obtain both, sellers’ prices and buyers’ willingness to pay, we apply a version
of a Nash demand game (Nash, 1950). This implies that sellers and buyers decided
simultaneously about the price, p, and their willingness to pay, wtp, respectively. The
product is sold to buyers whose wtp is equal or higher than the posted price.10 In
order to receive a complete strategy of every subject in the role of a buyer for all
valuation v, v 2 fH, M, Lg, we apply the strategy method (Selten, 1967), i.e., buyer







.11 After all buyers and the seller have made their decisions each
buyer in the market is randomly assigned to one valuation. Additionally, in the Free
market buyers who did not purchase the product also beneﬁted from it if at least an-
other buyer in the market bought. Payoffs depended on the market form correspond-
ing to the above described model.
After each period buyer i was informed about the posted price, his valuation and
reminded of the corresponding wtpi
v, whether he bought the product, and the proﬁt
earned. A seller learned the number of sold products. He was reminded of the priceSection 6.4. Results 135
he had posted and informed about his proﬁt. The market structure, distribution of
reselling values, payoff functions, the exchange rate, and the matching procedure were
common knowledge.
We were also interested how individual subjects interact in different institutions
and whether an institutional change has an impact on behavior, we employ a within
subject design where every participant interacted successively for 10 periods in both
treatments. After the ﬁrst 10 periods participants received instructions with informa-
tion of the change in institutions concerning the second treatment (see appendix 6.B).
To control for treatment order effects for half of the sessions the sequence of treatments
was reversed.12 Table 6.2 summarizes the design of the experiment. Sessions and their
corresponding treatment order are presented, where “I” and “II” indicate whether
subjects interacted in ﬁrst or second half of the experiment in a speciﬁc treatment and
subscripts “P” and “F” indicate the treatment, either Pro or Free market.
Altogether 120 persons, mainly students of economics, interacted for 20 periods.
We conducted 10 sessions consisting of 3 parallel markets with a total of 12 partici-
pants each. The experiment took on average 70 minutes including answering the post–
experimental questionnaire. All monetary units were expressed in ECU (Experimental
Currency Units). The exchange rate was ECU 25 = Euro 1. Participants were paid
immediately after the experiment. They earned on average Euro 10.5, more precisely
Euro 8.7 as buyer and Euro 15.9 as seller. In total we observe 600 markets consisting of
150 markets per treatment and order.
6.4 Results
In the following section, we investigate the pricing behavior of sellers and discuss it in
light of the theoretical predictions. Further, we will examine how well prices respond
to the actual demand behavior and continue by analyzing the behavior of buyers. Fi-
nally, we compare welfare realizations and surplus shares. This includes the inquiry
of demand behavior for all prices which will enable us to conclude on the surplus di-
vision within the market for given prices. Together with the actual pricing behavior of
sellers we can explore the impact of excludability on welfare and surplus distribution.
The last four columns of table 6.1 present the mean value and the standard devi-
ation of the outcome in both markets observed in the experiments: welfare, posted
prices, willingness to pay for different valuations, realized proﬁts and surplus shares136 Chapter 6. Information Goods
of sellers and buyers for the different markets.
6.4.1 Posted Prices
Table 6.1 contrasts the theoretical prices with the actual mean prices observed in the
experiment. Average posted prices are 13.2 in the Pro market and 12.8 in the Free mar-
ket: far below the prediction of 30 and 20, respectively. Furthermore, there seems to
be almost no difference in average posted prices between both markets. However, as
such conclusions are only based on aggregated prices, we might miss part of the infor-
mation in the price setting behavior, especially in case of bimodal densities like those
at hand.
Figure 6.1 reports nonparametric kernel–based density estimates of posted prices
for both treatments and orders.13 Indeed, density estimates of both treatments suggest
thattheinstitutionalenvironmenthasanimpactonpricesetting. Theﬁrstareainﬁgure
6.1 shows both treatments on top of each other. The picture indicates that price density
estimates are similar for low prices around the ﬁrst mode of 9 but different for prices
around the second mode of 15. In the range from 12 to 30 the posted price density
in the Free market is lower for low prices and higher for high prices compared to the
Pro market which portends the theoretical prediction of higher prices for at least part
of the posted prices. To test whether both density estimates are signiﬁcantly different
from each other we use the nonparametric approach proposed by Li (1996).
In the following we will brieﬂy introduce our methodology, which we will use later
on to detect differences between proﬁt and welfare densities. In our analysis we com-
pare densities of prices in the two treatments (IF and IP) and the different orders (IF
and IIF, as well as IP and IIP) with the Li test.14 The test is based on the distance
measure D =
R
(f (x) ¡ g(x))
2 dx between the two densities (f (x) and g(x)). Note
that we do not make any assumptions about the form of the distribution function in
separate treatments and test the null hypothesis, H0 : f (x) = g(x) for all x, against
f (x) 6= g(x) and that the test does not require independence of observations. The ﬁrst
area in ﬁgure 6.1 visualizes the approach of the test for differences in prices between
treatments which were both conducted in the ﬁrst 10 periods (IF ¡ IP), i.e., the treat-
ment effect. The second and third area indicate the differences of the same treatment
between sessions of different sequence (IF ¡ IIF), and (IP ¡ IIP), i.e., the treatment or-
der effects. Treatment order effects allow to observe whether there is pathdependance
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data of the same treatment, and explore the treatment effect with increased number
of observations. The Li test statistic follows a standard normal distribution, i.e., test
values above 1.96 reject the null hypothesis that both observed distributions are drawn
from the same population at a signiﬁcance level of 5%, and are presented in table 6.3.
The test values correspond to the following comparisons t1 : (IF ¡ IP), t2 (IF ¡ IIF),
and t3 (IP ¡ IIP). From the Li test (see table 6.3) we conclude that sellers do react to
the two legal systems under consideration and post different prices (t1 : 5.47).15
Result 1 Observed mean prices are very similar but price setting differs across treat-
ments.
To understand the price setting process better, we will now explore individual be-
havior of sellers in two subsequent markets. Each of the 30 sellers experiences both
markets sequentially for 10 periods. From the price adjustment of sellers in the differ-
ent institutions we will try to infer on their pricing strategies. The price adjustment
of individual subjects reveals that the theoretical predicted direction of change, higher
prices in the Free market, is observed for one–third of all sellers.16 Median prices of
these sellers are pFree = 15 and pPro = 9 which is about half of the theoretical pre-
dicted prices. 13% of the sellers adjust opposite to the predicted direction, i.e., they set
lower prices in the Free market than in the Pro market (median prices pFree = 9 and
pPro = 15). The remaining half of subjects keep their offer distribution with median
prices of pFree = pPro = 12 constant for both treatments.17
Result 2 Sellers adjust rather differently to the two institutions. One–third of the sell-
ersbehaveaccordingtothecomparativestaticsofthetheoreticalprediction. They
ask for higher prices in the Free market. However, given the observed demand,
prices which maximize expected proﬁts should be opposite to the theoretical pre-
diction, namely higher in the Pro market, which is realized by 13% of sellers. The
remaining half of sellers does not change their behavior.
The ﬁnancial consequences of such price setting for both treatments are presented
in ﬁgure 6.2. Realized proﬁts of both markets are shown as scatterplots (triangles =
Pro and circles = Free market), and dashed (Pro) and solid (Free) lines denote expected
proﬁts. They are projected on their corresponding prices. Realized proﬁts increase
up to a price of 9 above which in both markets the variance increases. In the Free
market realized proﬁts then start to decline, whereas in the Pro market realized proﬁts138 Chapter 6. Information Goods
increase up to a price of 15, after which they decrease. From the posted price densities
(see ﬁrst area in ﬁgure 6.1) we know that prices above 9 in the Free and above 15 in
the Pro market are less frequent which reduces our observations for those prices and
can explain the increase in the variance for prices above 9 and 15. We can compensate
for this shortcoming with the information we have about the acceptance threshold of
buyers. By an analysis of buyers’ willingness to pay we derive how many buyers of
each valuation would have bought on average at a given price. The expected proﬁt
of a seller is computed as the product of the posted price and the expected number of
buyers given this price, taking into account that only one buyer of each valuation is in
the market. Expected proﬁts are shown in ﬁgure 6.2 by the solid and dashed line for
Free and Pro market, respectively. They are close to actual realized prices especially for
ranges where more prices are observed.
In the Pro market proﬁt maximizing prices lay around 15 with an expected num-
ber of buyers of 1.56 and corresponding earnings of 23, whereas in the Free market
proﬁt maximizing prices are around 9 with an expected number of buyers of 1.83 and
corresponding earnings of 16.50. This result contradicts not only the values of the
theoretical price prediction but also its comparative statics. Given the experimentally
observed demand, a price of 15 (9) would maximize expected proﬁts in the Pro (Free)
treatment. As we have seen above, 13% of sellers seem to follow this pattern.
Continuing an established price policy is applied by 57% of all sellers which might
be a rather simple solution to the question of price adjustment in the subsequent mar-
kets. In this sense, posted prices around 12 minimize by one price the distance between
proﬁt maximizing prices of both institutions. Further discussion on the inﬂuence of the
institution on the seller’s proﬁt is delayed to section 6.4.3 below.
Result 3 Prices are much lower than predicted by the model. This can be explained
by the fact that buyers withhold demand and sellers beneﬁt less than predicted
from high prices.
Posted prices result from the interaction of sellers and buyers. Buyers withhold
demand in both markets for high prices which indicates that sellers could not have
successfully implemented theoretical prices. To understand why this is the case, we
turn now to buyer behavior.Section 6.4. Results 139
6.4.2 Demand
Buyers’ maximal willingness to pay is much below their valuation. The demand curves
estimated from buyers’ willingness to pay of the ﬁrst area in ﬁgure 6.3, where the Free
market is shown to lay below the Pro market demand curve. The remaining areas in
ﬁgure 6.3 plot demand curves for both orders. Table 6.1 reports the maximal willing-
ness to pay of H, M, and L (22.0, 15.5, 7.9) indicating that consumers want to keep at
least 33%,20%, and 20%, respectively, from their valuation in the Pro market.18 De-
mand withholding in the Pro market is costly for consumers. In the Free market con-
sumers state that they are willing to pay 17.4, 11.0, and 5.5, as H, M, and L, respectively,
which compared to the theoretical prediction is less for H and more for the remaining
consumers.
From the aggregated data we understand that consumers would hardly support
theoretically predicted prices, i.e., they mainly reject very high offers. This result is
corroborated by an analysis of the individual data which reveals that only 6% of the
subjects actually would be willing to pay up to their valuation for the good in both
markets.19
Result 4 The willingness to pay is much lower than predicted for all buyers in the Pro
market and for high valuation buyers in the Free market. Only 6% of all buyers
support by their willingness to pay the theoretical prediction. Relative to the
theoretical prediction in the Free market, high valuation consumers are willing to
pay less but lower valuation consumers are willing to pay more.
The observed demand withholding for H in the Free market cannot be explained by
theory according to which the high value consumer should be willing to pay any price
below his valuation. Demand withholding leads to lower prices in the Free market
such that also other consumers than only H could afford the product. Even though
also non buyers beneﬁt from the product in the Free market, as long it is bought by
someone else, one might expect that if fairness considerations play an important role,
in case of lower prices also more than one consumer might buy to transfer part of their
surplus to the seller. We actually observe, that M and L are willing to pay in the Free
market 11.0 and 5.5, respectively.
The willingness of M and L to purchase the product in the Free market offers the
opportunity to H to receive the product for free instead of buying it himself. This
strategic component of demand withholding in the market without protection might140 Chapter 6. Information Goods
explain the on average lower willingness to pay of 17.4 of the high value consumer in
the Free market compared to the Pro market. Demand withholding of H becomes free
riding at the expense of “poorer” consumers and the seller if prices are very low. From
information of the individual willingness to pay we observe that 8% of the consumer
subjects seem to free–ride generally as they are not willing to pay even prices of 5 in
the Free market regardless of their valuation.20
Result 5 Demand withholding by the high valuation consumer is higher in the Free
than in the Pro market which might account for the fact that demand withholding
is less costly in the Free market (since there is a positive probability that one of the
others might buy the product). In fact, we observe less demand withholding of
the remaining buyers than predicted indicating a general willingness to support
low prices. On the other hand, some subjects seem not be willing to buy at all for
any price in the Free market.
We will now explore in greater detail the consequences which the behavior of con-
sumers and sellers have on the welfare in the different institutional settings.
6.4.3 Proﬁts, Welfare and Surplus Division
The realized welfare of both markets lays below the theoretical prediction (see table
6.1). The test statistics (t1 : 51.49) indicate that welfare realizations of both markets
are signiﬁcantly different, despite similar averages of 47.2 in the Free market and 43.6
in the Pro market. This implies that the rejection of the null hypothesis of identical
distributions is driven by variances (Free: 24.6, Pro: 15.6). The difference in variances
can be explained by fact that the Free market leads to either 100% or 0% realization
of the total possible welfare, whereas the Pro market allows for intermediate efﬁciency
rates, dependingonwhetherone, two, orthreeconsumersboughttheproduct. Welfare
losses are 27% in the Pro market and lay 10% above the theoretical prediction whereas
in the Free market they are with 20% far above the theoretical prediction of 0% in the
Free market.21
Result 6 Both institutions display rather high welfare losses which does not support
the theoretical implication of no welfare losses in the Free market.
Let us now investigate how the surplus is distributed between consumers and sell-
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only for the seller beneﬁcial to protect the product.22 Proﬁts of the seller are 13.4 in
the Free market and 21 in the Pro market, which is almost two–thirds lower than pre-
dicted for the Free and half of the proﬁt prediction in the Pro market (see table 6.1). The
density estimates of seller’s and consumer’s proﬁt for both markets (ﬁrst left and right
areas in ﬁgure 6.4) corroborate this picture. The third area of the seller’s proﬁt densities
reports treatment order effects. The seller earns less in the Free market if subjects had
experienced a market with exclusion before (t1 : 5.07). The earnings of the seller in the
Pro markets (second area on the left) and of the consumer for both markets (area two
and three on the right) do not depend on the order of treatments.
Result 7 The Pro market is more beneﬁcial for the seller. Consumers gain more in the
Free market.
Divisions of surplus between sellers and consumers are on average 48% and 17%
(28% and 24%) in the Pro (Free) market (see table 6.1).23 Compared to the theoreti-
cal prediction surplus shares in both markets are more balanced. In the Free market
average consumer and seller shares resemble almost an equal split between all mar-
ket participants. Additionally, also surplus shares within consumers are more bal-
anced in both markets than predicted. Contrary to the theoretical predictions the high
value consumer obtains the highest income amongst consumers even in the Free mar-
ket. Nevertheless, compared to the Pro market high valuation consumers earn less in
the Free market whereas the income of M and L in the Free market increases weakly
corroborating some comparative statics of the theoretical model.
Result 8 The Free market fosters more equitable outcomes than the Pro market. Con-
trary to the theoretical prediction, the high value holder receives the highest in-
come within consumers not only in the Pro but also in the Free market.
On the basis of consumer’s willingness to pay, ﬁgure 6.5 plots the expected surplus
shareofthesellerandtheaverageconsumeraswellasthewelfarelossforallpricesand
both institutions. These graphs show that surplus shares in the Free market of seller
and consumer are quite close, for prices below 7.5 they are higher for the consumer
and above 7.5 they are slightly higher for the seller. Whereas in the Pro market surplus
shares for prices above a price of 5 favor the seller much more.
Welfare losses due to lost gains from trade and underutilization can be measured
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the surplus actually reached. Welfare losses in the Free market are for almost all prices
below than in the Pro market. Interestingly, for prices below 5 welfare losses arise only
in the Free market. For prices above 5 welfare losses increase faster and are higher in
the Pro market.
Result 9 Compared to a market without exclusion, an increase in prices in the Pro
market leads to higher inequality between consumers and the seller but also to
an increase in demand withholding resulting in higher welfare losses.
6.5 Discussion
A central problem has been the conﬂict between society’s goals of achieving efﬁcient
use of information goods once produced and providing ideal motivation for produc-
tion of information goods (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979). In order to incentivize the pro-
duction of information goods society grants intellectual property rights to inventors
which allow control of reproduction and redistribution. These monopolies artiﬁcially
created would be efﬁcient if perfectly price discriminating fees could be charged. In
practise, however, owners of those rights post one price and thereby artiﬁcially rein-
troduce exclusion in information good markets accompanied by welfare losses due to
underutilization. The economic literature has investigated the impacts of intellectual
property protection in light of the trade off between underproduction and underuti-
lization assuming price taking buyers. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that peo-
ple might be inﬂuenced by other preferences than usually assumed proﬁt maximiza-
tion and price taking giving rise to outcomes different from the predicted.
In this chapter we have investigated the interaction in markets for information
goods under the two legal regimes, with and without exclusive usage (copyright) of
the product by buyers. We use a standard market model wherein a non–excludable
good is offered by a monopolistic seller and compare it to a market where the good
is excludable. In order to appreciate the behavioral consequences of exclusion in a
market after production has taken place, we conduct a laboratory experiment which
captures the main characteristic features of information good markets with and with-
out protection. We observe interesting patterns of behavior, which if present in real
world markets should be considered when deciding for one or the other legal system.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to implement experimentally a public good
structure in a market to investigate information goods.Section 6.5. Discussion 143
We observe that prices in experimental markets are much lower than predicted
which can be explained by consumers’ demand withholding. Despite lower prices,
welfare losses are still present. Demand withholding accounts for a substantial share
of these welfare losses in the market with exclusion. In the environment without ex-
clusion, welfare losses can be explained by demand withholding of high valuation
consumers alone. In this market demand withholding has not only an impact on the
seller but has also external effects on other consumers. The outcome of the market
with non–exclusion depends strongly on high value consumers who should, accord-
ing to theory, be the only buyer. We observe that high value consumers exhibit higher
demand withholding than in a market with exclusion which indicates that they also
want to gain from the situation when the seller is less powerful and try to free ride on
other consumers who might buy. Also consumers with lower valuation are willing to
buy in the market without exclusion.
Sellers who want to maximize their proﬁts in the market without exclusion should
therefore decrease their prices instead of following the theoretical prediction to in-
crease them compared to a market with exclusion. Lower prices in the market without
exclusion lead to a decrease in demand withholding and therefore welfare losses and
result additionally in lower inequality than in a market with exclusion. Given the de-
mand behavior observed in the experiment, the welfare in a market consisting only of
expected proﬁt maximizing sellers would be higher in a non–exclusive environment
than in the exclusive environment.
As our experiment indicates, seller behavior is quite heterogeneous. Only some
sellers act in this best reply pattern and set lower prices in the market without exclu-
sion. We also observe sellers who do not change their price setting behavior across the
markets as well as opposite adjustment, more in line with theory which predicts higher
prices in the non–exclusion market. The heterogenous behavior of sellers results in av-
erage prices leading to similar high welfare losses in both markets.
In light of these results, no market seems to be more preferable from a welfare per-
spective, as both exhibit similar welfare losses. Therefore, further policy goals should
be considered in order to decide for one institution or the other: copy protection of
the information good might be less desirable if reallocation of income and equality are
important, on the other hand if higher proﬁts can be achieved by sellers in a market
with protection than such market structure might facilitate production of information
goods with high investment costs. Additionally, it is important to mention that prece-144 Chapter 6. Information Goods
dent market institutions seems to inﬂuence behavior. We have some indication for
treatment order effects concerning the behavior of sellers and their earnings.
Our analysis of information good markets under different legal systems has two
implications for their production. First, in view of buyer countervailing power theo-
retically predicted proﬁts could not be realized. This might directly lead to overestima-
tion of the investment budget. Second, overestimation would be higher in case of no
intellectual property protection where proﬁts comprise only one–third of the theoret-
ical prediction. In the protected environment sellers in our experiment could achieve
half of the predicted proﬁts.
To understand the impact of buyer and seller interaction in the real world of in-
formation good markets more investigation would be required. There are two cru-
cial features whose combination might be interesting for further investigation. First,
consideration of the production decision would be more realistic, in particular when
invested costs are private information to the producer and cannot been observed by
consumers. This raises the questions what impact the institution has on production
for which investments have to be undertaken which are only privately known to the
seller. And whether consumers are willing to withhold demand less in presence of
investment costs and no information about their volume?
Another related issue is the pricing of information goods. In the real world price
discrimination by the seller is hardly possible which leads to inefﬁcient usage. It could
be that posted pricing is not the optimal pricing scheme for information goods. Even
payment alternatives, such as donations, which allow for a kind of “self price discrim-
ination” of buyers may be considered. An advantage is that all buyers could access the
product which would terminate welfare losses due to underutilization. The drawback
is that non–exclusion might lead to free riding, so that some consumers might not pay
even when they use the product. Even though free riding behavior was present in the
current study, most participants were willing to pay even as low valuation consumers
in the market without exclusion which might indicate that self price discrimination
might successfully be implemented. Given the fact that under non–exclusion more
consumers can access the product, contributions might even outweigh losses from free
riding and, ﬁnally, lead to more preferable outcomes for both market sides. Further
analysis might therefore be promising.Section 6.A. Appendix 145
Appendix to Chapter 6
6.A Estimation and Tests
6.A.1 Density Estimation
Each reported density function, f(x), estimate is based on the standard normal kernel
function and optimal bandwidth:











where K is a bounded, nonnegative (kernel) function with
R
K(y)dy = 1. The band-
width h is a function of the sample size n and h ! 0 as n ! ¥ and nh ! ¥ as n ! ¥.
The selection of the bandwidth is crucial. A very large bandwidth oversmoothes the
data and leads to biased estimates. A very small bandwidth results in a noisy density
estimate with high variance. The chosen kernel is a Gaussian Kernel estimator and
the bandwidth for the estimates at hand are derived using the optimal bandwidth for
a standard normal density h = 1.06sn¡1/5 (see Pagan and Ullah, 1999, for a detailed
discussion).
6.A.2 Comparison of Unknown Densities
Let f (x) and g(x) be two continuous probability density functions. We compare those
two unknown densities and test H0 : f (x) = g(x) against H1 : f (x) 6= g(x) following
Li (1996). The test statistic, based on the space between the estimated density functions













































































. Li proves that the variance estimate e s2
converges faster to the true s2 than b s2 for small sample sizes. The tests described
above are asymptotically valid to compare either independent as well as dependent
samples (see Li).146 Chapter 6. Information Goods
6.B Instructions (Translation)
This is a translated version of the original German instructions which are available at
the author upon request. The basic instructions are for the Pro treatment. Italic notes
in parenthesis mark differences to the Free treatment and in brackets mark notes
General information
Please read the instructions carefully. Please notify us in case you do not under-
stand. We will come and answer your questions privately. Please do not communicate
with your neighbors, in which case we would have to exclude you fromthe experiment
and could not reimburse you.
The instructions are identical for all participants. You will make your decisions
at the computer. All decisions will be anonymous, i.e., you will not get to know the
identity of others and your identity will not be revealed to others.
You can earn money during this experiment. The amount will depend on your
decisions. Please note, that losses are possible and will be accounted with your proﬁts.
With appropriate behavior you can avoid losses.
During the experiment your income will be counted in ECU (Experimental Cur-
rency Unit). The exchange rate ECU to Euro is: 25 ECU = 1 Euro. In the following all
payment details will be given in ECU. At the end of the experiment your proﬁt will be
converted into Euro and paid immediately.
Instructions
Four agents, a seller (S) and three consumers (L, M, and H), interact on a market.
Consumers L, M, and H, can buy a product from S. Whether you will interact as seller
or one of the consumers, will be randomly determined at the beginning of the experi-
ment. You will keep this role during the entire experiment. The constellation of market
participants will be randomly determined every round, i.e., in a subsequent period you
will not interact with the same persons as the current period.
Every consumer values the product differently (L=10, M=20, H=30). The value cor-
responds to the payoff a consumer gets if he receives the product. Whether a consumer
L,M, or H is, will be reassigned randomly before each round.
One round proceeds as follows:
Consumers announce for each possible valuation (10, 20, and 30) how much they
would maximal be willing to pay for the product. Simultaneously the seller posts a
price for the product.
Following the consumers will be randomly assigned to one of the types L, M, or
H. The decision for the assigned role will then be compared to the price posted by the
seller. A consumer buys the product if his maximal willingness to pay equal or higher
then the posted price. He pays the product to the seller.
Your proﬁts will be determined according to your role as follows:
Consumer:
Buyer: If you have bought the product you receive your valuation and pay the price toSection 6.B. Appendix 147
the seller. Your proﬁt is your valuation minus the price.
Non–Buyer: If you have not bought the product you do not have to pay.
Your proﬁt is zero. (In case of a market transaction, i.e., if at least one of the other consumers
bought, you will also receive the product. Your proﬁt is your valuation in case of a transaction
and zero in case nobody bought the product.)
Seller: Your proﬁt is the product of sales and posted price. In case nobody bought
your proﬁt is zero.
At the end of each round you receive the following information:
Consumer:
° which buyer type was randomly assigned this round,
° whether you bought the product,
° as a reminder your willingness to pay for this type,
° the price and
° your proﬁt in this round.
Seller:
° the price,
° how many consumers bought the product,
° your proﬁt in this round.
[Subjects received the following additional instructions after the 10th round.]
You have participated in the market for ten rounds. There will be 10 additional
rounds with the same proceeding and calculation of proﬁts for buyers and sellers and
the following difference for non buyers:
In case of a market transaction, i.e., if at least one of the other consumers bought,
also a non buyer will receive the product. The proﬁt is the valuation in case of a trans-
action and zero in case nobody bought the product. (Non buyers do not receive the product
at all. They do not have to pay. The proﬁt is zero. Only buyers receive the product.)148 Chapter 6. Information Goods
6.C Tables
Prediction Data
Free Pro Free Pro
WTP H 30 30 17.4 (9.0) 22.0 (7.1)
buyer M 0 20 11.0 (6.8) 15.5 (4.5)
L 0 10 5.5 (4.1) 7.9 (2.0)
(Posted) Prices 30 20 13.2 (5.3) 12.8 (4.3)
Proﬁts
seller 30 40 13.4 (9.1) 21.0 (7.8)
average buyer 10 3 11.3 (6.2) 7.5 (3.6)
H 0 10 15.5 (11.4) 16.0 (6.6)
buyer M 20 0 11.4 (8.7) 6.2 (5.0)
L 10 0 7.0 (4.8) 0.4 (0.9)
Total surplus (welfare) 60 50 47.2 (24.6) 43.6 (15.6)
Share of surplus (in %)
seller 50 80 28 48
average buyer 17 7 24 17
H 0 20 33 37
buyer M 33 0 24 14
L 17 0 15 1
Table 6.1: Predictions and data: willingness to pay (WTP), prices, proﬁts, welfare, and
surplus shares, mean and standard deviations in parentheses. The standard deviations
for the buyer refer to group averages.Section 6.C. Tables 149
Session Treatment Periods
order 1 – 10 11 – 20
1¡ 5 Free-Pro IF IIP
6¡ 10 Pro-Free IP IIF
Table 6.2: Experimental design
t1 : t2 : t3 :
(IF ¡ IP) (IF ¡ IIF) (IP ¡ IIP)
Posted prices 5.47 5.59 1.96
Welfare 51.49 ¡0.29 ¡0.49
Proﬁts Seller 13.67 5.07 1.20
Buyer 67.28 1.79 ¡0.31
Table 6.3: Test statistics of the Li test150 Chapter 6. Information Goods
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Figure 6.1: Test statistics: posted pricesSection 6.D. Figures 151
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Figure 6.3: Estimated demand of buyers’ stated willingness to pay152 Chapter 6. Information Goods
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Figure 6.4: Test statistics: proﬁt densities of different treatments and treatment orders
for seller and (average) buyer

















































Figure 6.5: Expected surplus shares and welfare losses for all prices on basis of the
observed demandSection 6.E. Notes 153
Notes
1For instance, email, websites, or more commonly peer-to-peer (P2P) ﬁle sharing systems are used to
exchange information goods via the internet.
2Disputes have raged over the length of patents (Scotchmer, 1991) and copyrights (Varian, 2001). The
“price” feature of intellectual property rights has been criticized to lead to socially wasteful overinvest-
ment (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980, Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). Varian (2001) discusses consequences of
software patents which might lead to an increase in costs rather than in gains for society.
3Theoretically, incorporation of production costs does not change price setting, whereas the decision
whether to produce will of course depend on those costs.
4These assumptions are made for simplicity without loosing the basic economics of such markets.
Landes and Posner (1989) model basic copyright protection assuming that authors and copiers produce
quality–adjusted copies which are perfect substitutes. Novos and Waldman (1984) explicitly model the
secondary market for copies and analyze the effects of copy protection in a world with heterogeneous
reproduction costs for buyers.
5The experiment which will be described later realizes exactly this parametrization. Our results are
nevertheless very general. We receive the standard monopoly pricing in case of the protected market
and price discrimination of the high value holder when the seller can sell the product to one consumer
only, in the unprotected market.
6In case of personalized information goods price discrimination is more easily possible. Other ways
of price discrimination can be established by taking time preferences of buyers into account. Hard
cover books are sold way before the paperback version of a book to a higher price, price discriminating
impatient buyers. Similar price patterns can be observed for music CDs which are sold for much higher
prices before they are on sale later. We will not investigate these features of information goods here.
7Information goods with investment costs below 30 would be undertaken in both markets. For in-
vestment costs above 30 and below 40 the good would only be produced in a Pro market environment.
8The optimal effects of the Free market on welfare hold only if the good is sold at least once. This
will be warranted as the seller is interested to sell his product and therefore sets a price equal or slightly
below the highest valuation of the consumers. Correspondingly, the price–taking consumer will always
buy when the price is equal or below his valuation.
9One way to think about side payments is an environment with repeated interaction where the val-
uation position of buyers changes. Such that all buyers earn on average the same.
10In a Nash demand game two players bargain about the division of a pie. Both players decide si-
multaneously about their claims, p and b, on a pie, v, to share. If the sum of the two demands does
not exceed the pie (p + b · v) both receive what they demanded, otherwise (p + b > v) they receive
nothing.
In the situation at hand the pie is the buyer’s valuation, v, and claims are the price p asked by the seller
and b is determined indirectly by the buyer stating wtp(= v ¡ b). The payoff rule here is that the seller
receives his claim and the buyer the remainder (v ¡ p).
11Brandts and Charness (2000) have shown the strategy method to lead to similar responses as meth-
ods where agents directly act on a choice made by their interaction partners, so called “hot” decisions
(see also Seale, 2000, and Sonnemans, 2000).
12In a within subject design decisions might be inﬂuenced by behavior of earlier treatments. In the
current study we control for such so called “treatment order effects” by comparing behavior of corre-
sponding treatments with reversed treatment order.
13For a description of the estimation method see appendix 6.A.1.
14See appendix 6.A.2 for a detailed description of the test applied.
15In case of the Free market also the sequence of interaction has an impact on price setting (t2 : 5.59).
Average posted prices are IF : 14.1(5.7); IIF : 12.2(4.8) with standard deviation in parentheses.
16For this analysis we apply the Li test for each individual seller and test the null hypothesis that both
densities are the same. In case of rejection we compare median prices in both treatments to conclude on
the direction of adjustment. Most distributions are unimodal which would justify such an approach.
17These subjects include 3 sellers whose median price is the same in both institutions event though
the Li test rejects due to different dispersion.154 Chapter 6. Information Goods
18This share is computed as
v¡wtpv
v , v = H, M, L.
19Each buyer subject interacted for all valuation types in both treatments subsequently for 10 periods,
which allows us to investigate the individual level of support for the theoretical prediction. Buyers
supporting the strategic prediction, have a median willingness to pay (wtpH,wtpM,wtpL) of (30,20,10)
in the Pro market and of (30,¢,¢) in the Free market.
20Those subjects stated a median willingness to pay (wtpH,wtpM,wtpL) of (0,0,0) in the Free market
for prices greater or equal to 5. A price of 5 would on average result in equal split of the surplus between
the seller and average consumer if all consumers buy.
21According to the theoretical model welfare losses account for 10/60 (= 17%) of the social surplus in
the Pro market.
22We refer to the ﬁndings for the average consumer buyer.
23We report numbers from pooled data for the Pro market as there are no treatment order effects.
For the Free market we observe treatment order effects and report numbers corresponding to the ﬁrst
sequence (IF). Nevertheless, surplus shares do not change that much (IIF : sellers: 27% and consumers:
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321.Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit een vijftal artikelen die bestuderen hoe instituties en in-
dividuele preferenties tesamen menselijk gedrag be¨ ınvloeden en daardoor economi-
sche uitkomsten zoals prijzen en efﬁci¨ entie bepalen. Terwijl institutions bestaan uit
waarneembare regels, zijn individuele preferenties veelal niet direct waarneembaar.
Zowel institutions als preferenties hebben vele dimensies. Deze dissertatie richt zich
op vier dimensies van preferenties die belangrijk zijn voor economische transacties:
rechtvaardigheidsverwegingen, de neiging iemand te vertrouwen, risico houding en
tijdsvoorkeur. De invloed van deze preferenties wordt bestudeerd in verschillende
onderhandelings- en marktsituaties.
Theoretische analyse helpt de strategische structuur van een situatie te begrijpen.
Door aannames te maken over preferenties en de rationaliteit van actoren, kunnen
theoretische resultaten over het gedrag van actoren en de uitkomsten van interactie
worden afgeleid. De valideit van de gemaakte aannames is uiteindelijk echter een em-
pirische vraag. Economische experimenten verschaffen een methode waarmee men-
selijk gedrag en de uitkomsten van interactie empirisch kunnen worden onderzocht.
Theorie en experimenten zijn daarbij complementair. Hun combinatie verschaft de
onderzoeker een belangrijk instrument om de interacties in markten, bilaterale onder-
handelingen en andere vormen van interactie te analyseren en begrijpen.
Hoofdstuk 2 combineert een economisch experiment met enquˆ etegegevens om de
determinanten van vertrouwen en betrouwbaarheid in de Nederlandse samenleving
te onderzoeken. We stellen de gevolgtrekkingen die kunnen worden gedaan over de
neiging tot vertrouwen met behulp van verklaarde en gebleken voorkeuren tegenover
elkaar. We vinden dat personen van middelbare leeftijd en individuen met een hogere
opleiding relatief meer vertrouwen maar relatief minder betrouwbaar zijn. Het effect
van leeftijd en religie op vertrouwen blijkt zeer af te hangen van de vraag of de ge-
0The author is deeply indebted to Bas van Groezen and Jan Potters for their engagement in making
this summary understandable to a Dutch speaking audience.
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bruikte vertrouwensmaatstaven volgen uit experimenten of enquˆ etes.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt op theoretische en experimentele wijze opeenvolgende
onderhandelingen in risicovolle samenwerkingsverbanden met additieve boden en
afwisselende aanbiedingen ingeval van acceptatie. Deze situatie is gebaseerd op de
productie van een ﬁlm die aanleiding kan geven tot een vervolgproductie, waarby ac-
teurs en producenten met elkaar onderhandelen. Om de situatie zoveel mogelijk in
overeenstemming te brengen met de werkelijkheid, parametriseren we het experiment
op basis van empirische data van de ﬁlmindustrie. We vergelijken de voorspellin-
gen van alternatieve theoretische benaderingen gebaseerd op verschillende aannames
betreffende de voorkeuren van de onderhandelingspartijen. De speltheoretische voor-
spelling (uitgaande van risico-averse actoren) lijkt de geaggregeerde data het best te
verklaren. Nadere bestudering van de individuele risicoparameters brengt echer in-
consistenties met de theoretische aannames aan het licht, wat de voorspellende waarde
van risico-aversie twijfelachtig maakt. Rechtvaardigheidstheorie (eerlijk delen) blijkt
een betere verklaring te geven voor het waargenomen gedrag, ook op individueel
niveau. De onderhandelingspartijen lijken risico te willen delen omdat zij daarvoor
bij later succes worden gecompenseerd.
In hoofdstuk 4 modelleren we een duurzame monopoliemarkt waarin de mart-
partijen elkaars tijdsvoorkeur niet kennen. Het betreffende model is analoog aan een
twee-perioden bilateraal onderhandelingsspel met private informatie over de kosten
van uitstel en asymmetrische informatie over het bedrag waarover wordt onderhan-
deld. We leiden de theoretische uitkomst af en vergelijken die met het experimenteel
geobserveerdegedrag. Onzeresultatentonenaandatproefpersonentoekomstigewin-
sten goed anticiperen en reageren op korte-termijn problemen in overeenstemming
met de theoretische voorspelling.
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt met behulp van experimenten de efﬁci¨ entie en winstge-
vendheid van twee verschillende vormen van aanbesteding voor het geval dat de
kwaliteitvanproductenbelangrijkis. Webestuderen ´ e´ enmethodemetmeermededing-
ing aan de productiekant (vector veiling) met een andere methode, die de feitelijke
praktijk van aanbesteding weergeeft, namelijk, het organiseren van een veiling voor
de goedkope variant en vervolgens onderhandelen met de contractant over de ad-
ditionele kosten van de hogere kwaliteitsvariant. Onze belangrijkste hypothese, dat
kopers beter af zijn wanneer de vector veiling wordt gebruikt in plaats van de stan-
dard methode, wordt bevestigd.Chapter 6. Samenvatting 165
Hoofdstuk 6 bestudeert in welke mate de markt voor informatiegoederen wordt
be¨ ınvloed door het wettelijke kader. De vraag is hoe producten die makkelijk na te
maken en te verdelen zijn, worden verkocht op een monopolistische markt met en
zonder bescherming tegen namaak. De implicaties van een theoretisch model worden
vergeleken met de uitkomsten van een economisch experiment. We observeren dat
kopers soms niet bereid zijn het goed aan de schaffen zelfs voor een prijs die theo-
retisch gezien wel voordelig zou moeten zijn. Rechtvaardigheidsoverwegingen lijken
hiervoor verantwoordelijk. Het gevolg is dat prijzen vaak lager zijn dan voorspeld.
Deze “vraagonthouding” hangt af van het wettelijke kader en heeft welvaartsimpli-
caties die niet overeenkomen met de theoretische voorspelling.     
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